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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [XEN PATCH v4] xen/arm: ffa: reclaim shared memory on guest destroy
Hi Jens,
> On 5 Feb 2024, at 16:49, Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> When an FF-A enabled guest is destroyed it may leave behind memory
> shared with SPs. This memory must be reclaimed before it's reused or an
> SP may make changes to memory used by a new unrelated guest. So when the
> domain is teared down add FF-A requests to reclaim all remaining shared
> memory.
>
> SPs in the secure world are notified using VM_DESTROYED that a guest has
> been destroyed. An SP is supposed to relinquish all shared memory to allow
> reclaiming the memory. The relinquish operation may need to be delayed if
> the shared memory is for instance part of a DMA operation.
>
> The domain reference counter is increased when the first FF-A shared
> memory is registered and the counter is decreased again when the last
> shared memory is reclaimed. If FF-A shared memory registrations remain
> at the end of of ffa_domain_teardown() a timer is set to try to reclaim
> the shared memory every second until the memory is reclaimed.
>
> A few minor style fixes with a removed empty line here and an added new
> line there.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@xxxxxxxxxx>
>From my point of view all looks good now so with the changes requested
by Andrew handled, feel free to add my R-b in the v5:
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>
Cheers
Bertrand
> ---
>
> v4:
> - Retry FFA_MSG_SEND_VM_DESTROYED on the returned errors
> FFA_RET_INTERRUPTED and FFA_RET_RETRY even after all shared memory
> handles has been reclaimed.
> - Retry ffa_mem_reclaim() only on temporary returned errors, permanent
> errors like FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS is dealt with in recovery mode
> instead since the SPMC isn't expected to use that error under normal
> circumstances.
>
> v3:
> - Mentioning in the commit message that there are some style fixes
> - Addressing review comments
> - Refactor the ffa_domain_teardown() path to let
> ffa_domain_teardown_continue() do most of the work.
>
> v2:
> - Update commit message to match the new implementation
> - Using a per domain bitfield to keep track of which SPs has been notified
> with VM_DESTROYED
> - Holding a domain reference counter to keep the domain as a zombie domain
> while there still is shared memory registrations remaining to be reclaimed
> - Using a timer to retry reclaiming remaining shared memory registrations
> ---
> xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c | 285 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 236 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c
> index 0793c1c7585d..bbb6b819ee2b 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa.c
> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
> #include <xen/mm.h>
> #include <xen/sched.h>
> #include <xen/sizes.h>
> +#include <xen/timer.h>
> #include <xen/types.h>
>
> #include <asm/event.h>
> @@ -144,6 +145,12 @@
> */
> #define FFA_MAX_SHM_COUNT 32
>
> +/*
> + * The time we wait until trying to tear down a domain again if it was
> + * blocked initially.
> + */
> +#define FFA_CTX_TEARDOWN_DELAY SECONDS(1)
> +
> /* FF-A-1.1-REL0 section 10.9.2 Memory region handle, page 167 */
> #define FFA_HANDLE_HYP_FLAG BIT(63, ULL)
> #define FFA_HANDLE_INVALID 0xffffffffffffffffULL
> @@ -384,11 +391,6 @@ struct ffa_ctx {
> unsigned int page_count;
> /* FF-A version used by the guest */
> uint32_t guest_vers;
> - /*
> - * Number of SPs that we have sent a VM created signal to, used in
> - * ffa_domain_teardown() to know which SPs need to be signalled.
> - */
> - uint16_t create_signal_count;
> bool rx_is_free;
> /* Used shared memory objects, struct ffa_shm_mem */
> struct list_head shm_list;
> @@ -402,6 +404,15 @@ struct ffa_ctx {
> spinlock_t tx_lock;
> spinlock_t rx_lock;
> spinlock_t lock;
> + /* Used if domain can't be torn down immediately */
> + struct domain *teardown_d;
> + struct list_head teardown_list;
> + s_time_t teardown_expire;
> + /*
> + * Used for ffa_domain_teardown() to keep track of which SPs should be
> + * notified that this guest is being destroyed.
