[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [XTF-ARM] tests: Hypercall xen_version testing
On 16/12/2022 11:21, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > On 16.12.2022 10:30, Michal Orzel wrote: >> On 15/12/2022 16:48, Jan Beulich wrote: >>> On 15.12.2022 16:25, Michal Orzel wrote: >>>> --- /dev/null >>>> +++ b/tests/hyp-xen-version/main.c >>>> @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ >>>> +/** >>>> + * @file tests/hyp-xen-version/main.c >>>> + * @ref test-hyp-xen-version >>>> + * >>>> + * @page test-hyp-xen-version Hypercall xen_version >>>> + * >>>> + * Functional testing of xen_version hypercall. >>>> + * >>>> + * @see tests/hyp-xen-version/main.c >>>> + */ >>>> +#include <xtf.h> >>>> + >>>> +const char test_title[] = "Hypercall xen_version testing"; >>>> + >>>> +#define INVALID_CMD -1 >>>> + >>>> +void test_main(void) >>>> +{ >>>> + int ret; >>>> + >>>> + printk("Checking XENVER_version:\n"); >>>> + { >>>> + /* >>>> + * Version is returned directly in format: ((major << 16) | minor), >>>> + * so no need to check the return value for an error. >>>> + */ >>>> + ret = hypercall_xen_version(XENVER_version, NULL); >>>> + printk(" version: %u.%u\n", ret >> 16, ret & 0xFFFF); >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + printk("Checking XENVER_extraversion:\n"); >>>> + { >>>> + xen_extraversion_t xen_ev; >>>> + memset(&xen_ev, 0, sizeof(xen_ev)); >>>> + >>>> + ret = hypercall_xen_version(XENVER_extraversion, xen_ev); >>>> + if ( ret < 0 ) >>>> + return xtf_error("Error %d\n", ret); >>> >>> This, ... >>> >>>> + printk(" extraversion: %s\n", xen_ev); >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + printk("Checking XENVER_compile_info:\n"); >>>> + { >>>> + xen_compile_info_t xen_ci; >>>> + memset(&xen_ci, 0, sizeof(xen_ci)); >>>> + >>>> + ret = hypercall_xen_version(XENVER_compile_info, &xen_ci); >>>> + if ( ret < 0 ) >>>> + return xtf_error("Error %d\n", ret); >>> >>> ... this, and ... >>> >>>> + printk(" compiler: %s\n", xen_ci.compiler); >>>> + printk(" compile_by: %s\n", xen_ci.compile_by); >>>> + printk(" compile_domain: %s\n", xen_ci.compile_domain); >>>> + printk(" compile_date: %s\n", xen_ci.compile_date); >>>> + } >>>> + >>>> + printk("Checking XENVER_changeset:\n"); >>>> + { >>>> + xen_changeset_info_t xen_cs; >>>> + memset(&xen_cs, 0, sizeof(xen_cs)); >>>> + >>>> + ret = hypercall_xen_version(XENVER_changeset, &xen_cs); >>>> + if ( ret < 0 ) >>>> + return xtf_error("Error %d\n", ret); >>> >>> ... this can fail because of XSM denying access. (Others can of course >>> also fail for this reason, but here possible failure is kind of >>> "intended" - see the dummy xsm_xen_version() handling.) Therefore I >>> would like to suggest that you also special case getting back -EPERM, >>> resulting in e.g. just a warning instead of an error. >> When writing a test I did make sure to check xsm_xen_version *for the >> operations that I covered* >> and my understanding is as follows: >> For XENVER_version and XENVER_get_features, it returns 0 so deny is false. >> For other commands I test, xsm_default_action is called with XSM_HOOK which >> returns 0 as well. >> So AFAICT nothing can result in setting deny to true. >> But even in case of setting deny to true, it would just result in copying >> "<denied>" into >> the respective buffer. It would not alter the hypercall return value. > > For dummy itself all is fine; arrangements there suggest to me though > that the intention was that an actual Flask policy may be written such > that some of these might actually be refused. My recollection actually > is that when the distinction for the sub-ops was introduced, quite a > bit of discussion happened as to what may or may not be (optionally > or uniformly) be rejected. Ok but in any case, in the current xen_version implementation, it will just result in storing "<denied>". No -EPERM will be returned. So do you think it would make sense to add handling for it in the test even though it cannot be triggered? > > Jan ~Michal
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