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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [XEN PATCH v3] xen/arm: ffa: reclaim shared memory on guest destroy
Hi Jens,
> On 5 Feb 2024, at 14:39, Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi Bertrand,
>
> On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 2:57 PM Bertrand Marquis
> <Bertrand.Marquis@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Jens,
>>
>>> On 17 Jan 2024, at 12:06, Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>> When an FF-A enabled guest is destroyed it may leave behind memory
>>> shared with SPs. This memory must be reclaimed before it's reused or an
>>> SP may make changes to memory used by a new unrelated guest. So when the
>>> domain is teared down add FF-A requests to reclaim all remaining shared
>>> memory.
>>>
>>> SPs in the secure world are notified using VM_DESTROYED that a guest has
>>> been destroyed. An SP is supposed to relinquish all shared memory to allow
>>> reclaiming the memory. The relinquish operation may need to be delayed if
>>> the shared memory is for instance part of a DMA operation.
>>>
>>> The domain reference counter is increased when the first FF-A shared
>>> memory is registered and the counter is decreased again when the last
>>> shared memory is reclaimed. If FF-A shared memory registrations remain
>>> at the end of of ffa_domain_teardown() a timer is set to try to reclaim
>>> the shared memory every second until the memory is reclaimed.
>>>
>>> A few minor style fixes with a removed empty line here and an added new
>>> line there.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> v3:
>>> - Mentioning in the commit message that there are some style fixes
>>> - Addressing review comments
>>> - Refactor the ffa_domain_teardown() path to let
>>> ffa_domain_teardown_continue() do most of the work.
>>>
>>> v2:
>>> - Update commit message to match the new implementation
>>> - Using a per domain bitfield to keep track of which SPs has been notified
>>> with VM_DESTROYED
>>> - Holding a domain reference counter to keep the domain as a zombie domain
>>> while there still is shared memory registrations remaining to be reclaimed
>>> - Using a timer to retry reclaiming remaining shared memory registrations
>>> ---
>>> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c | 253 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>>> 1 file changed, 204 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c
>>> index 0793c1c7585d..80ebbf4f01c6 100644
>>> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c
>>> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
>>> #include <xen/mm.h>
>>> #include <xen/sched.h>
>>> #include <xen/sizes.h>
>>> +#include <xen/timer.h>
>>> #include <xen/types.h>
>>>
>>> #include <asm/event.h>
>>> @@ -144,6 +145,12 @@
>>> */
>>> #define FFA_MAX_SHM_COUNT 32
>>>
>>> +/*
>>> + * The time we wait until trying to tear down a domain again if it was
>>> + * blocked initially.
>>> + */
>>> +#define FFA_CTX_TEARDOWN_DELAY SECONDS(1)
>>> +
>>> /* FF-A-1.1-REL0 section 10.9.2 Memory region handle, page 167 */
>>> #define FFA_HANDLE_HYP_FLAG BIT(63, ULL)
>>> #define FFA_HANDLE_INVALID 0xffffffffffffffffULL
>>> @@ -384,11 +391,6 @@ struct ffa_ctx {
>>> unsigned int page_count;
>>> /* FF-A version used by the guest */
>>> uint32_t guest_vers;
>>> - /*
>>> - * Number of SPs that we have sent a VM created signal to, used in
>>> - * ffa_domain_teardown() to know which SPs need to be signalled.
>>> - */
>>> - uint16_t create_signal_count;
>>> bool rx_is_free;
>>> /* Used shared memory objects, struct ffa_shm_mem */
>>> struct list_head shm_list;
>>> @@ -402,6 +404,15 @@ struct ffa_ctx {
>>> spinlock_t tx_lock;
>>> spinlock_t rx_lock;
>>> spinlock_t lock;
>>> + /* Used if domain can't be torn down immediately */
>>> + struct domain *teardown_d;
>>> + struct list_head teardown_list;
>>> + s_time_t teardown_expire;
>>> + /*
>>> + * Used for ffa_domain_teardown() to keep track of which SPs should be
>>> + * notified that this guest is being destroyed.
