[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [XEN PATCH v3] xen/arm: ffa: reclaim shared memory on guest destroy


  • To: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Bertrand Marquis <Bertrand.Marquis@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 15:22:57 +0000
  • Accept-language: en-GB, en-US
  • Arc-authentication-results: i=2; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass (sender ip is 63.35.35.123) smtp.rcpttodomain=lists.xenproject.org smtp.mailfrom=arm.com; dmarc=pass (p=none sp=none pct=100) action=none header.from=arm.com; dkim=pass (signature was verified) header.d=armh.onmicrosoft.com; arc=pass (0 oda=1 ltdi=1 spf=[1,1,smtp.mailfrom=arm.com] dkim=[1,1,header.d=arm.com] dmarc=[1,1,header.from=arm.com])
  • Arc-authentication-results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=arm.com; dmarc=pass action=none header.from=arm.com; dkim=pass header.d=arm.com; arc=none
  • Arc-message-signature: i=2; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-1; bh=SRY6zly75qyZO3IoYXgvNPG6LAcRfIxsTT5sGoA2obE=; b=LiLb42WTlBuagCwuFGOZuOBfKCtw1frYVp843TYxdhTQFEA3yXxoWivhtE3Y4skeKvzZS3r+rzcG07JR9UTgKgSiJof0T+Sj9wC6QacxBnlcPlZzcXyOgl4tv8z/2d2MTa6iYZqsnlEvSscrQnduy6EPFRIWiwl3XHEG5NdqwOjidHCbU2DSbyNIRxK9DXjPcZdf0V6da++90IFGdNQ0xE11l8D++zQVzRQvfefzjTtZCT6jenoSOn5LqSkxB2IAg6wcrtCf/M+T5uAn78bXK8/kqtU81YdFPLalZgOWjTiBVKmJbW3NNkalcytopP8X13nG+aRLD0h0hr5zrLOKIQ==
  • Arc-message-signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-1; bh=SRY6zly75qyZO3IoYXgvNPG6LAcRfIxsTT5sGoA2obE=; b=EGvGpoqeKonxlkmw6huy/8VJQmxpZHsQIwTNJRsyxuPOKssu5Qyrp/oNxYJhCvGS3tsn/1UM6VX2YRd7BBykXti8gtKM9yGuUeJL58g9rve5T+zvVEyqgh4XkGq+oh4tkUVZm5eFHuPMXsllL3cgLVRlQOFmmaYodQcCpws1+6MkTVxp2hPlYGZ4HY7n4jQQWmTSx2vSlziz3VOZp2KEnt3OkPgGVmecoX1IpJK9dHg4KyxN1MTJFKlagwuke8gDAVbG7XuqmLJaHEF4ys0ab8jV3jCXvQJUxxL+M5Y40/qhDO+hGlAfC1jDRYxC5XqrFvt7a9EZ2z+FAD7KHmMXNA==
  • Arc-seal: i=2; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=pass; b=IzmbJT/857NLqZRFDxNSyToU4onC3MQZOfDMbhMz9OovFGeTSfvs1TZtzcF5UPw5MrnjVE7yNu37w1xGYpwSjTjxPwfNDd0LfbiR4dwQr4MJvwMYjEwcjrVa5aGAktHvwfT9/l2lJXgIiYD2kIRimMRS05a9Nh2dRheOm0junQ4fpdZCmoQ7gdSLxPN9qwXinbocFO1G5I55+2vWeVSfFaY6UM+MoIwz6jbC2KYSkJqH3GsAKk3peGjrQm5zhbyaLzaTO/YAkkXCBBcLsCeSiDkwT5L/3ad23X6VrlkPpxfweoZM52nZ7nUcBPxCPpmw+dFa+1uYuUBaVg+KfONiaQ==
  • Arc-seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=Y5mBjdptPFuBU5/awCjvxatSfiVj82ZuCk5dJBO9Bwvp57RwbtFBfQ7LbFEfSbz4IS3DkeljIagy3E5pwyy5AhNZS7OtyS0Hk7bAxfbwnrAdawOQxR0m8v67d5Dx1a5hDupoloxDSRdkJN3xJ6PdKtDT5L/p6q1nn/y4QWU27SlAURP3REJPUtT2PS2Cgqc7hi0uWarVlP8CBFAOR6mfikZ6PdHmFl/Cy2ni6SbmKS79IBPkOZEoOdysLnGRxWa+V6hHFCXHQ2LRaW1Ke9tl1lhbtpXz5eUCXbctjW37gqv3As5ePDf02HODsN2Do1gxvDnQBijWcoa34Pqk5YdNOw==
  • Authentication-results-original: dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;dmarc=none action=none header.from=arm.com;
  • Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "patches@xxxxxxxxxx" <patches@xxxxxxxxxx>, Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@xxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 05 Feb 2024 15:23:20 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
  • Nodisclaimer: true
  • Original-authentication-results: dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;dmarc=none action=none header.from=arm.com;
  • Thread-index: AQHaSTVKNVT0ywRTlE22Kr4Xf5r90LD1mryAgAZVM4CAAAv9AA==
  • Thread-topic: [XEN PATCH v3] xen/arm: ffa: reclaim shared memory on guest destroy

Hi Jens,

