[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/vPIT: check values loaded from state save record
In particular pit_latch_status() and speaker_ioport_read() perform calculations which assume in-bounds values. Several of the state save record fields can hold wider ranges, though. Refuse to load values which cannot result from normal operation, except mode, the init state of which (see also below) cannot otherwise be reached. Note that ->gate should only be possible to be zero for channel 2; enforce that as well. Adjust pit_reset()'s writing of ->mode as well, to not unduly affect the value pit_latch_status() may calculate. The chosen mode of 7 is still one which cannot be established by writing the control word. Note that with or without this adjustment effectively all switch() statements using mode as the control expression aren't quite right when the PIT is still in that init state; there is an apparent assumption that before these can sensibly be invoked, the guest would init the PIT (i.e. in particular set the mode). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> --- For mode we could refuse to load values in the [0x08,0xfe] range; I'm not certain that's going to be overly helpful. For count I was considering to clip the saved value to 16 bits (i.e. to convert the internally used 0x10000 back to the architectural 0x0000), but pit_save() doesn't easily lend itself to such a "fixup". If desired perhaps better a separate change anyway. --- v2: Introduce separate checking function; switch to refusing to load bogus values. Re-base. --- a/xen/arch/x86/emul-i8254.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/emul-i8254.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ #define RW_STATE_MSB 2 #define RW_STATE_WORD0 3 #define RW_STATE_WORD1 4 +#define RW_STATE_NUM 5 #define get_guest_time(v) \ (is_hvm_vcpu(v) ? hvm_get_guest_time(v) : (u64)get_s_time()) @@ -427,6 +428,47 @@ static int cf_check pit_save(struct vcpu return rc; } +static int cf_check pit_check(const struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) +{ + const struct hvm_hw_pit *hw; + unsigned int i; + + if ( !has_vpit(d) ) + return -ENODEV; + + hw = hvm_point_entry(PIT, h); + if ( !hw ) + return -ENODATA; + + /* + * Check to-be-loaded values are within valid range, for them to represent + * actually reachable state. Uses of some of the values elsewhere assume + * this is the case. Note that the channels' mode fields aren't checked; + * older Xen might save them as 0xff. + */ + if ( hw->speaker_data_on > 1 || hw->pad0 ) + return -EDOM; + + for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hw->channels); ++i ) + { + const struct hvm_hw_pit_channel *ch = &hw->channels[i]; + + if ( ch->count > 0x10000 || + ch->count_latched >= RW_STATE_NUM || + ch->read_state >= RW_STATE_NUM || + ch->write_state >= RW_STATE_NUM || + ch->rw_mode > RW_STATE_WORD0 || + ch->gate > 1 || + ch->bcd > 1 ) + return -EDOM; + + if ( i != 2 && !ch->gate ) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static int cf_check pit_load(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) { PITState *pit = domain_vpit(d); @@ -443,6 +485,14 @@ static int cf_check pit_load(struct doma goto out; } + for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pit->hw.channels); ++i ) + { + struct hvm_hw_pit_channel *ch = &pit->hw.channels[i]; + + if ( (ch->mode &= 7) > 5 ) + ch->mode -= 4; + } + /* * Recreate platform timers from hardware state. There will be some * time jitter here, but the wall-clock will have jumped massively, so @@ -458,7 +508,7 @@ static int cf_check pit_load(struct doma return rc; } -HVM_REGISTER_SAVE_RESTORE(PIT, pit_save, NULL, pit_load, 1, HVMSR_PER_DOM); +HVM_REGISTER_SAVE_RESTORE(PIT, pit_save, pit_check, pit_load, 1, HVMSR_PER_DOM); #endif /* The intercept action for PIT DM retval: 0--not handled; 1--handled. */ @@ -575,7 +625,7 @@ void pit_reset(struct domain *d) for ( i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { s = &pit->hw.channels[i]; - s->mode = 0xff; /* the init mode */ + s->mode = 7; /* the init mode */ s->gate = (i != 2); pit_load_count(pit, i, 0); }
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