>>> + */
>>> + unsigned long vm_destroy_bitmap[];
>>> };
>>>
>>> struct ffa_shm_mem {
>>> @@ -436,6 +447,12 @@ static void *ffa_tx __read_mostly;
>>> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ffa_rx_buffer_lock);
>>> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ffa_tx_buffer_lock);
>>>
>>> +
>>> +/* Used to track domains that could not be torn down immediately. */
>>> +static struct timer ffa_teardown_timer;
>>> +static struct list_head ffa_teardown_head;
>>> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> +
>>> static bool ffa_get_version(uint32_t *vers)
>>> {
>>> const struct arm_smccc_1_2_regs arg = {
>>> @@ -853,7 +870,6 @@ static int32_t handle_partition_info_get(uint32_t w1,
>>> uint32_t w2, uint32_t w3,
>>> goto out_rx_release;
>>> }
>>>
>>> -
>>> memcpy(ctx->rx, ffa_rx, sz);
>>> }
>>> ctx->rx_is_free = false;
>>> @@ -992,53 +1008,75 @@ static void put_shm_pages(struct ffa_shm_mem *shm)
>>> }
>>> }
>>>
>>> -static bool inc_ctx_shm_count(struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
>>> +static bool inc_ctx_shm_count(struct domain *d, struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
>>> {
>>> bool ret = true;
>>>
>>> spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * If this is the first shm added, increase the domain reference
>>> + * counter as we need to keep domain around a bit longer to reclaim the
>>> + * shared memory in the teardown path.
>>> + */
>>> + if ( !ctx->shm_count )
>>> + get_knownalive_domain(d);
>>> +
>>> if (ctx->shm_count >= FFA_MAX_SHM_COUNT)
>>> ret = false;
>>> else
>>> ctx->shm_count++;
>>> +
>>> spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
>>>
>>> return ret;
>>> }
>>>
>>> -static void dec_ctx_shm_count(struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
>>> +static void dec_ctx_shm_count(struct domain *d, struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
>>> {
>>> spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
>>> +
>>> ASSERT(ctx->shm_count > 0);
>>> ctx->shm_count--;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * If this was the last shm removed, let go of the domain reference we
>>> + * took in inc_ctx_shm_count() above.
>>> + */
>>> + if ( !ctx->shm_count )
>>> + put_domain(d);
>>> +
>>> spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
>>> }
>>>
>>> -static struct ffa_shm_mem *alloc_ffa_shm_mem(struct ffa_ctx *ctx,
>>> +static struct ffa_shm_mem *alloc_ffa_shm_mem(struct domain *d,
>>> unsigned int page_count)
>>> {
>>> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>> struct ffa_shm_mem *shm;
>>>
>>> if ( page_count >= FFA_MAX_SHM_PAGE_COUNT )
>>> return NULL;
>>> - if ( !inc_ctx_shm_count(ctx) )
>>> + if ( !inc_ctx_shm_count(d, ctx) )
>>> return NULL;
>>>
>>> shm = xzalloc_flex_struct(struct ffa_shm_mem, pages, page_count);
>>> if ( shm )
>>> shm->page_count = page_count;
>>> else
>>> - dec_ctx_shm_count(ctx);
>>> + dec_ctx_shm_count(d, ctx);
>>>
>>> return shm;
>>> }
>>>
>>> -static void free_ffa_shm_mem(struct ffa_ctx *ctx, struct ffa_shm_mem *shm)
>>> +static void free_ffa_shm_mem(struct domain *d, struct ffa_shm_mem *shm)
>>> {
>>> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>> +
>>> if ( !shm )
>>> return;
>>>
>>> - dec_ctx_shm_count(ctx);
>>> + dec_ctx_shm_count(d, ctx);
>>> put_shm_pages(shm);
>>> xfree(shm);
>>> }
>>> @@ -1306,7 +1344,7 @@ static void handle_mem_share(struct cpu_user_regs
>>> *regs)
>>> goto out_unlock;
>>> }
>>>
>>> - shm = alloc_ffa_shm_mem(ctx, page_count);
>>> + shm = alloc_ffa_shm_mem(d, page_count);
>>> if ( !shm )
>>> {
>>> ret = FFA_RET_NO_MEMORY;
>>> @@ -1350,7 +1388,7 @@ static void handle_mem_share(struct cpu_user_regs
