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Re: [PATCH] x86/altp2m: p2m_altp2m_get_or_propagate() should honor ap2m->default_access


  • To: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 15:00:35 +0100
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  • Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxx>, Petr Beneš <w1benny@xxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 08 Feb 2024 14:00:47 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 08.02.2024 14:45, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 8, 2024 at 2:46 AM Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> On 08.02.2024 05:32, George Dunlap wrote:
>>> Er, ok, just one more comment: this could allow an altp2m to have more
>>> permissions than the host; for example, the host p2m entry could be
>>> p2m_access_r, but if the altp2m's default_access were p2m_access_rw,
>>> it would override that.  Is that the behavior we want?  Or do we want
>>> to do some sort of intersection of permissions?
>>>
>>> If the former, I'd propose the comment be adjusted thus:
> 
> No intersection of permissions please, that needlessly complicates
> things and makes it hard to reason about the state of a view where
> default permissions are used. No need to force a specific type of
> usecase here where the hostp2m's permissions are special just cause we
> say so. No, the permissions in the hostp2m should not have more weight
> then the specifically requested default permission.
> 
>>>
>>>  * If the entry is invalid, and the host entry was valid, propagate
>>>  * the host's entry to the altp2m, retaining page order but using the
>>>  * altp2m's default_access, and indicate that the caller should re-try
>>>  * the faulting instruction.
>>
>> I find it highly questionable that such blind overriding should be taking
>> place.
> 
> It's not blind overriding, it's the requested default permission set
> for a view where no entry was present before. It is the expected
> behavior. It would be way harder to design applications with this
> feature if it was special cased and it would take different
> permissions based on what permission is set in another view.

But the default can be only one specific value: How do you make sure that
R/O, R/X, and R/W mappings all retain their respective restrictions in the
alternative view? To not over-restrict permissions, the default would then
need to be RWX, yet then all mappings will have full permission. What am I
missing?

Jan



 


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