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[PATCH v2 13/15] VMX: convert vmx_vmentry_control


  • To: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2023 09:42:50 +0100
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  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>, Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 24 Nov 2023 08:43:01 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

... to a field in the capability/controls struct.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
v2: New.

--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
@@ -162,7 +162,6 @@ static int cf_check parse_ept_param_runt
 
 /* Dynamic (run-time adjusted) execution control flags. */
 struct vmx_caps __ro_after_init vmx_caps;
-u32 vmx_vmentry_control __read_mostly;
 u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap __read_mostly;
 static uint64_t __read_mostly vmx_vmfunc;
 
@@ -237,7 +236,6 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(bool bsp
     struct vmx_caps caps;
     u64 _vmx_ept_vpid_cap = 0;
     u64 _vmx_misc_cap = 0;
-    u32 _vmx_vmentry_control;
     u64 _vmx_vmfunc = 0;
     bool mismatch = false;
 
@@ -448,7 +446,7 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(bool bsp
     min = 0;
     opt = (VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_EFER |
            VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS);
-    _vmx_vmentry_control = adjust_vmx_controls(
+    caps.vmentry_control = adjust_vmx_controls(
         "VMEntry Control", min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS, &mismatch);
 
     if ( mismatch )
@@ -459,7 +457,6 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(bool bsp
         /* First time through. */
         vmx_caps = caps;
         vmx_ept_vpid_cap           = _vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
-        vmx_vmentry_control        = _vmx_vmentry_control;
         vmx_caps.basic_msr = ((uint64_t)vmx_basic_msr_high << 32) |
                              vmx_basic_msr_low;
         vmx_vmfunc                 = _vmx_vmfunc;
@@ -496,7 +493,7 @@ static int vmx_init_vmcs_config(bool bsp
             vmx_caps.vmexit_control, caps.vmexit_control);
         mismatch |= cap_check(
             "VMEntry Control",
-            vmx_vmentry_control, _vmx_vmentry_control);
+            vmx_caps.vmentry_control, caps.vmentry_control);
         mismatch |= cap_check(
             "EPT and VPID Capability",
             vmx_ept_vpid_cap, _vmx_ept_vpid_cap);
@@ -1056,7 +1053,7 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v
 {
     struct domain *d = v->domain;
     uint32_t vmexit_ctl = vmx_caps.vmexit_control;
-    u32 vmentry_ctl = vmx_vmentry_control;
+    u32 vmentry_ctl = vmx_caps.vmentry_control;
     int rc = 0;
 
     vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
@@ -2160,7 +2157,6 @@ int __init vmx_vmcs_init(void)
          * Make sure all dependent features are off as well.
          */
         memset(&vmx_caps, 0, sizeof(vmx_caps));
-        vmx_vmentry_control        = 0;
         vmx_ept_vpid_cap           = 0;
         vmx_vmfunc                 = 0;
     }
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -233,7 +233,6 @@ void vmx_vmcs_reload(struct vcpu *v);
 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT         0x00004000
 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_EFER        0x00008000
 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS           0x00010000
-extern u32 vmx_vmentry_control;
 
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES 0x00000001U
 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT               0x00000002U
@@ -286,6 +285,7 @@ struct vmx_caps {
     uint32_t cpu_based_exec_control;
     uint32_t secondary_exec_control;
     uint32_t vmexit_control;
+    uint32_t vmentry_control;
 };
 extern struct vmx_caps vmx_caps;
 
@@ -312,9 +312,9 @@ extern struct vmx_caps vmx_caps;
 #define cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag \
     (vmx_caps.cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_pat \
-    (vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT)
+    (vmx_caps.vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_efer \
-    (vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_EFER)
+    (vmx_caps.vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_EFER)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest \
     (vmx_caps.secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST)
 #define vmx_unrestricted_guest(v)               \
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ extern struct vmx_caps vmx_caps;
     (vmx_caps.secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_mpx \
     ((vmx_caps.vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) && \
-     (vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
+     (vmx_caps.vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
 #define cpu_has_vmx_xsaves \
     (vmx_caps.secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling \




 


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