>>> *regs)
>>>
>>> out:
>>> if ( ret )
>>> - free_ffa_shm_mem(ctx, shm);
>>> + free_ffa_shm_mem(d, shm);
>>> out_unlock:
>>> spin_unlock(&ctx->tx_lock);
>>>
>>> @@ -1401,7 +1439,7 @@ static int handle_mem_reclaim(uint64_t handle,
>>> uint32_t flags)
>>> }
>>> else
>>> {
>>> - free_ffa_shm_mem(ctx, shm);
>>> + free_ffa_shm_mem(d, shm);
>>> }
>>>
>>> return ret;
>>> @@ -1486,6 +1524,41 @@ static bool ffa_handle_call(struct cpu_user_regs
>>> *regs)
>>> }
>>> }
>>>
>>> +static bool is_in_subscr_list(const uint16_t *subscr, uint16_t start,
>>> + uint16_t end, uint16_t sp_id)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned int n;
>>> +
>>> + for ( n = start; n < end; n++ )
>>> + {
>>> + if ( subscr[n] == sp_id )
>>> + return true;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + return false;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static void vm_destroy_bitmap_init(struct ffa_ctx *ctx,
>>> + unsigned int create_signal_count)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned int n;
>>> +
>>> + for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_destroyed_count; n++ )
>>> + {
>>> + /*
>>> + * Skip SPs subscribed to the VM created event that never was
>>> + * notified of the VM creation due to an error during
>>> + * ffa_domain_init().
>>> + */
>>> + if ( is_in_subscr_list(subscr_vm_created, create_signal_count,
>>> + subscr_vm_created_count,
>>> + subscr_vm_destroyed[n]) )
>>> + continue;
>>> +
>>> + set_bit(n, ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap);
>>> + }
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> static int ffa_domain_init(struct domain *d)
>>> {
>>> struct ffa_ctx *ctx;
>>> @@ -1501,11 +1574,14 @@ static int ffa_domain_init(struct domain *d)
>>> if ( d->domain_id >= UINT16_MAX)
>>> return -ERANGE;
>>>
>>> - ctx = xzalloc(struct ffa_ctx);
>>> + ctx = xzalloc_flex_struct(struct ffa_ctx, vm_destroy_bitmap,
>>> + BITS_TO_LONGS(subscr_vm_destroyed_count));
>>> if ( !ctx )
>>> return -ENOMEM;
>>>
>>> d->arch.tee = ctx;
>>> + ctx->teardown_d = d;
>>> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->shm_list);
>>>
>>> for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_created_count; n++ )
>>> {
>>> @@ -1515,65 +1591,141 @@ static int ffa_domain_init(struct domain *d)
>>> {
>>> printk(XENLOG_ERR "ffa: Failed to report creation of vm_id %u to
>>> %u: res %d\n",
>>> get_vm_id(d), subscr_vm_created[n], res);
>>> - ctx->create_signal_count = n;
>>> - return -EIO;
>>> + break;
>>> }
>>> }
>>> - ctx->create_signal_count = subscr_vm_created_count;
>>> -
>>> - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->shm_list);
>>> + vm_destroy_bitmap_init(ctx, n);
>>> + if ( n != subscr_vm_created_count )
>>> + return -EIO;
>>>
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> -static bool is_in_subscr_list(const uint16_t *subscr, uint16_t start,
>>> - uint16_t end, uint16_t sp_id)
>>> +static void send_vm_destroyed(struct domain *d)
>>> {
>>> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>> unsigned int n;
>>> + int32_t res;
>>>
>>> - for ( n = start; n < end; n++ )
>>> + for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_destroyed_count; n++ )
>>> {
>>> - if ( subscr[n] == sp_id )
>>> - return true;
>>> - }
>>> + if ( !test_bit(n, ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap) )
>>> + continue;
>>>
>>> - return false;
>>> + res = ffa_direct_req_send_vm(subscr_vm_destroyed[n], get_vm_id(d),
>>> + FFA_MSG_SEND_VM_DESTROYED);
>>> +
>>
>> I think here we should dinstinguish cases depending on the error received:
>> - retry: we should keep the bit set and retry later
>> - other: unset the bit as there is not much we can do but log it.