> On 5 Feb 2024, at 14:39, Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> Hi Bertrand,
> 
> On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 2:57 PM Bertrand Marquis
> <Bertrand.Marquis@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi Jens,
>> 
>>> On 17 Jan 2024, at 12:06, Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> 
>>> When an FF-A enabled guest is destroyed it may leave behind memory
>>> shared with SPs. This memory must be reclaimed before it's reused or an
>>> SP may make changes to memory used by a new unrelated guest. So when the
>>> domain is teared down add FF-A requests to reclaim all remaining shared
>>> memory.
>>> 
>>> SPs in the secure world are notified using VM_DESTROYED that a guest has
>>> been destroyed. An SP is supposed to relinquish all shared memory to allow
>>> reclaiming the memory. The relinquish operation may need to be delayed if
>>> the shared memory is for instance part of a DMA operation.
>>> 
>>> The domain reference counter is increased when the first FF-A shared
>>> memory is registered and the counter is decreased again when the last
>>> shared memory is reclaimed. If FF-A shared memory registrations remain
>>> at the end of of ffa_domain_teardown() a timer is set to try to reclaim
>>> the shared memory every second until the memory is reclaimed.
>>> 
>>> A few minor style fixes with a removed empty line here and an added new
>>> line there.
>>> 
>>> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> 
>>> v3:
>>> - Mentioning in the commit message that there are some style fixes
>>> - Addressing review comments
>>> - Refactor the ffa_domain_teardown() path to let
>>> ffa_domain_teardown_continue() do most of the work.
>>> 
>>> v2:
>>> - Update commit message to match the new implementation
>>> - Using a per domain bitfield to keep track of which SPs has been notified
>>> with VM_DESTROYED
>>> - Holding a domain reference counter to keep the domain as a zombie domain
>>> while there still is shared memory registrations remaining to be reclaimed
>>> - Using a timer to retry reclaiming remaining shared memory registrations
>>> ---
>>> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c | 253 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>>> 1 file changed, 204 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
>>> 
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c
>>> index 0793c1c7585d..80ebbf4f01c6 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c
>>> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
>>> #include <xen/mm.h>
>>> #include <xen/sched.h>
>>> #include <xen/sizes.h>
>>> +#include <xen/timer.h>
>>> #include <xen/types.h>
>>> 
>>> #include <asm/event.h>
>>> @@ -144,6 +145,12 @@
>>> */
>>> #define FFA_MAX_SHM_COUNT               32
>>> 
>>> +/*
>>> + * The time we wait until trying to tear down a domain again if it was
>>> + * blocked initially.
>>> + */
>>> +#define FFA_CTX_TEARDOWN_DELAY          SECONDS(1)
>>> +
>>> /* FF-A-1.1-REL0 section 10.9.2 Memory region handle, page 167 */
>>> #define FFA_HANDLE_HYP_FLAG             BIT(63, ULL)
>>> #define FFA_HANDLE_INVALID              0xffffffffffffffffULL
>>> @@ -384,11 +391,6 @@ struct ffa_ctx {
>>>    unsigned int page_count;
>>>    /* FF-A version used by the guest */
>>>    uint32_t guest_vers;
>>> -    /*
>>> -     * Number of SPs that we have sent a VM created signal to, used in
>>> -     * ffa_domain_teardown() to know which SPs need to be signalled.
