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Re: [PATCH 4/6] nestedsvm: Disable TscRateMSR



On Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 5:50 PM Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 22.02.2024 10:30, George Dunlap wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 21, 2024 at 6:52 PM Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>> But then of course Andrew may know of reasons why all of this is done
> >>>> in calculate_host_policy() in the first place, rather than in HVM
> >>>> policy calculation.
> >>>
> >>> It sounds like maybe you're confusing host_policy with
> >>> x86_capabilities?  From what I can tell:
> >>>
> >>> *  the "basic" cpu_has_X macros resolve to boot_cpu_has(), which
> >>> resolves to cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, ...), which is completely
> >>> independent of the cpu-policy.c:host_cpu_policy
> >>>
> >>> * cpu-policy.c:host_cpu_policy only affects what is advertised to
> >>> guests, via {pv,hvm}_cpu_policy and featureset bits.  Most notably a
> >>> quick skim doesn't show any mechanism by which host_cpu_policy could
> >>> affect what features Xen itself decides to use.
> >>
> >> I'm not mixing the two, no; the two are still insufficiently disentangled.
> >> There's really no reason (long term) to have both host policy and
> >> x86_capabilities. Therefore I'd prefer if new code (including a basically
> >> fundamental re-write as is going to be needed for nested) to avoid
> >> needlessly further extending x86_capabilities. Unless of course there's
> >> something fundamentally wrong with eliminating the redundancy, which
> >> likely Andrew would be in the best position to point out.
> >
> > So I don't know the history of how things got to be the way they are,
> > nor really much about the code but what I've gathered from skimming
> > through while creating this patch series.  But from that impression,
> > the only issue I really see with the current code is the confusing
> > naming.  The cpufeature.h code has this nice infrastructure to allow
> > you to, for instance, enable or disable certain bits on the
> > command-line; and the interface for querying all the different bits of
> > functionality is all nicely put in one place.  Moving the
> > svm_feature_flags into x86_capabilities would immediately allow SVM to
> > take advantage of this infrastructure; it's not clear to me how this
> > would be "needless".
> >
> > Furthermore, it looks to me like host_cpu_policy is used as a starting
> > point for generating pv_cpu_policy and hvm_cpu_policy, both of which
> > are only used for guest cpuid generation.  Given that the format of
> > those policies is fixed, and there's a lot of "copy this bit from the
> > host policy wholesale", it seems like no matter what, you'd want a
> > host_cpu_policy.
> >
> > And in any case -- all that is kind of moot.  *Right now*,
> > host_cpu_policy is only used for guest cpuid policy creation; *right
> > now*, the nested virt features of AMD are handled in the
> > host_cpu_policy; *right now*, we're advertising to guests bits which
> > are not properly virtualized; *right now* these bits are actually set
> > unconditionally, regardless of whether they're even available on the
> > hardware; *right now*, Xen uses svm_feature_flags to determine its own
> > use of TscRateMSR; so *right now*, removing this bit from
> > host_cpu_policy won't prevent Xen from using TscRateMSR itself.
> >
> > (Unless my understanding of the code is wrong, in which case I'd
> > appreciate a correction.)
>
> There's nothing wrong afaics, just missing at least one aspect: Did you
> see all the featureset <-> policy conversions in cpu-policy.c? That (to
> me at least) clearly is a sign of unnecessary duplication of the same
> data. This goes as far as seeding the host policy from the raw one, just
> to then immediately run x86_cpu_featureset_to_policy(), thus overwriting
> a fair part of what was first taken from the raw policy. That's necessary
> right now, because setup_{force,clear}_cpu_cap() act on
> boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[], not the host policy.
>
> As to the "needless" further up, it's only as far as moving those bits
> into x86_capability[] would further duplicate information, rather than
> (for that piece at least) putting them into the policies right away. But
> yes, if the goal is to have setup_{force,clear}_cpu_cap() be able to
> control those bits as well, then going the intermediate step would be
> unavoidable at this point in time.

I'm still not sure of what needs to happen to move this forward.

As I said, I'm not opposed to doing some prep work; but I don't want
to randomly guess as to what kinds of clean-up needs to be done, only
to be told it was wrong (either by you when I post it or by Andy
sometime after it's checked in).

I could certainly move svm_feature_flags into host_cpu_policy, and
have cpu_svm_feature_* reference host_cpu_policy instead (after moving
the nested virt "guest policy" tweaks into hvm_cpu_policy); but as far
as I can tell, that would be the *very first* instance of Xen using
host_cpu_policy in that manner.  I'd like more clarity that this is
the long-term direction that things are going before then.

If you (plural) don't have time now to refresh your memory / make an
informed decision about what you want to happen, then please consider
just taking the patch as it is; it doesn't make future changes any
harder.

 -George



 


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