>
> Makes sense.
>
>>
>> The interrupted case can happen, we handle that already in the direct message
>> request but we will get back here if that does not work after some retries so
>> putting it in the other category is ok i think.
>
> In the case of FFA_MSG_SEND_VM_DESTROYED is think it makes more sense
> to also retry FFA_RET_INTERRUPTED later. To me it seems that there
> will be an even better chance for an eventual non-secure interrupt to
> be handled if wait a little before retrying. So, if you don't mind,
> I'll skip clearing the bit below for both FFA_RET_INTERRUPTED and
> FFA_RET_RETRY.
I agree.
Cheers
Bertrand
>
>>
>>> + if ( res )
>>> + {
>>> + printk(XENLOG_ERR "%pd: ffa: Failed to report destruction of
>>> vm_id %u to %u: res %d\n",
>>> + d, get_vm_id(d), subscr_vm_destroyed[n], res);
>>> + }
>>> + else
>>> + {
>>> + clear_bit(n, ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap);
>>> + }
>>> + }
>>> }
>>>
>>> -/* This function is supposed to undo what ffa_domain_init() has done */
>>> -static int ffa_domain_teardown(struct domain *d)
>>> +static void reclaim_shms(struct domain *d)
>>> {
>>> struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>> - unsigned int n;
>>> + struct ffa_shm_mem *shm, *tmp;
>>> int32_t res;
>>>
>>> - if ( !ctx )
>>> - return 0;
>>> + list_for_each_entry_safe(shm, tmp, &ctx->shm_list, list)
>>> + {
>>> + register_t handle_hi;
>>> + register_t handle_lo;
>>>
>>> - for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_destroyed_count; n++ )
>>> + uint64_to_regpair(&handle_hi, &handle_lo, shm->handle);
>>> + res = ffa_mem_reclaim(handle_lo, handle_hi, 0);
>>
>> Same here as for the VM_DESTROYED, there are some error code that we should
>> not reiterate on as they will also fail next time:
>> - invalid parameters: stop and log an error, this will always fail
>> - no memory: for now I would say do the same as invalid parameter with a
>> comment
>> maybe because we could retry and memory coud be available next time
>> - abort: stop and log an error, this is a major fault on the other side
>> - denied: retry.
>
> I agree, I'll propose something like that in the v4.
>
>>
>>> + if ( res )
>>> + {
>>> + printk(XENLOG_G_INFO "%pd: ffa: Failed to reclaim handle %#lx
>>> : %d\n",
>>> + d, shm->handle, res);
>>> + }
>>> + else
>>> + {
>>> + printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG "%pd: ffa: Reclaimed handle %#lx\n",
>>> + d, shm->handle);
>>> + list_del(&shm->list);
>>> + free_ffa_shm_mem(d, shm);
>>> + }
>>> + }
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static void ffa_domain_teardown_continue(struct ffa_ctx *ctx, bool
>>> first_time)
>>> +{
>>> + struct ffa_ctx *next_ctx = NULL;
>>> +
>>> + send_vm_destroyed(ctx->teardown_d);
>>> + reclaim_shms(ctx->teardown_d);
>>> +
>>> + if ( ctx->shm_count )
>>> + {
>>
>> If i do understand right you only retry if there are remaining SHM to
>> reclaim but what
>> if you have destroy messages that were not sent successfully, shouldn't we
>> reiterate
>> in that case to send the destroy message again ?
