[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 4/4] x86: switch to cpu_feature_enabled() for X86_FEATURE_XENPV
On 03.11.22 14:19, Brian Gerst wrote: On Thu, Nov 3, 2022 at 8:37 AM Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> wrote:Convert the remaining cases of static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) and boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) to use cpu_feature_enabled(), allowing more efficient code in case the kernel is configured without CONFIG_XEN_PV. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/topology.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 860b60273df3..697fe881e967 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH); /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */ - if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS); /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index da7c361f47e0..7f78e1527c5e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } - if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) { + if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) { pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option); return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c index 21fd425088fe..1c27645fd429 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARAT); /* Hygon CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */ - if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS); check_null_seg_clears_base(c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index 6b3418bff326..e2f469175be8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static noinstr unsigned long __rdgsbase_inactive(void) lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); - if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) { + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) { native_swapgs(); gsbase = rdgsbase(); native_swapgs(); @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static noinstr void __wrgsbase_inactive(unsigned long gsbase) { lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); - if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) { + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) { native_swapgs(); wrgsbase(gsbase); native_swapgs(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c index 8617d1ed9d31..1b83377274b8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/topology.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int arch_register_cpu(int num) * Xen PV guests don't support CPU0 hotplug at all. */ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL || - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) + cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) cpu0_hotpluggable = 0; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c index 6c2f1b76a0b6..c83799753d44 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(unsigned int cpu) * On Xen PV, the GDT must be read-only because the hypervisor * requires it. */ - pgprot_t gdt_prot = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ? + pgprot_t gdt_prot = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ? PAGE_KERNEL_RO : PAGE_KERNEL; pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL; #endifThis is another case that can be removed because it's for 32-bit. Oh yes, indeed. Thanks for noticing. Juergen Attachment:
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