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Re: [patch 22/37] arm64: smp: Switch to hotplug core state synchronization
- To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2023 10:15:48 +0200
- Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, x86@xxxxxxxxxx, David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>, Arjan van de Veen <arjan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Paul McKenney <paulmck@xxxxxxxxxx>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>, Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Paul Menzel <pmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <gpiccoli@xxxxxxxxxx>, Piotr Gorski <lucjan.lucjanov@xxxxxxxxx>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>, Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>, linux-arm-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Usama Arif <usama.arif@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Russell King <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>, Guo Ren <guoren@xxxxxxxxxx>, linux-csky@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, linux-mips@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Helge Deller <deller@xxxxxx>, linux-parisc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@xxxxxxxxxx>, Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxx>, linux-riscv@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Sabin Rapan <sabrapan@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Wed, 26 Apr 2023 08:16:03 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On Wed, Apr 26 2023 at 08:59, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 09:51:12PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> If not then it's just yet another way of DoS which is an "acceptable"
>> attack as it only affects availability but not confidentiality.
>
> Sure.
>
> My thinking is that this is an attack against the *integrity* of the guest
> (since the vCPU that gets unpasued may write to memory), and so it's
> potentially more than just a DoS.
>
> I only mention this because I'd like to account for that on arm64, and if
> other
> architectures also wanted to handle that it might make sense to have some
> common infrastructure to track whether CPUs are potentially still within the
> kernel.
Fair enough.
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