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[PATCH] x86/pvh: fix identity mapping of low 1MB


  • To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 17:37:56 +0200
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  • Cc: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 15:38:49 +0000
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

The mapping of memory regions below the 1MB mark was all done by the PVH dom0
builder code, thus completely avoiding that region in the arch-specific IOMMU
hardware domain initialization code.  That lead to the IOMMU being enabled
without reserved regions in the low 1MB identity mapped in the p2m for PVH
hardware domains.  Firmware with missing RMRR/IVMD ranges that would otherwise
be located in the low 1MB would transiently trigger IOMMU faults until the p2m
is populated by the PVH dom0 builder:

AMD-Vi: IO_PAGE_FAULT: 0000:00:13.1 d0 addr 00000000000eb380 flags 0x20 RW
AMD-Vi: IO_PAGE_FAULT: 0000:00:13.1 d0 addr 00000000000eb340 flags 0
AMD-Vi: IO_PAGE_FAULT: 0000:00:13.2 d0 addr 00000000000ea1c0 flags 0
AMD-Vi: IO_PAGE_FAULT: 0000:00:14.5 d0 addr 00000000000eb480 flags 0x20 RW
AMD-Vi: IO_PAGE_FAULT: 0000:00:12.0 d0 addr 00000000000eb080 flags 0x20 RW
AMD-Vi: IO_PAGE_FAULT: 0000:00:14.5 d0 addr 00000000000eb400 flags 0
AMD-Vi: IO_PAGE_FAULT: 0000:00:12.0 d0 addr 00000000000eb040 flags 0

Mostly remove the special handling of the low 1MB done by the PVH dom0 builder,
leaving just the data copy between RAM regions.  Otherwise rely on the IOMMU
arch init code to create any identity mappings for reserved regions in such
range (like it already does for all reserved regions).

Note there's a small difference in behavior, as holes in the low 1MB will no
longer be identity mapped to the p2m.

Fixes: 6b4f6a31ace1 ('x86/PVH: de-duplicate mappings for first Mb of Dom0 
memory')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c       | 22 ----------------------
 xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c |  8 +-------
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c
index bc0e290db612..979db7d1ec4d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/dom0_build.c
@@ -449,28 +449,6 @@ static int __init pvh_populate_p2m(struct domain *d)
         }
     }
 
-    /* Non-RAM regions of space below 1MB get identity mapped. */
-    for ( i = rc = 0; i < MB1_PAGES; ++i )
-    {
-        p2m_type_t p2mt;
-        mfn_t mfn = get_gfn_query(d, i, &p2mt);
-
-        if ( mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) )
-            rc = set_mmio_p2m_entry(d, _gfn(i), _mfn(i), PAGE_ORDER_4K);
-        else
-            /*
-             * If the p2m entry is already set it must belong to a RMRR and
-             * already be identity mapped, or be a RAM region.
-             */
-            ASSERT(p2mt == p2m_ram_rw || mfn_eq(mfn, _mfn(i)));
-        put_gfn(d, i);
-        if ( rc )
-        {
-            printk("Failed to identity map PFN %x: %d\n", i, rc);
-            return rc;
-        }
-    }
-
     if ( cpu_has_vmx && paging_mode_hap(d) && !vmx_unrestricted_guest(v) )
     {
         /*
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c 
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
index c85549ccad6e..857dccb6a465 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
@@ -400,13 +400,7 @@ void __hwdom_init arch_iommu_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
     max_pfn = (GB(4) >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1;
     top = max(max_pdx, pfn_to_pdx(max_pfn) + 1);
 
-    /*
-     * First Mb will get mapped in one go by pvh_populate_p2m(). Avoid
-     * setting up potentially conflicting mappings here.
-     */
-    start = paging_mode_translate(d) ? PFN_DOWN(MB(1)) : 0;
-
-    for ( i = pfn_to_pdx(start), count = 0; i < top; )
+    for ( i = 0, start = 0, count = 0; i < top; )
     {
         unsigned long pfn = pdx_to_pfn(i);
         unsigned int perms = hwdom_iommu_map(d, pfn, max_pfn);
-- 
2.42.0




 


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