[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH 1/6] x86/boot: Rework dom0 feature configuration
Right now, dom0's feature configuration is split between between the common path and a dom0-specific one. This mostly is by accident, and causes some very subtle bugs. First, start by clearly defining init_dom0_cpuid_policy() to be the domain that Xen builds automatically. The late hwdom case is still constructed in a mostly normal way, with the control domain having full discretion over the CPU policy. Identifying this highlights a latent bug - the two halves of the MSR_ARCH_CAPS bodge are asymmetric with respect to the hardware domain. This means that shim, or a control-only dom0 sees the MSR_ARCH_CAPS CPUID bit but none of the MSR content. This in turn declares the hardware to be retpoline-safe by failing to advertise the {R,}RSBA bits appropriately. Restrict this logic to the hardware domain, although the special case will cease to exist shortly. For the CPUID Faulting adjustment, the comment in ctxt_switch_levelling() isn't actually relevant. Provide a better explanation. Move the recalculate_cpuid_policy() call outside of the dom0-cpuid= case. This is no change for now, but will become necessary shortly. Finally, place the second half of the MSR_ARCH_CAPS bodge after the recalculate_cpuid_policy() call. This is necessary to avoid transiently breaking the hardware domain's view while the handling is cleaned up. This special case will cease to exist shortly. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c index ef6a2d0d180a..5e7e19fbcda8 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c @@ -687,29 +687,6 @@ int init_domain_cpu_policy(struct domain *d) if ( !p ) return -ENOMEM; - /* See comment in ctxt_switch_levelling() */ - if ( !opt_dom0_cpuid_faulting && is_control_domain(d) && is_pv_domain(d) ) - p->platform_info.cpuid_faulting = false; - - /* - * Expose the "hardware speculation behaviour" bits of ARCH_CAPS to dom0, - * so dom0 can turn off workarounds as appropriate. Temporary, until the - * domain policy logic gains a better understanding of MSRs. - */ - if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && cpu_has_arch_caps ) - { - uint64_t val; - - rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, val); - - p->arch_caps.raw = val & - (ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL | ARCH_CAPS_RSBA | - ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | - ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO | - ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA | - ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO | ARCH_CAPS_PBRSB_NO); - } - d->arch.cpu_policy = p; recalculate_cpuid_policy(d); @@ -845,11 +822,15 @@ void recalculate_cpuid_policy(struct domain *d) p->extd.raw[0x19] = EMPTY_LEAF; } +/* + * Adjust the CPU policy for dom0. Really, this is "the domain Xen builds + * automatically on boot", and might not have the domid 0 (e.g. pvshim). + */ void __init init_dom0_cpuid_policy(struct domain *d) { struct cpu_policy *p = d->arch.cpuid; - /* dom0 can't migrate. Give it ITSC if available. */ + /* Dom0 doesn't migrate relative to Xen. Give it ITSC if available. */ if ( cpu_has_itsc ) p->extd.itsc = true; @@ -858,7 +839,7 @@ void __init init_dom0_cpuid_policy(struct domain *d) * so dom0 can turn off workarounds as appropriate. Temporary, until the * domain policy logic gains a better understanding of MSRs. */ - if ( cpu_has_arch_caps ) + if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && cpu_has_arch_caps ) p->feat.arch_caps = true; /* Apply dom0-cpuid= command line settings, if provided. */ @@ -876,8 +857,32 @@ void __init init_dom0_cpuid_policy(struct domain *d) } x86_cpu_featureset_to_policy(fs, p); + } + + /* + * PV Control domains used to require unfiltered CPUID. This was fixed in + * Xen 4.13, but there is an cmdline knob to restore the prior behaviour. + * + * If the domain is getting unfiltered CPUID, don't let the guest kernel + * play with CPUID faulting either, as Xen's CPUID path won't cope. + */ + if ( !opt_dom0_cpuid_faulting && is_control_domain(d) && is_pv_domain(d) ) + p->platform_info.cpuid_faulting = false; - recalculate_cpuid_policy(d); + recalculate_cpuid_policy(d); + + if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && cpu_has_arch_caps ) + { + uint64_t val; + + rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, val); + + p->arch_caps.raw = val & + (ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL | ARCH_CAPS_RSBA | + ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO | ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | + ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO | ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO | + ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO | ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAPS_RRSBA | + ARCH_CAPS_BHI_NO | ARCH_CAPS_PBRSB_NO); } } -- 2.30.2
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