[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/cpu-policy: Derive RSBA/RRSBA for guest policies
The RSBA bit, "RSB Alternative", means that the RSB may use alternative predictors when empty. From a practical point of view, this mean "Retpoline not safe". Enhanced IBRS (officially IBRS_ALL in Intel's docs, previously IBRS_ATT) is a statement that IBRS is implemented in hardware (as opposed to the form retrofitted to existing CPUs in microcode). The RRSBA bit, "Restricted-RSBA", is a combination of RSBA, and the eIBRS property that predictions are tagged with the mode in which they were learnt. Therefore, it means "when eIBRS is active, the RSB may fall back to alternative predictors but restricted to the current prediction mode". As such, it's stronger statement than RSBA, but still means "Retpoline not safe". CPUs are not expected to enumerate both RSBA and RRSBA. Add feature dependencies for EIBRS and RRSBA. While technically they're not linked, absolutely nothing good can of letting the guest see RRSBA without EIBRS. Nor can anything good come of a guest seeing EIBRS without IBRSB. Furthermore, we use this dependency to simplify the max derivation logic. The max policies gets RSBA and RRSBA unconditionally set (with the EIBRS dependency maybe hiding RRSBA). We can run any VM, even if it has been told "somewhere you might run, Retpoline isn't safe". The default policies are more complicated. A guest shouldn't see both bits, but it needs to see one if the current host suffers from any form of RSBA, and which bit it needs to see depends on whether eIBRS is visible or not. Therefore, the calculation must be performed after sanitise_featureset(). Finally, apply the same logic in recalculate_cpuid_policy(), as we do for other safety settings while we're still overhauling the toolstack logic in this area. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx> v2: * Expand/adjust the comment for the max features. * Rewrite the default feature derivation in light of new information. * Fix up in recalculate_cpuid_policy() too. --- xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++ xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 4 +- xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py | 5 +- 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c index ee256ff5a137..f3bcb1ea4101 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c @@ -423,8 +423,17 @@ static void __init guest_common_max_feature_adjustments(uint32_t *fs) * Retpoline not safe)", so these need to be visible to a guest in all * cases, even when it's only some other server in the pool which * suffers the identified behaviour. + * + * We can always run any VM which has previously (or will + * subsequently) run on hardware where Retpoline is not safe. + * Note: + * - The dependency logic may hide RRSBA for other reasons. + * - The max policy does not contitute a sensible configuration to + * run a guest in. */ __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS, fs); + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_RSBA, fs); + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA, fs); } } @@ -532,6 +541,21 @@ static void __init calculate_pv_def_policy(void) guest_common_default_feature_adjustments(fs); sanitise_featureset(fs); + + /* + * If the host suffers from RSBA of any form, and the guest can see + * MSR_ARCH_CAPS, reflect the appropriate RSBA/RRSBA property to the guest + * depending on the visibility of eIBRS. + */ + if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS, fs) && + (cpu_has_rsba || cpu_has_rrsba) ) + { + bool eibrs = test_bit(X86_FEATURE_EIBRS, fs); + + __set_bit(eibrs ? X86_FEATURE_RRSBA + : X86_FEATURE_RSBA, fs); + } + x86_cpu_featureset_to_policy(fs, p); recalculate_xstate(p); } @@ -664,6 +688,21 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void) __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD, fs); sanitise_featureset(fs); + + /* + * If the host suffers from RSBA of any form, and the guest can see + * MSR_ARCH_CAPS, reflect the appropriate RSBA/RRSBA property to the guest + * depending on the visibility of eIBRS. + */ + if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS, fs) && + (cpu_has_rsba || cpu_has_rrsba) ) + { + bool eibrs = test_bit(X86_FEATURE_EIBRS, fs); + + __set_bit(eibrs ? X86_FEATURE_RRSBA + : X86_FEATURE_RSBA, fs); + } + x86_cpu_featureset_to_policy(fs, p); recalculate_xstate(p); } @@ -786,6 +825,20 @@ void recalculate_cpuid_policy(struct domain *d) sanitise_featureset(fs); + /* + * If the host suffers from RSBA of any form, and the guest can see + * MSR_ARCH_CAPS, reflect the appropriate RSBA/RRSBA property to the guest + * depending on the visibility of eIBRS. + */ + if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS, fs) && + (cpu_has_rsba || cpu_has_rrsba) ) + { + bool eibrs = test_bit(X86_FEATURE_EIBRS, fs); + + __set_bit(eibrs ? X86_FEATURE_RRSBA + : X86_FEATURE_RSBA, fs); + } + /* Fold host's FDP_EXCP_ONLY and NO_FPU_SEL into guest's view. */ fs[FEATURESET_7b0] &= ~(cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FDP_EXCP_ONLY) | cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_NO_FPU_SEL)); diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h index 4edf9aba7ff6..a0e46138d763 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(CET_SSS, 15*32+18) /* CET Supervisor Shadow Stacks s /* Intel-defined CPU features, MSR_ARCH_CAPS 0x10a.eax, word 16 */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(RDCL_NO, 16*32+ 0) /*A No Rogue Data Cache Load (Meltdown) */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(EIBRS, 16*32+ 1) /*A Enhanced IBRS */ -XEN_CPUFEATURE(RSBA, 16*32+ 2) /*!A RSB Alternative (Retpoline not safe) */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(RSBA, 16*32+ 2) /*! RSB Alternative (Retpoline not safe) */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SKIP_L1DFL, 16*32+ 3) /* Don't need to flush L1D on VMEntry */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(INTEL_SSB_NO, 16*32+ 4) /*A No Speculative Store Bypass */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(MDS_NO, 16*32+ 5) /*A No Microarchitectural Data Sampling */ @@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(FBSDP_NO, 16*32+14) /*A No Fill Buffer Stale Data Prop XEN_CPUFEATURE(PSDP_NO, 16*32+15) /*A No Primary Stale Data Propagation */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(FB_CLEAR, 16*32+17) /*A Fill Buffers cleared by VERW */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(FB_CLEAR_CTRL, 16*32+18) /* MSR_OPT_CPU_CTRL.FB_CLEAR_DIS */ -XEN_CPUFEATURE(RRSBA, 16*32+19) /*!A Restricted RSB Alternative */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(RRSBA, 16*32+19) /*! Restricted RSB Alternative */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(BHI_NO, 16*32+20) /*A No Branch History Injection */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XAPIC_STATUS, 16*32+21) /* MSR_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(OVRCLK_STATUS, 16*32+23) /* MSR_OVERCLOCKING_STATUS */ diff --git a/xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py b/xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py index 973fcc1c64e8..72cf11654ba9 100755 --- a/xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py +++ b/xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ def crunch_numbers(state): # IBRSB/IBRS, and we pass this MSR directly to guests. Treating them # as dependent features simplifies Xen's logic, and prevents the guest # from seeing implausible configurations. - IBRSB: [STIBP, SSBD, INTEL_PSFD], + IBRSB: [STIBP, SSBD, INTEL_PSFD, EIBRS], IBRS: [AMD_STIBP, AMD_SSBD, PSFD, AUTO_IBRS, IBRS_ALWAYS, IBRS_FAST, IBRS_SAME_MODE], AMD_STIBP: [STIBP_ALWAYS], @@ -328,6 +328,9 @@ def crunch_numbers(state): # The ARCH_CAPS CPUID bit enumerates the availability of the whole register. ARCH_CAPS: list(range(RDCL_NO, RDCL_NO + 64)), + + # The behaviour described by RRSBA depend on eIBRS being active. + EIBRS: [RRSBA], } deep_features = tuple(sorted(deps.keys())) -- 2.30.2
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