[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[RFC XEN PATCH v5 5/5] domctl: Add XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant gsi


  • To: <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 14:13:17 +0800
  • Arc-authentication-results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass (sender ip is 165.204.84.17) smtp.rcpttodomain=lists.xenproject.org smtp.mailfrom=amd.com; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine sp=quarantine pct=100) action=none header.from=amd.com; dkim=none (message not signed); arc=none (0)
  • Arc-message-signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-1; bh=PSkLYrAo95Wea4+HG7BuppVa+CyaaIyZn3k0KcMeVOM=; b=NOYXnsKZTXzIIz74DC0T5lnDjFihVFVAtbRky2/Uhns7psBfH2jRSqczHbgnqSqGKoCp9h9T3Xyq0zs/SmV5S9fVuaeOfU+m2Sl7GbQ7PbIImnXk5on31/xwdvU7HXo/VdvCW1zByxBUKKLtsODxoKthO9KAU63LiSGNy64TCMQfroG2jrGS6HFbBoNbQ/kMUU9Cac+5kj179yAbMvbVFtkJuupb6LE/EkGJUXwKXHbRPLwTizMiIWgVh6ajhZDxoUzijuS67eIVJZfgRMtqrmyub/J0J1Att2RM+jbTr1ygyglzfnJ8SXbASV6SF7PRo2GVzOPA5zfKMYpIAklwdg==
  • Arc-seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=VAVSCJYFwHIdovrr4N6QiUnWEu3KwFi6T00bg2NvFWRqV4HJw3H1gFE6DwMlKO8LSQoSIhqDmn785ehkTJpZGCpTic3wH0PHduOCENXs9wBmIOaaqoVI8O+9PUZNKOkVIWghiYuJofe/jc2D9hLPwB22ccWds8/ITfEh+7cFqk8TQwWkweQnDywpZ/2voofQ7Zkj0OdZipwvwAV9pIz/D4XNjMlexTjYfyVqcybTeSKErORSMrBS4qvsCetjNLomgr0VLOOUj6KBkXGSAZZADu+C6WOmcqm9DW4jNO3yQJ5O4Bbkhi27DRlifaCgUJQPV7cAsrwBoa5JtCod46HiYw==
  • Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, "Juergen Gross" <jgross@xxxxxxxx>, "Daniel P . Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stewart Hildebrand <Stewart.Hildebrand@xxxxxxx>, Huang Rui <Ray.Huang@xxxxxxx>, Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>, Huang Rui <ray.huang@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 06:15:29 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

Some type of domain don't have PIRQ, like PVH, when
passthrough a device to guest on PVH dom0, callstack
pci_add_dm_done->XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission will failed
at domain_pirq_to_irq.

So, add a new hypercall to grant/revoke gsi permission
when dom0 is not PV or dom0 has not PIRQ flag.

Co-developed-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>
---
 tools/include/xenctrl.h      |  5 +++++
 tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c  | 15 +++++++++++++++
 tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 xen/arch/x86/domctl.c        | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 xen/include/public/domctl.h  |  9 +++++++++
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c        |  1 +
 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/include/xenctrl.h
index 2ef8b4e05422..519c860a00d5 100644
--- a/tools/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -1382,6 +1382,11 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch,
                              uint32_t pirq,
                              bool allow_access);
 
+int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch,
+                             uint32_t domid,
+                             uint32_t gsi,
+                             bool allow_access);
+
 int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch,
                                uint32_t domid,
                                unsigned long first_mfn,
diff --git a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c
index f2d9d14b4d9f..448ba2c59ae1 100644
--- a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c
@@ -1394,6 +1394,21 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch,
     return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
 }
 
+int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch,
+                             uint32_t domid,
+                             uint32_t gsi,
+                             bool allow_access)
+{
+    struct xen_domctl domctl = {};
+
+    domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission;
+    domctl.domain = domid;
+    domctl.u.gsi_permission.gsi = gsi;
+    domctl.u.gsi_permission.allow_access = allow_access;
+
+    return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
+}
+
 int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch,
                                uint32_t domid,
                                unsigned long first_mfn,
diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
index a1c6e82631e9..4136a860a048 100644
--- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c
@@ -1421,6 +1421,8 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
     uint32_t flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED;
     uint32_t domainid = domid;
     bool isstubdom = libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, &domainid);
+    int gsi;
+    bool has_gsi = true;
 
