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Re: [PATCH v3 4/9] xen/riscv: setup fixmap mapping


  • To: oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 14:11:19 +0200
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>, Bob Eshleman <bobbyeshleman@xxxxxxxxx>, Connor Davis <connojdavis@xxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 12:11:30 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 30.07.2024 13:25, oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> On Tue, 2024-07-30 at 09:49 +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 29.07.2024 18:11, oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2024-07-29 at 15:35 +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 24.07.2024 17:31, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>>>> @@ -81,6 +82,14 @@ static inline void
>>>>> flush_page_to_ram(unsigned
>>>>> long mfn, bool sync_icache)
>>>>>      BUG_ON("unimplemented");
>>>>>  }
>>>>>  
>>>>> +/* Write a pagetable entry. */
>>>>> +static inline void write_pte(pte_t *p, pte_t pte)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    RISCV_FENCE(rw, rw);
>>>>> +    *p = pte;
>>>>> +    RISCV_FENCE(rw, rw);
>>>>> +}
>>>>
>>>> Why the first of the two fences? 
>>> To ensure that writes have completed with the old mapping.
>>
>> Wait: There can certainly be uncompleted writes, but those must have
>> walked the page tables already, or else a (synchronous) fault could
>> not be delivered on the originating store instruction. Or am I
>> misunderstanding how paging (and associated faults) work on RISC-V?
> I am not sure that I correctly understand the part regarding (
> synchronous ) fault. Could you please come up with an example?
> 
> If something during page table walk will go wrong then a fault will be
> raised.

On the very insn, with subsequent insns not having started executing
(from an architectural perspective, i.e. leaving aside speculation).
That is what my use of "synchronous" meant.

> My initial intension was to be sure if I will be writing to an actively
> in-use page table that other cores can see at the time then fences
> above are required. It is not the case for now as we have only one CPUs
> but I assume that it will be a case when SMP will be enabled and more
> then one CPU will be able to work with the same page table.

Would that first fence really help there? The other CPU could use
the page tables in the window between the fence and the write. My
understanding of the need for fences is for them to be used at times
where ordering of memory accesses matters. For the moment I don't
see this as an aspect for the 1st fence here, but I may be
overlooking something.

>>>>> +    tmp = paddr_to_pte(LINK_TO_LOAD((unsigned
>>>>> long)&xen_fixmap),
>>>>> PTE_TABLE);
>>>>
>>>> I'm a little puzzled by the use of LINK_TO_LOAD() (and
>>>> LOAD_TO_LINK()
>>>> a
>>>> little further up) here. Don't you have functioning __pa() and
>>>> __va()?
>>> No, they haven't been introduced yet.
>>
>> So you're building up more technical debt, as the use of said two
>> constructs really should be limited to very early setup. Aiui once
>> you have functioning __va() / __pa() the code here would want
>> changing?
> 
> Ideally yes, it would want to changed.
> 
> Would it be the better solution to define __va() and __pa() using
> LOAD_TO_LINK()/LINK_TO_LOAD() so when "real" __va() and __pa() will be
> ready so only definitions of __va() and __pa() should be changed.

Well, that's something you're in a better position to answer, as it
depends on the ordering of subsequent work of yours.

Jan



 


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