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Re: [XEN PATCH v1 13/15] x86: wire cpu_has_{svm/vmx}_* to false when svm/vmx not enabled
- To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Sergiy Kibrik <sergiy_kibrik@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 16:31:04 +0300
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- Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Xenia Ragiadakou <xenia.ragiadakou@xxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 13:31:20 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
16.04.24 16:26, Andrew Cooper:
I'm afraid this is going in an unhelpful direction. We want to move
both of these files to be local to arch/x86/hvm/{vmx,svm}/.
cpu_has_svm_* isn't actually used outside of svm/; only the plain
SVM_FEATURE_* constants are, and that's only because they're not
expressed as plain cpu features yet.
cpu_has_vmx_* has a few more users, but most are unlikely to remain in
this form. One critical set of changes to fix vulnerabilities in
nested-virt is to make almost of of these decisions based on per-domain
state, not host state. The aspects which are host state should be in
regular cpu features.
I already volunteered to sort out the SEV feature leaf properly, and I
was going to do the SVM leaf while I was at it. If you can wait a few
days, I might be able to make half of this problem disappear.
I guess it can wait, surely if a better solution is to be crafted at the
end.
Stefano, what's your opinion on that?
-Sergiy
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