>
> I agree, I'll fix.
>
> Cheers,
> Jens
>
>>
>>> + printk(XENLOG_G_INFO "%pd: ffa: Remaining unclaimed handles,
>>> retrying\n", ctx->teardown_d);
>>> +
>>> + ctx->teardown_expire = NOW() + FFA_CTX_TEARDOWN_DELAY;
>>> +
>>> + spin_lock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> + list_add_tail(&ctx->teardown_list, &ffa_teardown_head);
>>> + /* Need to set a new timer for the next ctx in line */
>>> + next_ctx = list_first_entry(&ffa_teardown_head, struct ffa_ctx,
>>> + teardown_list);
>>> + spin_unlock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> + }
>>> + else
>>> {
>>> /*
>>> - * Skip SPs subscribed to the VM created event that never was
>>> - * notified of the VM creation due to an error during
>>> - * ffa_domain_init().
>>> + * domain_destroy() might have been called (via put_domain() in
>>> + * reclaim_shms()), so we can't touch the domain structure anymore.
>>> */
>>> - if ( is_in_subscr_list(subscr_vm_created, ctx->create_signal_count,
>>> - subscr_vm_created_count,
>>> - subscr_vm_destroyed[n]) )
>>> - continue;
>>> + xfree(ctx);
>>>
>>> - res = ffa_direct_req_send_vm(subscr_vm_destroyed[n], get_vm_id(d),
>>> - FFA_MSG_SEND_VM_DESTROYED);
>>> -
>>> - if ( res )
>>> - printk(XENLOG_ERR "ffa: Failed to report destruction of vm_id
>>> %u to %u: res %d\n",
>>> - get_vm_id(d), subscr_vm_destroyed[n], res);
>>> + /* Only check if there has been a change to the teardown queue */
>>> + if ( !first_time )
>>> + {
>>> + spin_lock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> + next_ctx = list_first_entry_or_null(&ffa_teardown_head,
>>> + struct ffa_ctx,
>>> teardown_list);
>>> + spin_unlock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> + }
>>> }
>>>
>>> + if ( next_ctx )
>>> + set_timer(&ffa_teardown_timer, next_ctx->teardown_expire);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static void ffa_teardown_timer_callback(void *arg)
>>> +{
>>> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx;
>>> +
>>> + spin_lock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> + ctx = list_first_entry_or_null(&ffa_teardown_head, struct ffa_ctx,
>>> + teardown_list);
>>> + if ( ctx )
>>> + list_del(&ctx->teardown_list);
>>> + spin_unlock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
>>> +
>>> + if ( ctx )
>>> + ffa_domain_teardown_continue(ctx, false /* !first_time */);
>>> + else
>>> + printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%s: teardown list is empty\n", __func__);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +/* This function is supposed to undo what ffa_domain_init() has done */
>>> +static int ffa_domain_teardown(struct domain *d)
>>> +{
>>> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
>>> +
>>> + if ( !ctx )
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> if ( ctx->rx )
>>> rxtx_unmap(ctx);
>>>
>>> - XFREE(d->arch.tee);
>>> + ffa_domain_teardown_continue(ctx, true /* first_time */);
>>>
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>> @@ -1739,6 +1891,9 @@ static bool ffa_probe(void)
>>> if ( !init_sps() )
>>> goto err_free_ffa_tx;
>>>
>>> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ffa_teardown_head);
>>> + init_timer(&ffa_teardown_timer, ffa_teardown_timer_callback, NULL, 0);
>>> +
>>> return true;
>>>
>>> err_free_ffa_tx:
>>> --
>>> 2.34.1
>>>
>>
>> Regards
>> Bertrand
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