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Re: [PATCH v10 0/3] Adds starting the idle domain privileged


  • To: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2022 08:15:12 +0200
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  • Cc: jandryuk@xxxxxxxxx, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 02 Aug 2022 06:15:26 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 01.08.2022 20:49, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> This series makes it so that the idle domain is started privileged under the
> default policy, which the SILO policy inherits, and under the flask policy. It
> then introduces a new one-way XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, that is hooked
> by an XSM policy to transition the idle domain to its running privilege level.
> 
> Patch 3 is an important one, as first it addresses the issue raised under an
> RFC late last year by Jason Andryuk regarding the awkward entanglement of
> flask_domain_alloc_security() and flask_domain_create(). Second, it helps
> articulate why it is that the hypervisor should go through the access control
> checks, even when it is doing the action itself. The issue at hand is not that
> the hypervisor could be influenced to go around these check. The issue is 
> these
> checks provides a configurable way to express the execution flow that the
> hypervisor should enforce. Specifically with this change, it is now possible
> for an owner of a dom0less or hyperlaunch system to express a policy where the
> hypervisor will enforce that no dom0 will be constructed, regardless of what
> boot construction details were provided to it. Likewise, an owner that does 
> not
> want to see dom0less or hyperlaunch to be used can enforce that the hypervisor
> will only construct a dom0 domain. This can all be accomplished without the
> need to rebuild the hypervisor with these features enabled or disabled.
> 
> Changes in v10:
> - rewrote patch 3 commit message
> - fixed typos in patch 3
> - reworked logic in flask_domain_create() to be simpler and not result in
>   changing the domain security struct before the access check fails
> 
> Changes in v9:
> - added missing Rb/Tb to patch 1
> - corrected the flask policy macro in patch 2 to allow domain create
> - added patch 3 to address allowing the hypervisor create more than 1 domain
> 
> Changes in v8:
> - adjusted panic messages in arm and x86 setup.c to be less than 80cols
> - fixed comment line that went over 80col
> - added line in patch #1 commit message to clarify the need is for domain
>   creation
> 
> Changes in v7:
> - adjusted error message in default and flask xsm_set_system_active hooks
> - merged panic messages in arm and x86 setup.c to a single line
> 
> Changes in v6:
> - readded the setting of is_privileged in flask_set_system_active()
> - clarified comment on is_privileged in flask_set_system_active()
> - added ASSERT on is_privileged and self_sid in flask_set_system_active()
> - fixed err code returned on Arm for xsm_set_system_active() panic message
> 
> Changes in v5:
> - dropped setting is_privileged in flask_set_system_active()
> - added err code returned by xsm_set_system_active() to panic message
> 
> Changes in v4:
> - reworded patch 1 commit messaged
> - fixed whitespace to coding style
> - fixed comment to coding style
> 
> Changes in v3:
> - renamed *_transition_running() to *_set_system_active()
> - changed the XSM hook set_system_active() from void to int return
> - added ASSERT check for the expected privilege level each XSM policy expected
> - replaced a check against is_privileged in each arch with checking the return
>   value from the call to xsm_set_system_active()
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - renamed flask_domain_runtime_security() to flask_transition_running()
> - added the missed assignment of self_sid
> 
> Daniel P. Smith (3):
>   xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
>   flask: implement xsm_set_system_active

Against what tree is this series? These two patches look to be in staging
already (and they have been there for almost a month), so if there are
incremental changes to make, please send incremental patches. Otherwise
please clarify whether ...

>   xsm: refactor flask sid alloc and domain check

... this change alone was meant to be (re)submitted.

Jan



 


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