     /* Convenience aliases */
     bool starting = pas->starting;
@@ -1482,6 +1484,7 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
                                 pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func);
 
     if ( access(sysfs_path, F_OK) != 0 ) {
+        has_gsi = false;
         if ( errno == ENOENT )
             sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain,
                                 pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func);
@@ -1497,6 +1500,7 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
         goto out_no_irq;
     }
     if ((fscanf(f, "%u", &irq) == 1) && irq) {
+        gsi = irq;
         r = xc_physdev_map_pirq(ctx->xch, domid, irq, &irq);
         if (r < 0) {
             LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "xc_physdev_map_pirq irq=%d (error=%d)",
@@ -1505,7 +1509,10 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc,
             rc = ERROR_FAIL;
             goto out;
         }
-        r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 1);
+        if ( has_gsi )
+            r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, 1);
+        if ( !has_gsi || r == -EOPNOTSUPP )
+            r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 1);
         if (r < 0) {
             LOGED(ERROR, domainid,
                   "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d (error=%d)", irq, r);
@@ -2185,6 +2192,7 @@ static void pci_remove_detached(libxl__egc *egc,
     FILE *f;
     uint32_t domainid = prs->domid;
     bool isstubdom;
+    bool has_gsi = true;
 
     /* Convenience aliases */
     libxl_device_pci *const pci = &prs->pci;
@@ -2244,6 +2252,7 @@ skip_bar:
                            pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func);
 
     if ( access(sysfs_path, F_OK) != 0 ) {
+        has_gsi = false;
         if ( errno == ENOENT )
             sysfs_path = GCSPRINTF(SYSFS_PCI_DEV"/"PCI_BDF"/irq", pci->domain,
                                 pci->bus, pci->dev, pci->func);
@@ -2270,7 +2279,10 @@ skip_bar:
              */
             LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_physdev_unmap_pirq irq=%d", irq);
         }
-        rc = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 0);
+        if ( has_gsi )
+            rc = xc_domain_gsi_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 0);
+        if ( !has_gsi || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP )
+            rc = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 0);
         if (rc < 0) {
             LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d", irq);
         }
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index 3c0ea8554107..75f23f511ac1 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -237,6 +237,37 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         break;
     }
 
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
+    {
+        unsigned int gsi = domctl->u.gsi_permission.gsi;
+        int allow = domctl->u.gsi_permission.allow_access;
+
+        if ( is_pv_domain(current->domain) || has_pirq(current->domain) )
+        {
+            ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ( gsi >= nr_irqs_gsi )
+        {
+            ret = -EINVAL;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, gsi) ||
+             xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, gsi, allow) )
+        {
+            ret = -EPERM;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ( allow )
+            ret = irq_permit_access(d, gsi);
+        else
+            ret = irq_deny_access(d, gsi);
+        break;
+    }
+
     case XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo3:
     {
         unsigned int num = domctl->u.getpageframeinfo3.num;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
index a33f9ec32b08..47e95f9ee824 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
@@ -447,6 +447,13 @@ struct xen_domctl_irq_permission {
 };
 
 
+/* XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission */
+struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission {
+    uint32_t gsi;
+    uint8_t allow_access;    /* flag to specify enable/disable of x86 gsi 
access */
+};
+
+
 /* XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission */
 struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission {
     uint64_aligned_t first_mfn;/* first page (physical page number) in range */
@@ -1277,6 +1284,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_vmtrace_op                    84
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_get_paging_mempool_size       85
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_set_paging_mempool_size       86
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission                87
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio            1000
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu             1001
 #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu           1002
@@ -1299,6 +1307,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
         struct xen_domctl_setdomainhandle   setdomainhandle;
         struct xen_domctl_setdebugging      setdebugging;
         struct xen_domctl_irq_permission    irq_permission;
+        struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission    gsi_permission;
         struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission  iomem_permission;
         struct xen_domctl_ioport_permission ioport_permission;
         struct xen_domctl_hypercall_init    hypercall_init;
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 78225f68c15c..376076865198 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int cmd)
     case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH
     /*
-- 
2.34.1




 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.