[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] x86/spec-ctrl: Use IST RSB protection for !SVM systems
On 15.08.2022 11:33, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 15/08/2022 09:26, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 05.08.2022 12:38, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c >>> @@ -1327,8 +1327,24 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) >>> * mappings. >>> */ >>> if ( opt_rsb_hvm ) >>> + { >>> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM); >>> >>> + /* >>> + * For SVM, Xen's RSB safety actions are performed before STGI, so >>> + * behave atomically with respect to IST sources. >>> + * >>> + * For VT-x, NMIs are atomic with VMExit (the NMI gets queued but >>> not >>> + * delivered) whereas other IST sources are not atomic. >>> Specifically, >>> + * #MC can hit ahead the RSB safety action in the vmexit path. >>> + * >>> + * Therefore, it is necessary for the IST logic to protect Xen >>> against >>> + * possible rogue RSB speculation. >>> + */ >>> + if ( !cpu_has_svm ) >>> + default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_rsb; >> Only now, when I'm about to backport this, it occurs to me to ask: Why >> is this !cpu_has_svm rather than cpu_has_vmx? > > Because it is only SVM known to be safe. Yes. Which amounts to only VT-x being unsafe. And in particular PV alone (e.g. shim, from the perspective of the shim itself) is safe as well, no matter what CPU we're on. >> Plus shouldn't this further >> be gated upon HVM actually being in use (i.e. in particular CONFIG_HVM=y >> in the first place)? > > Perhaps, but not locally here. All of init_speculation_mitigations() > wants reconsidering if you're going down that route. Not sure - many of the settings (like X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM also being set in the enclosing if()) only affect HVM-specific code paths, so which way they are set wouldn't matter when !CONFIG_HVM. But the one here clearly affects a common code path, for no gains at all. It's not an overly hot code path, sure, but it still strikes me as odd. Jan
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