[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH v3 1/3] restrict concept of pIRQ to x86
... by way of a new arch-selectable Kconfig control. Note that some smaller pieces of code are left without #ifdef, to keep things better readable. Hence items like ECS_PIRQ, nr_static_irqs, or domain_pirq_to_irq() remain uniformly. As to XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission - this, despite having a uniformly available wrapper in libxc, is unused on Arm: libxl bypasses those calls, and the Python and OCamL bindings have no users at all. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> --- v3: Move #ifdef in xen/common/domctl.c around the entire sub-op. Re-base. v2: New. --- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc @@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ introduced with the Nehalem architecture intended as an emergency option for people who first chose fast, then change their minds to secure, and wish not to reboot.** -### extra_guest_irqs +### extra_guest_irqs (x86) > `= [<domU number>][,<dom0 number>]` > Default: `32,<variable>` --- a/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/irq.h +++ b/xen/arch/arm/include/asm/irq.h @@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ struct arch_irq_desc { extern const unsigned int nr_irqs; #define nr_static_irqs NR_IRQS -#define arch_hwdom_irqs(domid) NR_IRQS struct irq_desc; struct irqaction; --- a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ config X86 select HAS_PCI select HAS_PCI_MSI select HAS_PDX + select HAS_PIRQ select HAS_SCHED_GRANULARITY select HAS_UBSAN select HAS_VPCI if HVM --- a/xen/common/Kconfig +++ b/xen/common/Kconfig @@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ config HAS_KEXEC config HAS_PDX bool +config HAS_PIRQ + bool + config HAS_PMAP bool --- a/xen/common/domain.c +++ b/xen/common/domain.c @@ -350,6 +350,8 @@ static int late_hwdom_init(struct domain #endif } +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ + static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_hwdom_irqs; static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_domU_irqs = 32; @@ -364,6 +366,8 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_extra_g } custom_param("extra_guest_irqs", parse_extra_guest_irqs); +#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ */ + static int __init cf_check parse_dom0_param(const char *s) { const char *ss; @@ -682,6 +686,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t dom if ( is_system_domain(d) && !is_idle_domain(d) ) return d; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ if ( !is_idle_domain(d) ) { if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) ) @@ -693,6 +698,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t dom radix_tree_init(&d->pirq_tree); } +#endif if ( (err = arch_domain_create(d, config, flags)) != 0 ) goto fail; @@ -784,7 +790,9 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t dom { evtchn_destroy(d); evtchn_destroy_final(d); +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ radix_tree_destroy(&d->pirq_tree, free_pirq_struct); +#endif } if ( init_status & INIT_watchdog ) watchdog_domain_destroy(d); @@ -1180,7 +1188,9 @@ static void cf_check complete_domain_des evtchn_destroy_final(d); +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ radix_tree_destroy(&d->pirq_tree, free_pirq_struct); +#endif xfree(d->vcpu); @@ -1893,6 +1903,8 @@ long do_vm_assist(unsigned int cmd, unsi } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ + struct pirq *pirq_get_info(struct domain *d, int pirq) { struct pirq *info = pirq_info(d, pirq); @@ -1922,6 +1934,8 @@ void cf_check free_pirq_struct(void *ptr call_rcu(&pirq->rcu_head, _free_pirq_struct); } +#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ */ + struct migrate_info { long (*func)(void *data); void *data; --- a/xen/common/domctl.c +++ b/xen/common/domctl.c @@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe } break; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission: { unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq; @@ -667,6 +668,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq); break; } +#endif case XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission: { --- a/xen/common/event_channel.c +++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c @@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ static int evtchn_bind_ipi(evtchn_bind_i return rc; } +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ static void link_pirq_port(int port, struct evtchn *chn, struct vcpu *v) { @@ -592,9 +593,11 @@ static void unlink_pirq_port(struct evtc chn->u.pirq.prev_port; } +#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ */ static int evtchn_bind_pirq(evtchn_bind_pirq_t *bind) { +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ struct evtchn *chn; struct domain *d = current->domain; struct vcpu *v = d->vcpu[0]; @@ -664,6 +667,9 @@ static int evtchn_bind_pirq(evtchn_bind_ write_unlock(&d->event_lock); return rc; +#else /* !CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ */ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif } @@ -696,6 +702,7 @@ int evtchn_close(struct domain *d1, int case ECS_UNBOUND: break; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ case ECS_PIRQ: { struct pirq *pirq = pirq_info(d1, chn1->u.pirq.irq); @@ -705,14 +712,13 @@ int evtchn_close(struct domain *d1, int pirq_guest_unbind(d1, pirq); pirq->evtchn = 0; pirq_cleanup_check(pirq, d1); -#ifdef CONFIG_X86 if ( is_hvm_domain(d1) && domain_pirq_to_irq(d1, pirq->pirq) > 0 ) unmap_domain_pirq_emuirq(d1, pirq->pirq); -#endif } unlink_pirq_port(chn1, d1->vcpu[chn1->notify_vcpu_id]); break; } +#endif case ECS_VIRQ: { struct vcpu *v; @@ -1122,6 +1128,8 @@ int evtchn_bind_vcpu(evtchn_port_t port, case ECS_INTERDOMAIN: chn->notify_vcpu_id = v->vcpu_id; break; + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ case ECS_PIRQ: if ( chn->notify_vcpu_id == v->vcpu_id ) break; @@ -1131,6 +1139,8 @@ int evtchn_bind_vcpu(evtchn_port_t port, cpumask_of(v->processor)); link_pirq_port(port, chn, v); break; +#endif + default: rc = -EINVAL; break; --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h @@ -438,12 +438,14 @@ struct domain struct grant_table *grant_table; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ /* * Interrupt to event-channel mappings and other per-guest-pirq data. * Protected by the domain's event-channel spinlock. */ struct radix_tree_root pirq_tree; unsigned int nr_pirqs; +#endif unsigned int options; /* copy of createdomain flags */
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