>>> -     */
>>> -    uint16_t create_signal_count;
>>>    bool rx_is_free;
>>>    /* Used shared memory objects, struct ffa_shm_mem */
>>>    struct list_head shm_list;
>>> @@ -402,6 +404,15 @@ struct ffa_ctx {
>>>    spinlock_t tx_lock;
>>>    spinlock_t rx_lock;
>>>    spinlock_t lock;
>>> +    /* Used if domain can't be torn down immediately */
>>> +    struct domain *teardown_d;
>>> +    struct list_head teardown_list;
>>> +    s_time_t teardown_expire;
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * Used for ffa_domain_teardown() to keep track of which SPs should be
>>> +     * notified that this guest is being destroyed.
>>> +     */
>>> +    unsigned long vm_destroy_bitmap[];
>>> };
>>> 
>>> struct ffa_shm_mem {
>>> @@ -436,6 +447,12 @@ static void *ffa_tx __read_mostly;
>>> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ffa_rx_buffer_lock);
>>> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ffa_tx_buffer_lock);
>>> 
>>> +
>>> +/* Used to track domains that could not be torn down immediately. */
>>> +static struct timer ffa_teardown_timer;
>>> +static struct list_head ffa_teardown_head;
>>> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> +
>>> static bool ffa_get_version(uint32_t *vers)
>>> {
>>>    const struct arm_smccc_1_2_regs arg = {
>>> @@ -853,7 +870,6 @@ static int32_t handle_partition_info_get(uint32_t w1, 
>>> uint32_t w2, uint32_t w3,
>>>            goto out_rx_release;
>>>        }
>>> 
>>> -
>>>        memcpy(ctx->rx, ffa_rx, sz);
>>>    }
>>>    ctx->rx_is_free = false;
>>> @@ -992,53 +1008,75 @@ static void put_shm_pages(struct ffa_shm_mem *shm)
>>>    }
>>> }
>>> 
>>> -static bool inc_ctx_shm_count(struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
>>> +static bool inc_ctx_shm_count(struct domain *d, struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
>>> {
>>>    bool ret = true;
>>> 
>>>    spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
>>> +
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * If this is the first shm added, increase the domain reference
>>> +     * counter as we need to keep domain around a bit longer to reclaim the
>>> +     * shared memory in the teardown path.
>>> +     */
>>> +    if ( !ctx->shm_count )
>>> +        get_knownalive_domain(d);
>>> +
>>>    if (ctx->shm_count >= FFA_MAX_SHM_COUNT)
>>>        ret = false;
>>>    else
>>>        ctx->shm_count++;
>>> +
>>>    spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
>>> 
>>>    return ret;
>>> }
>>> 
>>> -static void dec_ctx_shm_count(struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
>>> +static void dec_ctx_shm_count(struct domain *d, struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
>>> {
>>>    spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
>>> +
>>>    ASSERT(ctx->shm_count > 0);
>>>    ctx->shm_count--;
>>> +
>>> +    /*
>>> +     * If this was the last shm removed, let go of the domain reference we
>>> +     * took in inc_ctx_shm_count() above.
>>> +     */
>>> +    if ( !ctx->shm_count )
>>> +        put_domain(d);
>>> +
>>>    spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
>>> }
>>> 
>>> -static struct ffa_shm_mem *alloc_ffa_shm_mem(struct ffa_ctx *ctx,
>>> +static struct ffa_shm_mem *alloc_ffa_shm_mem(struct domain *d,
>>>                                             unsigned int page_count)
>>> {
>>> +    struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>>    struct ffa_shm_mem *shm;
>>> 
>>>    if ( page_count >= FFA_MAX_SHM_PAGE_COUNT )
>>>        return NULL;
>>> -    if ( !inc_ctx_shm_count(ctx) )
>>> +    if ( !inc_ctx_shm_count(d, ctx) )
>>>        return NULL;
>>> 
>>>    shm = xzalloc_flex_struct(struct ffa_shm_mem, pages, page_count);
>>>    if ( shm )
>>>        shm->page_count = page_count;
>>>    else
>>> -        dec_ctx_shm_count(ctx);
>>> +        dec_ctx_shm_count(d, ctx);
>>> 
>>>    return shm;
>>> }
>>> 
>>> -static void free_ffa_shm_mem(struct ffa_ctx *ctx, struct ffa_shm_mem *shm)
>>> +static void free_ffa_shm_mem(struct domain *d, struct ffa_shm_mem *shm)
>>> {
>>> +    struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>> +
>>>    if ( !shm )
>>>        return;
>>> 
>>> -    dec_ctx_shm_count(ctx);
>>> +    dec_ctx_shm_count(d, ctx);
>>>    put_shm_pages(shm);
>>>    xfree(shm);
>>> }
>>> @@ -1306,7 +1344,7 @@ static void handle_mem_share(struct cpu_user_regs 
>>> *regs)
>>>        goto out_unlock;
>>>    }
>>> 