> + */
> + unsigned long vm_destroy_bitmap[];
> };
>
> struct ffa_shm_mem {
> @@ -436,6 +447,12 @@ static void *ffa_tx __read_mostly;
> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ffa_rx_buffer_lock);
> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ffa_tx_buffer_lock);
>
> +
> +/* Used to track domains that could not be torn down immediately. */
> +static struct timer ffa_teardown_timer;
> +static struct list_head ffa_teardown_head;
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ffa_teardown_lock);
> +
> static bool ffa_get_version(uint32_t *vers)
> {
> const struct arm_smccc_1_2_regs arg = {
> @@ -853,7 +870,6 @@ static int32_t handle_partition_info_get(uint32_t w1,
> uint32_t w2, uint32_t w3,
> goto out_rx_release;
> }
>
> -
> memcpy(ctx->rx, ffa_rx, sz);
> }
> ctx->rx_is_free = false;
> @@ -992,53 +1008,75 @@ static void put_shm_pages(struct ffa_shm_mem *shm)
> }
> }
>
> -static bool inc_ctx_shm_count(struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
> +static bool inc_ctx_shm_count(struct domain *d, struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
> {
> bool ret = true;
>
> spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
> +
> + /*
> + * If this is the first shm added, increase the domain reference
> + * counter as we need to keep domain around a bit longer to reclaim the
> + * shared memory in the teardown path.
> + */
> + if ( !ctx->shm_count )
> + get_knownalive_domain(d);
> +
> if (ctx->shm_count >= FFA_MAX_SHM_COUNT)
> ret = false;
> else
> ctx->shm_count++;
> +
> spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
>
> return ret;
> }
>
> -static void dec_ctx_shm_count(struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
> +static void dec_ctx_shm_count(struct domain *d, struct ffa_ctx *ctx)
> {
> spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
> +
> ASSERT(ctx->shm_count > 0);
> ctx->shm_count--;
> +
> + /*
> + * If this was the last shm removed, let go of the domain reference we
> + * took in inc_ctx_shm_count() above.
> + */
> + if ( !ctx->shm_count )
> + put_domain(d);
> +
> spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
> }
>
> -static struct ffa_shm_mem *alloc_ffa_shm_mem(struct ffa_ctx *ctx,
> +static struct ffa_shm_mem *alloc_ffa_shm_mem(struct domain *d,
> unsigned int page_count)
> {
> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
> struct ffa_shm_mem *shm;
>
> if ( page_count >= FFA_MAX_SHM_PAGE_COUNT )
> return NULL;
> - if ( !inc_ctx_shm_count(ctx) )
> + if ( !inc_ctx_shm_count(d, ctx) )
> return NULL;
>
> shm = xzalloc_flex_struct(struct ffa_shm_mem, pages, page_count);
> if ( shm )
> shm->page_count = page_count;
> else
> - dec_ctx_shm_count(ctx);
> + dec_ctx_shm_count(d, ctx);
>
> return shm;
> }
>
> -static void free_ffa_shm_mem(struct ffa_ctx *ctx, struct ffa_shm_mem *shm)
> +static void free_ffa_shm_mem(struct domain *d, struct ffa_shm_mem *shm)
> {
> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
> +
> if ( !shm )
> return;
>
> - dec_ctx_shm_count(ctx);
> + dec_ctx_shm_count(d, ctx);
> put_shm_pages(shm);
> xfree(shm);
> }
> @@ -1306,7 +1344,7 @@ static void handle_mem_share(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> goto out_unlock;
> }
>
> - shm = alloc_ffa_shm_mem(ctx, page_count);
> + shm = alloc_ffa_shm_mem(d, page_count);
> if ( !shm )
> {
> ret = FFA_RET_NO_MEMORY;
> @@ -1350,7 +1388,7 @@ static void handle_mem_share(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>
> out:
> if ( ret )
> - free_ffa_shm_mem(ctx, shm);
> + free_ffa_shm_mem(d, shm);
> out_unlock:
> spin_unlock(&ctx->tx_lock);
>
> @@ -1401,7 +1439,7 @@ static int handle_mem_reclaim(uint64_t handle, uint32_t
> flags)
> }
> else
> {
> - free_ffa_shm_mem(ctx, shm);
> + free_ffa_shm_mem(d, shm);
> }
>
> return ret;
> @@ -1486,6 +1524,41 @@ static bool ffa_handle_call(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> }
> }
>
> +static bool is_in_subscr_list(const uint16_t *subscr, uint16_t start,
> + uint16_t end, uint16_t sp_id)
> +{
> + unsigned int n;
> +
> + for ( n = start; n < end; n++ )
> + {
> + if ( subscr[n] == sp_id )
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static void vm_destroy_bitmap_init(struct ffa_ctx *ctx,
> + unsigned int create_signal_count)
> +{
> + unsigned int n;
> +
> + for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_destroyed_count; n++ )
> + {
> + /*
> + * Skip SPs subscribed to the VM created event that never was
> + * notified of the VM creation due to an error during
> + * ffa_domain_init().
> + */
> + if ( is_in_subscr_list(subscr_vm_created, create_signal_count,
> + subscr_vm_created_count,
> + subscr_vm_destroyed[n]) )
> + continue;
> +
> + set_bit(n, ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap);
> + }
> +}
> +
> static int ffa_domain_init(struct domain *d)
> {
> struct ffa_ctx *ctx;
> @@ -1501,11 +1574,14 @@ static int ffa_domain_init(struct domain *d)
> if ( d->domain_id >= UINT16_MAX)
> return -ERANGE;
>
> - ctx = xzalloc(struct ffa_ctx);
> + ctx = xzalloc_flex_struct(struct ffa_ctx, vm_destroy_bitmap,
> + BITS_TO_LONGS(subscr_vm_destroyed_count));
> if ( !ctx )
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> d->arch.tee = ctx;
> + ctx->teardown_d = d;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->shm_list);
>
> for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_created_count; n++ )
> {
> @@ -1515,65 +1591,173 @@ static int ffa_domain_init(struct domain *d)
> {
> printk(XENLOG_ERR "ffa: Failed to report creation of vm_id %u to
> %u: res %d\n",
> get_vm_id(d), subscr_vm_created[n], res);
> - ctx->create_signal_count = n;
> - return -EIO;
> + break;
> }
> }
> - ctx->create_signal_count = subscr_vm_created_count;
> -
> - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->shm_list);
> + vm_destroy_bitmap_init(ctx, n);
> + if ( n != subscr_vm_created_count )
> + return -EIO;
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static bool is_in_subscr_list(const uint16_t *subscr, uint16_t start,
> - uint16_t end, uint16_t sp_id)
> +static void send_vm_destroyed(struct domain *d)
> {
> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
> unsigned int n;
> + int32_t res;
>
> - for ( n = start; n < end; n++ )
> + for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_destroyed_count; n++ )
> {
> - if ( subscr[n] == sp_id )
> - return true;
> - }
> + if ( !test_bit(n, ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap) )
> + continue;
>
> - return false;
> + res = ffa_direct_req_send_vm(subscr_vm_destroyed[n], get_vm_id(d),
> + FFA_MSG_SEND_VM_DESTROYED);
> +
> + if ( res )
> + {
> + printk(XENLOG_ERR "%pd: ffa: Failed to report destruction of
> vm_id %u to %u: res %d\n",
> + d, get_vm_id(d), subscr_vm_destroyed[n], res);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * For these two error codes the hypervisor is expected to resend
> + * the destruction message. For the rest it is expected that the
> + * error is permanent and that is doesn't help to resend the
> + * destruction message.
> + */
> + if ( res != FFA_RET_INTERRUPTED && res != FFA_RET_RETRY )
> + clear_bit(n, ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap);
> + }
> }
>
> -/* This function is supposed to undo what ffa_domain_init() has done */
> -static int ffa_domain_teardown(struct domain *d)
> +static void reclaim_shms(struct domain *d)
> {
> struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
> - unsigned int n;
> + struct ffa_shm_mem *shm, *tmp;
> int32_t res;
>
> - if ( !ctx )
> - return 0;
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(shm, tmp, &ctx->shm_list, list)
> + {
> + register_t handle_hi;
> + register_t handle_lo;
> +
> + uint64_to_regpair(&handle_hi, &handle_lo, shm->handle);
> + res = ffa_mem_reclaim(handle_lo, handle_hi, 0);
> + switch ( res ) {
> + case FFA_RET_OK:
> + printk(XENLOG_G_DEBUG "%pd: ffa: Reclaimed handle %#lx\n",
> + d, shm->handle);
> + list_del(&shm->list);
> + free_ffa_shm_mem(d, shm);
> + break;
> + case FFA_RET_DENIED:
> + /*
> + * A temporary error that may get resolved a bit later, it's
> + * worth retrying.
> + */
> + printk(XENLOG_G_INFO "%pd: ffa: Failed to reclaim handle %#lx :
> %d\n",
> + d, shm->handle, res);
> + break; /* We will retry later */
> + default:
> + /*
> + * The rest of the error codes are not expected and are assumed
> + * to be of a permanent nature. It not in our control to handle
> + * the error properly so the object in this case is to try to
> + * minimize the damage.
> + *
> + * FFA_RET_NO_MEMORY might be a temporary error as it it could
> + * succeed if retried later, but treat it as permanent for now.
> + */
> + printk(XENLOG_G_INFO "%pd: ffa: Permanent failure to reclaim
> handle %#lx : %d\n",
> + d, shm->handle, res);
>
> - for ( n = 0; n < subscr_vm_destroyed_count; n++ )
> + /*
> + * Remove the shm from the list and free it, but don't drop
> + * references. This results in having the shared physical pages
> + * permanently allocate and also keeps the domain as a zombie
> + * domain.
> + */
> + list_del(&shm->list);
> + xfree(shm);
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void ffa_domain_teardown_continue(struct ffa_ctx *ctx, bool
> first_time)
> +{
> + struct ffa_ctx *next_ctx = NULL;
> +
> + send_vm_destroyed(ctx->teardown_d);
> + reclaim_shms(ctx->teardown_d);
> +
> + if ( ctx->shm_count ||
> + !bitmap_empty(ctx->vm_destroy_bitmap, subscr_vm_destroyed_count) )
> + {
> + printk(XENLOG_G_INFO "%pd: ffa: Remaining cleanup, retrying\n",
> ctx->teardown_d);
> +
> + ctx->teardown_expire = NOW() + FFA_CTX_TEARDOWN_DELAY;
> +
> + spin_lock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
> + list_add_tail(&ctx->teardown_list, &ffa_teardown_head);
> + /* Need to set a new timer for the next ctx in line */
> + next_ctx = list_first_entry(&ffa_teardown_head, struct ffa_ctx,
> + teardown_list);
> + spin_unlock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
> + }
> + else
> {
> /*
> - * Skip SPs subscribed to the VM created event that never was
> - * notified of the VM creation due to an error during
> - * ffa_domain_init().
> + * domain_destroy() might have been called (via put_domain() in
> + * reclaim_shms()), so we can't touch the domain structure anymore.
> */
> - if ( is_in_subscr_list(subscr_vm_created, ctx->create_signal_count,
> - subscr_vm_created_count,
> - subscr_vm_destroyed[n]) )
> - continue;
> + xfree(ctx);
>
> - res = ffa_direct_req_send_vm(subscr_vm_destroyed[n], get_vm_id(d),
> - FFA_MSG_SEND_VM_DESTROYED);
> -
> - if ( res )
> - printk(XENLOG_ERR "ffa: Failed to report destruction of vm_id %u
> to %u: res %d\n",
> - get_vm_id(d), subscr_vm_destroyed[n], res);
> + /* Only check if there has been a change to the teardown queue */
> + if ( !first_time )
> + {
> + spin_lock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
> + next_ctx = list_first_entry_or_null(&ffa_teardown_head,
> + struct ffa_ctx,
> teardown_list);
> + spin_unlock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
> + }
> }
>
> + if ( next_ctx )
> + set_timer(&ffa_teardown_timer, next_ctx->teardown_expire);
> +}
> +
> +static void ffa_teardown_timer_callback(void *arg)
> +{
> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx;
> +
> + spin_lock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
> + ctx = list_first_entry_or_null(&ffa_teardown_head, struct ffa_ctx,
> + teardown_list);
> + if ( ctx )
> + list_del(&ctx->teardown_list);
> + spin_unlock(&ffa_teardown_lock);
> +
> + if ( ctx )
> + ffa_domain_teardown_continue(ctx, false /* !first_time */);
> + else
> + printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "%s: teardown list is empty\n", __func__);
> +}
> +
> +/* This function is supposed to undo what ffa_domain_init() has done */
> +static int ffa_domain_teardown(struct domain *d)
> +{
> + struct ffa_ctx *ctx = d->arch.tee;
> +
> + if ( !ctx )
> + return 0;
> +
> if ( ctx->rx )
> rxtx_unmap(ctx);
>
> - XFREE(d->arch.tee);
> + ffa_domain_teardown_continue(ctx, true /* first_time */);
>
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -1739,6 +1923,9 @@ static bool ffa_probe(void)
> if ( !init_sps() )
> goto err_free_ffa_tx;
>
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ffa_teardown_head);
> + init_timer(&ffa_teardown_timer, ffa_teardown_timer_callback, NULL, 0);
> +
> return true;
>
> err_free_ffa_tx:
> --
> 2.34.1
>
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