[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [XEN PATCH v10 5/5] domctl: Add XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant gsi
Hi Daniel, On 2024/6/17 17:00, Jiqian Chen wrote: > Some type of domain don't have PIRQs, like PVH, it doesn't do > PHYSDEVOP_map_pirq for each gsi. When passthrough a device > to guest base on PVH dom0, callstack > pci_add_dm_done->XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission will fail at function > domain_pirq_to_irq, because PVH has no mapping of gsi, pirq and > irq on Xen side. > What's more, current hypercall XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission requires > passing in pirq, it is not suitable for dom0 that doesn't have > PIRQs. > > So, add a new hypercall XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission to grant the > permission of irq(translate from gsi) to dumU when dom0 has no > PIRQs. > > Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@xxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx> > --- > RFC: it needs review and needs to wait for the corresponding third patch on > linux kernel side to be merged. > --- > tools/include/xenctrl.h | 5 +++ > tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c | 15 +++++++ > tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- > xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++ > xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h | 2 + > xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c | 17 ++++++++ > xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c | 3 +- > xen/include/public/domctl.h | 8 ++++ > xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 1 + > 9 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/tools/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/include/xenctrl.h > index a0381f74d24b..f3feb6848e25 100644 > --- a/tools/include/xenctrl.h > +++ b/tools/include/xenctrl.h > @@ -1382,6 +1382,11 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch, > uint32_t pirq, > bool allow_access); > > +int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch, > + uint32_t domid, > + uint32_t gsi, > + bool allow_access); > + > int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch, > uint32_t domid, > unsigned long first_mfn, > diff --git a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c > index f2d9d14b4d9f..8540e84fda93 100644 > --- a/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c > +++ b/tools/libs/ctrl/xc_domain.c > @@ -1394,6 +1394,21 @@ int xc_domain_irq_permission(xc_interface *xch, > return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); > } > > +int xc_domain_gsi_permission(xc_interface *xch, > + uint32_t domid, > + uint32_t gsi, > + bool allow_access) > +{ > + struct xen_domctl domctl = { > + .cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission, > + .domain = domid, > + .u.gsi_permission.gsi = gsi, > + .u.gsi_permission.allow_access = allow_access, > + }; > + > + return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); > +} > + > int xc_domain_iomem_permission(xc_interface *xch, > uint32_t domid, > unsigned long first_mfn, > diff --git a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c > index 376f91759ac6..f027f22c0028 100644 > --- a/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c > +++ b/tools/libs/light/libxl_pci.c > @@ -1431,6 +1431,9 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, > uint32_t flag = XEN_DOMCTL_DEV_RDM_RELAXED; > uint32_t domainid = domid; > bool isstubdom = libxl_is_stubdom(ctx, domid, &domainid); > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 > + xc_domaininfo_t info; > +#endif > > /* Convenience aliases */ > bool starting = pas->starting; > @@ -1516,14 +1519,39 @@ static void pci_add_dm_done(libxl__egc *egc, > rc = ERROR_FAIL; > goto out; > } > - r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 1); > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 > + /* If dom0 doesn't have PIRQs, need to use xc_domain_gsi_permission > */ > + r = xc_domain_getinfo_single(ctx->xch, 0, &info); > if (r < 0) { > - LOGED(ERROR, domainid, > - "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d (error=%d)", irq, r); > + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "getdomaininfo failed (error=%d)", errno); > fclose(f); > rc = ERROR_FAIL; > goto out; > } > + if (info.flags & XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest && > + !(info.arch_config.emulation_flags & XEN_X86_EMU_USE_PIRQ) && > + gsi > 0) { > + r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, 1); > + if (r < 0) { > + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, > + "xc_domain_gsi_permission gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, > errno); > + fclose(f); > + rc = ERROR_FAIL; > + goto out; > + } > + } > + else > +#endif > + { > + r = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 1); > + if (r < 0) { > + LOGED(ERROR, domainid, > + "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d (error=%d)", irq, > errno); > + fclose(f); > + rc = ERROR_FAIL; > + goto out; > + } > + } > } > fclose(f); > > @@ -2200,6 +2228,10 @@ static void pci_remove_detached(libxl__egc *egc, > #endif > uint32_t domainid = prs->domid; > bool isstubdom; > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 > + int r; > + xc_domaininfo_t info; > +#endif > > /* Convenience aliases */ > libxl_device_pci *const pci = &prs->pci; > @@ -2287,9 +2319,32 @@ skip_bar: > */ > LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_physdev_unmap_pirq irq=%d", irq); > } > - rc = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 0); > - if (rc < 0) { > - LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d", irq); > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 > + /* If dom0 doesn't have PIRQs, need to use xc_domain_gsi_permission > */ > + r = xc_domain_getinfo_single(ctx->xch, 0, &info); > + if (r < 0) { > + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "getdomaininfo failed (error=%d)", errno); > + fclose(f); > + rc = ERROR_FAIL; > + goto skip_legacy_irq; > + } > + if (info.flags & XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest && > + !(info.arch_config.emulation_flags & XEN_X86_EMU_USE_PIRQ) && > + gsi > 0) { > + r = xc_domain_gsi_permission(ctx->xch, domid, gsi, 0); > + if (r < 0) { > + LOGED(ERROR, domid, > + "xc_domain_gsi_permission gsi=%d (error=%d)", gsi, > errno); > + rc = ERROR_FAIL; > + } > + } > + else > +#endif > + { > + rc = xc_domain_irq_permission(ctx->xch, domid, irq, 0); > + if (rc < 0) { > + LOGED(ERROR, domid, "xc_domain_irq_permission irq=%d", irq); > + } > } > } > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c > index 335aedf46d03..6b465bbc6ec0 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c > @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ > #include <asm/xstate.h> > #include <asm/psr.h> > #include <asm/cpu-policy.h> > +#include <asm/io_apic.h> > > static int update_domain_cpu_policy(struct domain *d, > xen_domctl_cpu_policy_t *xdpc) > @@ -237,6 +238,48 @@ long arch_do_domctl( > break; > } > > + case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission: > + { > + unsigned int gsi = domctl->u.gsi_permission.gsi; > + int irq; > + bool allow = domctl->u.gsi_permission.allow_access; > + > + /* Check all pads are zero */ > + ret = -EINVAL; > + for ( i = 0; > + i < sizeof(domctl->u.gsi_permission.pad) / > + sizeof(domctl->u.gsi_permission.pad[0]); > + ++i ) > + if ( domctl->u.gsi_permission.pad[i] ) > + goto out; > + > + /* > + * If current domain is PV or it has PIRQ flag, it has a mapping > + * of gsi, pirq and irq, so it should use XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission > + * to grant irq permission. > + */ > + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; > + if ( is_pv_domain(currd) || has_pirq(currd) ) > + goto out; > + > + ret = -EINVAL; > + if ( gsi >= nr_irqs_gsi || (irq = gsi_2_irq(gsi)) < 0 ) > + goto out; > + > + ret = -EPERM; > + if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) || > + xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, irq, allow) ) Copy the question of Jan from the previous version to here: Is it okay to issue the XSM check using the translated value, not the one that was originally passed into the hypercall? > + goto out; > + > + if ( allow ) > + ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq); > + else > + ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq); > + > + out: > + break; > + } > + > case XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo3: > { > unsigned int num = domctl->u.getpageframeinfo3.num; > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h > b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h > index 78268ea8f666..7e86d8337758 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/io_apic.h > @@ -213,5 +213,7 @@ unsigned highest_gsi(void); > > int ioapic_guest_read( unsigned long physbase, unsigned int reg, u32 *pval); > int ioapic_guest_write(unsigned long physbase, unsigned int reg, u32 val); > +int mp_find_ioapic(int gsi); > +int gsi_2_irq(int gsi); > > #endif > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c > index b48a64246548..23845c8cb11f 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/io_apic.c > @@ -955,6 +955,23 @@ static int pin_2_irq(int idx, int apic, int pin) > return irq; > } > > +int gsi_2_irq(int gsi) > +{ > + int ioapic, pin, irq; > + > + ioapic = mp_find_ioapic(gsi); > + if ( ioapic < 0 ) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + pin = gsi - io_apic_gsi_base(ioapic); > + > + irq = apic_pin_2_gsi_irq(ioapic, pin); > + if ( irq <= 0 ) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + return irq; > +} > + > static inline int IO_APIC_irq_trigger(int irq) > { > int apic, idx, pin; > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c > index d8ccab2449c6..c95da0de5770 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mpparse.c > @@ -841,8 +841,7 @@ static struct mp_ioapic_routing { > } mp_ioapic_routing[MAX_IO_APICS]; > > > -static int mp_find_ioapic ( > - int gsi) > +int mp_find_ioapic(int gsi) > { > unsigned int i; > > diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h > index 2a49fe46ce25..f7ae8b19d27d 100644 > --- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h > +++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h > @@ -464,6 +464,12 @@ struct xen_domctl_irq_permission { > uint8_t pad[3]; > }; > > +/* XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission */ > +struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission { > + uint32_t gsi; > + uint8_t allow_access; /* flag to specify enable/disable of x86 gsi > access */ > + uint8_t pad[3]; > +}; > > /* XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission */ > struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission { > @@ -1306,6 +1312,7 @@ struct xen_domctl { > #define XEN_DOMCTL_get_paging_mempool_size 85 > #define XEN_DOMCTL_set_paging_mempool_size 86 > #define XEN_DOMCTL_dt_overlay 87 > +#define XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission 88 > #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio 1000 > #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu 1001 > #define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu 1002 > @@ -1328,6 +1335,7 @@ struct xen_domctl { > struct xen_domctl_setdomainhandle setdomainhandle; > struct xen_domctl_setdebugging setdebugging; > struct xen_domctl_irq_permission irq_permission; > + struct xen_domctl_gsi_permission gsi_permission; > struct xen_domctl_iomem_permission iomem_permission; > struct xen_domctl_ioport_permission ioport_permission; > struct xen_domctl_hypercall_init hypercall_init; > diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c > index 5e88c71b8e22..a5b134c91101 100644 > --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c > +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c > @@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, int > cmd) > case XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op: > case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission: > case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping: > + case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission: > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PASSTHROUGH > /* -- Best regards, Jiqian Chen.
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