[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v8 08/13] vpci/header: program p2m with guest BAR view
On 24.07.2023 15:16, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Mon, Jul 24, 2023 at 12:43:26PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 20.07.2023 02:32, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote: >>> @@ -52,8 +66,8 @@ static int cf_check map_range( >>> * - {un}map_mmio_regions doesn't support preemption. >>> */ >>> >>> - rc = map->map ? map_mmio_regions(map->d, _gfn(s), size, _mfn(s)) >>> - : unmap_mmio_regions(map->d, _gfn(s), size, _mfn(s)); >>> + rc = map->map ? map_mmio_regions(map->d, start_gfn, size, _mfn(s)) >>> + : unmap_mmio_regions(map->d, start_gfn, size, >>> _mfn(s)); >> >> Aiui this is the first direct exposure of these functions to DomU-s; > > I guess it depends on how direct you consider exposure from > XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping hypercall, as that's what gets called by > QEMU also in order to set up BAR mappings. Fair point - it is one of the few domctls not covered by XSA-77. >> so far all calls were Xen-internal or from a domctl. There are a >> couple of Arm TODOs listed in the comment ahead, but I'm not sure >> that's all what is lacking here, and it's unclear whether this can >> sensibly be left as a follow-on activity (at the very least known >> open issues need mentioning as TODOs). >> >> For example the x86 function truncates an unsigned long local >> variable to (signed) int in its main return statement. This may for >> the moment still be only a theoretical issue, but will need dealing >> with sooner or later, I think. > > One bit that we need to add is the iomem_access_permitted() plus the > xsm_iomem_mapping() checks to map_range(). The former would just be reassurance, wouldn't it? Assigning a PCI device surely implies granting access to all its BARs (minus the MSI-X page(s), if any). The latter would of course be more "interesting", as XSM could in principle interject. Jan
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