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[PATCH v2 4/5] x86: remove X86_FEATURE_XENPV usage in setup_cpu_entry_area()



Testing of X86_FEATURE_XENPV in setup_cpu_entry_area() can be removed,
as this code path is 32-bit only, and Xen PV guests are not supporting
32-bit mode.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
---
V2:
- new patch
---
 arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index 6c2f1b76a0b6..42cd96e7d733 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -138,17 +138,13 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(unsigned int cpu)
        pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL_RO;
 #else
        /*
-        * On native 32-bit systems, the GDT cannot be read-only because
+        * On 32-bit systems, the GDT cannot be read-only because
         * our double fault handler uses a task gate, and entering through
         * a task gate needs to change an available TSS to busy.  If the
         * GDT is read-only, that will triple fault.  The TSS cannot be
         * read-only because the CPU writes to it on task switches.
-        *
-        * On Xen PV, the GDT must be read-only because the hypervisor
-        * requires it.
         */
-       pgprot_t gdt_prot = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ?
-               PAGE_KERNEL_RO : PAGE_KERNEL;
+       pgprot_t gdt_prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
        pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
 #endif
 
-- 
2.35.3




 


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