>>> -    shm = alloc_ffa_shm_mem(ctx, page_count);
>>> +    shm = alloc_ffa_shm_mem(d, page_count);
>>>    if ( !shm )
>>>    {
>>>        ret = FFA_RET_NO_MEMORY;
>>> @@ -1350,7 +1388,7 @@ static void handle_mem_share(struct cpu_user_regs 
>>> *regs)
>>> 
>>> out:
>>>    if ( ret )
>>> -        free_ffa_shm_mem(ctx, shm);
>>> +        free_ffa_shm_mem(d, shm);
>>> out_unlock:
>>>    spin_unlock(&ctx->tx_lock);
>>> 
>>> @@ -1401,7 +1439,7 @@ static int handle_mem_reclaim(uint64_t handle, 
>>> uint32_t flags)
>>>    }
>>>    else
>>>    {
>>> -        free_ffa_shm_mem(ctx, shm);
>>> +        free_ffa_shm_mem(d, shm);
>>>    }
>>> 
>>>    return ret;
>>> @@ -1486,6 +1524,41 @@ static bool ffa_handle_call(struct cpu_user_regs 
>>> *regs)
>>>    }
>>> }
>>> 
>>> +static bool is_in_subscr_list(const uint16_t *subscr, uint16_t start,
>>> +                              uint16_t end, uint16_t sp_id)
>>> +{
>>> +    unsigned int n;
>>> +
>>> +    for ( n = start; n < end; n++ )
>>> +    {
>>> +        if ( subscr[n] == sp_id )
>>> +            return true;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    return false;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static void vm_destroy_bitmap_init(struct ffa_ctx *ctx,
>>> +                                   unsigned int create_signal_count)
>>> +{
>>> +    unsigned int n;
>>> +
>>> +    for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_destroyed_count; n++ )
>>> +    {
>>> +        /*
>>> +         * Skip SPs subscribed to the VM created event that never was
>>> +         * notified of the VM creation due to an error during
>>> +         * ffa_domain_init().
>>> +         */
>>> +        if ( is_in_subscr_list(subscr_vm_created, create_signal_count,
>>> +                               subscr_vm_created_count,
>>> +                               subscr_vm_destroyed[n]) )
>>> +            continue;
>>> +
>>> +        set_bit(n, ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap);
>>> +    }
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> static int ffa_domain_init(struct domain *d)
>>> {
>>>    struct ffa_ctx *ctx;
>>> @@ -1501,11 +1574,14 @@ static int ffa_domain_init(struct domain *d)
>>>    if ( d->domain_id >= UINT16_MAX)
>>>        return -ERANGE;
>>> 
>>> -    ctx = xzalloc(struct ffa_ctx);
>>> +    ctx = xzalloc_flex_struct(struct ffa_ctx, vm_destroy_bitmap,
>>> +                              BITS_TO_LONGS(subscr_vm_destroyed_count));
>>>    if ( !ctx )
>>>        return -ENOMEM;
>>> 
>>>    d->arch.tee = ctx;
>>> +    ctx->teardown_d = d;
>>> +    INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->shm_list);
>>> 
>>>    for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_created_count; n++ )
>>>    {
>>> @@ -1515,65 +1591,141 @@ static int ffa_domain_init(struct domain *d)
>>>        {
>>>            printk(XENLOG_ERR "ffa: Failed to report creation of vm_id %u to 
>>>  %u: res %d\n",
>>>                   get_vm_id(d), subscr_vm_created[n], res);
>>> -            ctx->create_signal_count = n;
>>> -            return -EIO;
>>> +            break;
>>>        }
>>>    }
>>> -    ctx->create_signal_count = subscr_vm_created_count;
>>> -
>>> -    INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->shm_list);
>>> +    vm_destroy_bitmap_init(ctx, n);
>>> +    if ( n != subscr_vm_created_count )
>>> +        return -EIO;
>>> 
>>>    return 0;
>>> }
>>> 
>>> -static bool is_in_subscr_list(const uint16_t *subscr, uint16_t start,
>>> -                              uint16_t end, uint16_t sp_id)
>>> +static void send_vm_destroyed(struct domain *d)
>>> {
>>> +    struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>>    unsigned int n;
>>> +    int32_t res;
>>> 
>>> -    for ( n = start; n < end; n++ )
>>> +    for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_destroyed_count; n++ )
>>>    {
>>> -        if ( subscr[n] == sp_id )
>>> -            return true;
>>> -    }
>>> +        if ( !test_bit(n, ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap) )
>>> +            continue;
>>> 
>>> -    return false;
>>> +        res = ffa_direct_req_send_vm(subscr_vm_destroyed[n], get_vm_id(d),
>>> +                                     FFA_MSG_SEND_VM_DESTROYED);
>>> +
>> 
>> I think here we should dinstinguish cases depending on the error received:
>> - retry: we should keep the bit set and retry later
>> - other: unset the bit as there is not much we can do but log it.
