[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [XEN PATCH v2 07/13] x86/hvm: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3
On Mon, 24 Jun 2024, Federico Serafini wrote: > MISRA C Rule 16.3 states that "An unconditional `break' statement shall > terminate every switch-clause". > > Add pseudo keyword fallthrough or missing break statement > to address violations of the rule. > > As a defensive measure, return -EOPNOTSUPP in case an unreachable > return statement is reached. > > Signed-off-by: Federico Serafini <federico.serafini@xxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > Changes in v2: > - replace hypened fallthrough with the pseudo keyword. > --- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c | 9 ++++++--- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 6 ++++++ > xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c | 1 + > xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c | 1 + > 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c > index 02e378365b..859c21a5ab 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c > @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int hvmemul_do_io( > } > case X86EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED: > ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); > - /* Fall-through */ > + fallthrough; > default: > BUG(); > } > @@ -2674,6 +2674,7 @@ static int _hvm_emulate_one(struct hvm_emulate_ctxt > *hvmemul_ctxt, > > default: > ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); > + break; same here > } > > if ( hvmemul_ctxt->ctxt.retire.singlestep ) > @@ -2764,6 +2765,7 @@ int hvm_emulate_one_mmio(unsigned long mfn, unsigned > long gla) > /* fallthrough */ > default: > hvm_emulate_writeback(&ctxt); > + break; > } > > return rc; > @@ -2799,10 +2801,11 @@ void hvm_emulate_one_vm_event(enum emul_kind kind, > unsigned int trapnr, > memcpy(hvio->mmio_insn, curr->arch.vm_event->emul.insn.data, > hvio->mmio_insn_bytes); > } > - /* Fall-through */ > + fallthrough; > default: > ctx.set_context = (kind == EMUL_KIND_SET_CONTEXT_DATA); > rc = hvm_emulate_one(&ctx, VIO_no_completion); > + break; > } > > switch ( rc ) > @@ -2818,7 +2821,7 @@ void hvm_emulate_one_vm_event(enum emul_kind kind, > unsigned int trapnr, > case X86EMUL_UNIMPLEMENTED: > if ( hvm_monitor_emul_unimplemented() ) > return; > - /* fall-through */ > + fallthrough; > case X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE: > hvm_dump_emulation_state(XENLOG_G_DEBUG, "Mem event", &ctx, rc); > hvm_inject_hw_exception(trapnr, errcode); > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > index 7f4b627b1f..c263e562ff 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c > @@ -4919,6 +4919,8 @@ static int do_altp2m_op( > > default: > ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); > + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; > + break; same here > } > > out: > @@ -5020,6 +5022,8 @@ static int compat_altp2m_op( > > default: > ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); > + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; > + break; same here > } > > return rc; > @@ -5283,6 +5287,8 @@ void hvm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum > x86_segment seg, > * %cs and %tr are unconditionally present. SVM ignores these > present > * bits and will happily run without them set. > */ > + fallthrough; > + > case x86_seg_cs: > reg->p = 1; > break; > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c > index 7fb3136f0c..2271afe02a 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c > @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ int hvm_hypercall(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) > case 8: > eax = regs->rax; > /* Fallthrough to permission check. */ > + fallthrough; > case 4: > case 2: > if ( currd->arch.monitor.guest_request_userspace_enabled && > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c > index 210cebb0e6..1eab44defc 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c > @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ static void hvm_set_callback_irq_level(struct vcpu *v) > __hvm_pci_intx_assert(d, pdev, pintx); > else > __hvm_pci_intx_deassert(d, pdev, pintx); > + break; > default: > break; > } > -- > 2.34.1 > >
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