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Re: [PATCH v5 5/7] xen/riscv: introduce trap_init()



On Wed, 2023-03-22 at 12:14 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
> 
> 
> On 22/03/2023 11:33, Oleksii wrote:
> > Hi Julien,
> 
> Hi Oleksii,
> 
> > 
> > On Tue, 2023-03-21 at 17:42 +0000, Julien Grall wrote:
> > > Hi Oleksii,
> > > 
> > > On 16/03/2023 14:39, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
> > > > Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
> > > > Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>
> > > > ---
> > > > Changes in V5:
> > > >     - Nothing changed
> > > > ---
> > > > Changes in V4:
> > > >     - Nothing changed
> > > > ---
> > > > Changes in V3:
> > > >     - Nothing changed
> > > > ---
> > > > Changes in V2:
> > > >     - Rename setup_trap_handler() to trap_init().
> > > >     - Add Reviewed-by to the commit message.
> > > > ---
> > > >    xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/traps.h | 1 +
> > > >    xen/arch/riscv/setup.c             | 5 +++++
> > > >    xen/arch/riscv/traps.c             | 7 +++++++
> > > >    3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/traps.h
> > > > b/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/traps.h
> > > > index f3fb6b25d1..f1879294ef 100644
> > > > --- a/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/traps.h
> > > > +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/traps.h
> > > > @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
> > > >    
> > > >    void do_trap(struct cpu_user_regs *cpu_regs);
> > > >    void handle_trap(void);
> > > > +void trap_init(void);
> > > >    
> > > >    #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> > > >    
> > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/setup.c b/xen/arch/riscv/setup.c
> > > > index 36556eb779..b44d105b5f 100644
> > > > --- a/xen/arch/riscv/setup.c
> > > > +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/setup.c
> > > > @@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
> > > >    #include <xen/kernel.h>
> > > >    
> > > >    #include <asm/boot-info.h>
> > > > +#include <asm/csr.h>
> > > >    #include <asm/early_printk.h>
> > > > +#include <asm/traps.h>
> > > >    
> > > >    /* Xen stack for bringing up the first CPU. */
> > > >    unsigned char __initdata cpu0_boot_stack[STACK_SIZE]
> > > > @@ -32,7 +34,10 @@ void __init noreturn start_xen(unsigned long
> > > > bootcpu_id,
> > > >    
> > > >        fill_boot_info();
> > > >    
> > > > +    trap_init();
> > > > +
> > > >        early_printk("All set up\n");
> > > > +
> > > >        for ( ;; )
> > > >            asm volatile ("wfi");
> > > >    
> > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c b/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c
> > > > index 8a1529e0c5..581f34efbc 100644
> > > > --- a/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c
> > > > +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/traps.c
> > > > @@ -13,6 +13,13 @@
> > > >    #include <asm/processor.h>
> > > >    #include <asm/traps.h>
> > > >    
> > > > +void trap_init(void)
> > > > +{
> > > > +    unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)&handle_trap;
> > > 
> > > It is not super clear to me whether this is going to store the
> > > virtual
> > > or physical address.
> > Actually it is going to store both the virtual and physical
> > address.
> > Depending on if MMU is enabled or not.
> 
> I think some comment in the code would be really good because this
> is...
> 
> > > 
> > > Depending on the answer, the next would be whether the value
> > > would
> > > still
> > > be valid after the MMU is turned on?
> > It would still be valid because for addr will be generated PC-
> > relative
> > address.
> 
> ... not clear to me what would guarantee that Xen is compiled with 
> -noPIE. Is the cmodel?
There is a patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/2785518800dce64fafb3096480a5ae4c4e026bcb.1678970065.git.oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx/
Which guarantees that Xen is complied with -noPIE.

The cmodel determines which software addressing mode is used, and,
therefore, what constraints are enforced on the linked program.

> 
> A suggestion for the top of the function:
> 
> "Initialize the trap handling. This is called twice (before and after
> the MMU)."
> 
> And for on top of 'addr', I would add:
> 
> "When the MMU is off, this will be a physical address otherwise it
> would 
> be a virtual address. This is guarantee because [fill the blank]".
Thanks for the recommendations.
I will take them into account.

~ Oleksii



 


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