> 
> Makes sense.
> 
>> 
>> The interrupted case can happen, we handle that already in the direct message
>> request but we will get back here if that does not work after some retries so
>> putting it in the other category is ok i think.
> 
> In the case of FFA_MSG_SEND_VM_DESTROYED is think it makes more sense
> to also retry FFA_RET_INTERRUPTED later. To me it seems that there
> will be an even better chance for an eventual non-secure interrupt to
> be handled if wait a little before retrying. So, if you don't mind,
> I'll skip clearing the bit below for both FFA_RET_INTERRUPTED and
> FFA_RET_RETRY.

I agree.

Cheers
Bertrand

> 
>> 
>>> +        if ( res )
>>> +        {
>>> +            printk(XENLOG_ERR "%pd: ffa: Failed to report destruction of 
>>> vm_id %u to %u: res %d\n",
>>> +                   d, get_vm_id(d), subscr_vm_destroyed[n], res);
>>> +        }
>>> +        else
>>> +        {
>>> +            clear_bit(n, ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap);
>>> +        }
>>> +    }
>>> }
>>> 
>>> -/* This function is supposed to undo what ffa_domain_init() has done */
>>> -static int ffa_domain_teardown(struct domain *d)
>>> +static void reclaim_shms(struct domain *d)
>>> {
>>>    struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>> -    unsigned int n;
>>> +    struct ffa_shm_mem *shm, *tmp;
>>>    int32_t res;
>>> 
>>> -    if ( !ctx )
>>> -        return 0;
>>> +    list_for_each_entry_safe(shm, tmp, &ctx->shm_list, list)
>>> +    {
>>> +        register_t handle_hi;
>>> +        register_t handle_lo;
>>> 
>>> -    for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_destroyed_count; n++ )
>>> +        uint64_to_regpair(&handle_hi, &handle_lo, shm->handle);
>>> +        res = ffa_mem_reclaim(handle_lo, handle_hi, 0);
>> 
>> Same here as for the VM_DESTROYED, there are some error code that we should
>> not reiterate on as they will also fail next time:
>> - invalid parameters: stop and log an error, this will always fail
>> - no memory: for now I would say do the same as invalid parameter with a 
>> comment
>> maybe because we could retry and memory coud be available next time
>> - abort: stop and log an error, this is a major fault on the other side
>> - denied: retry.
> 
> I agree, I'll propose something like that in the v4.
> 
>> 
>>> +        if ( res )
>>> +        {
>>> +            printk(XENLOG_G_INFO "%pd: ffa: Failed to reclaim handle %#lx 
>>> : %d\n",
>>> +                   d, shm->handle, res);
>>> +        }
>>> +        else
>>> +        {
>>> +            printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG "%pd: ffa: Reclaimed handle %#lx\n",
>>> +                   d, shm->handle);
>>> +            list_del(&shm->list);
>>> +            free_ffa_shm_mem(d, shm);
>>> +        }
>>> +    }
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static void ffa_domain_teardown_continue(struct ffa_ctx *ctx, bool 
>>> first_time)
>>> +{
>>> +    struct ffa_ctx *next_ctx = NULL;
>>> +
>>> +    send_vm_destroyed(ctx->teardown_d);
>>> +    reclaim_shms(ctx->teardown_d);
>>> +
>>> +    if ( ctx->shm_count )
>>> +    {
>> 
>> If i do understand right you only retry if there are remaining SHM to 
>> reclaim but what
>> if you have destroy messages that were not sent successfully, shouldn't we 
>> reiterate
>> in that case to send the destroy message again ?
