[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 8/8] x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate the Zen1 DIV leakge
On Wed, Sep 13, 2023 at 6:09 PM Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > @@ -955,6 +960,40 @@ static void __init srso_calculations(bool hw_smt_enabled) > setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); > } > > +/* > + * Div leakage is specific to the AMD Zen1 microarchitecure. Use STIBP as a > + * heuristic to select between Zen1 and Zen2 uarches. > + */ > +static bool __init has_div_vuln(void) > +{ > + if ( !(boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & > + (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) ) > + return false; > + > + if ( (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17 && boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x18) || > + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP) ) > + return false; > + > + return true; > +} > + > +static void __init div_calculations(bool hw_smt_enabled) > +{ > + bool cpu_bug_div = has_div_vuln(); > + Would it make sense to add if ( !cpu_bug_div ) return ... > + if ( opt_div_scrub == -1 ) > + opt_div_scrub = cpu_bug_div; > + > + if ( opt_div_scrub ) > + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_DIV); ...so that div-scrub=1 isn't setting X86_FEATURE_SC_DIV on un-affected hardware? Or do you want to leave command line control in place in case it might be needed as a future workaround on other hardware? Thanks, Jason
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |