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Re: [PATCH v2] x86/vmx: add support for virtualize SPEC_CTRL
- To: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 17:07:51 +0100
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- Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wl@xxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 16:07:56 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 15.02.2024 16:54, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 03:09:01PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 09.02.2024 12:40, Roger Pau Monne wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
>>> @@ -823,18 +823,29 @@ static void cf_check vmx_cpuid_policy_changed(struct
>>> vcpu *v)
>>> {
>>> vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL, VMX_MSR_RW);
>>>
>>> - rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
>>> - if ( rc )
>>> - goto out;
>>> + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virt_spec_ctrl )
>>> + {
>>> + rc = vmx_add_guest_msr(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
>>> + if ( rc )
>>> + goto out;
>>> + }
>>> }
>>> else
>>> {
>>> vmx_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL, VMX_MSR_RW);
>>>
>>> - rc = vmx_del_msr(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL, VMX_MSR_GUEST);
>>> - if ( rc && rc != -ESRCH )
>>> - goto out;
>>> - rc = 0; /* Tolerate -ESRCH */
>>> + /*
>>> + * NB: there's no need to clear the virtualize SPEC_CTRL control,
>>> as
>>> + * the MSR intercept takes precedence. The SPEC_CTRL shadow VMCS
>>> field
>>> + * is also not loaded on guest entry/exit if the intercept is set.
>>> + */
>>
>> It wasn't so much the shadow field than the mask one that I was concerned
>> might be used in some way. The shadow one clearly is used only during
>> guest RDMSR/WRMSR processing. To not focus on "shadow", maybe simple say
>> "The SPEC_CTRL shadow VMCS fields are also not ..."?
>
> What about:
>
> "The SPEC_CTRL shadow and mask VMCS fields don't take effect if the
> intercept is set."
SGTM.
Jan
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