> 
> I agree, I'll fix.
> 
> Cheers,
> Jens
> 
>> 
>>> +        printk(XENLOG_G_INFO "%pd: ffa: Remaining unclaimed handles, 
>>> retrying\n", ctx->teardown_d);
>>> +
>>> +        ctx->teardown_expire = NOW() + FFA_CTX_TEARDOWN_DELAY;
>>> +
>>> +        spin_lock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> +        list_add_tail(&ctx->teardown_list, &ffa_teardown_head);
>>> +        /* Need to set a new timer for the next ctx in line */
>>> +        next_ctx = list_first_entry(&ffa_teardown_head, struct ffa_ctx,
>>> +                                    teardown_list);
>>> +        spin_unlock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> +    }
>>> +    else
>>>    {
>>>        /*
>>> -         * Skip SPs subscribed to the VM created event that never was
>>> -         * notified of the VM creation due to an error during
>>> -         * ffa_domain_init().
>>> +         * domain_destroy() might have been called (via put_domain() in
>>> +         * reclaim_shms()), so we can't touch the domain structure anymore.
>>>         */
>>> -        if ( is_in_subscr_list(subscr_vm_created, ctx->create_signal_count,
>>> -                               subscr_vm_created_count,
>>> -                               subscr_vm_destroyed[n]) )
>>> -            continue;
>>> +        xfree(ctx);
>>> 
>>> -        res = ffa_direct_req_send_vm(subscr_vm_destroyed[n], get_vm_id(d),
>>> -                                     FFA_MSG_SEND_VM_DESTROYED);
>>> -
>>> -        if ( res )
>>> -            printk(XENLOG_ERR "ffa: Failed to report destruction of vm_id 
>>> %u to  %u: res %d\n",
>>> -                   get_vm_id(d), subscr_vm_destroyed[n], res);
>>> +        /* Only check if there has been a change to the teardown queue */
>>> +        if ( !first_time )
>>> +        {
>>> +            spin_lock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> +            next_ctx = list_first_entry_or_null(&ffa_teardown_head,
>>> +                                                struct ffa_ctx, 
>>> teardown_list);
>>> +            spin_unlock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> +        }
>>>    }
>>> 
>>> +    if ( next_ctx )
>>> +        set_timer(&ffa_teardown_timer, next_ctx->teardown_expire);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static void ffa_teardown_timer_callback(void *arg)
>>> +{
>>> +    struct ffa_ctx *ctx;
>>> +
>>> +    spin_lock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> +    ctx = list_first_entry_or_null(&ffa_teardown_head, struct ffa_ctx,
>>> +                                   teardown_list);
>>> +    if ( ctx )
>>> +        list_del(&ctx->teardown_list);
>>> +    spin_unlock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> +
>>> +    if ( ctx )
>>> +        ffa_domain_teardown_continue(ctx, false /* !first_time */);
>>> +    else
>>> +        printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%s: teardown list is empty\n", __func__);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +/* This function is supposed to undo what ffa_domain_init() has done */
>>> +static int ffa_domain_teardown(struct domain *d)
>>> +{
>>> +    struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>> +
>>> +    if ( !ctx )
>>> +        return 0;
>>> +
>>>    if ( ctx->rx )
>>>        rxtx_unmap(ctx);
>>> 
>>> -    XFREE(d->arch.tee);
>>> +    ffa_domain_teardown_continue(ctx, true /* first_time */);
>>> 
>>>    return 0;
>>> }
>>> @@ -1739,6 +1891,9 @@ static bool ffa_probe(void)
>>>    if ( !init_sps() )
>>>        goto err_free_ffa_tx;
>>> 
>>> +    INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ffa_teardown_head);
>>> +    init_timer(&ffa_teardown_timer, ffa_teardown_timer_callback, NULL, 0);
>>> +
>>>    return true;
>>> 
>>> err_free_ffa_tx:
>>> --
>>> 2.34.1
>>> 
>> 
>> Regards
>> Bertrand



 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.