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Re: [XEN PATCH v5 10/13] x86/vpmu: guard calls to vmx/svm functions
- To: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@xxxxxxxx>
- From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 14:29:50 +0200
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- Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Xenia Ragiadakou <xenia.ragiadakou@xxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 12:30:15 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 30.07.2024 12:35, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> @@ -266,10 +268,10 @@ static inline void __core2_vpmu_save(struct vcpu *v)
> rdmsrl(MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(i), xen_pmu_cntr_pair[i].control);
> }
>
> - if ( !is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
> + if ( !is_vmx_vcpu(v) )
With this ...
> rdmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS, core2_vpmu_cxt->global_status);
> /* Save MSR to private context to make it fork-friendly */
> - else if ( mem_sharing_enabled(v->domain) )
> + else if ( is_vmx_vcpu(v) && mem_sharing_enabled(v->domain) )
... why this further change?
> @@ -326,14 +328,14 @@ static inline void __core2_vpmu_load(struct vcpu *v)
> if ( vpmu_is_set(vcpu_vpmu(v), VPMU_CPU_HAS_DS) )
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DS_AREA, core2_vpmu_cxt->ds_area);
>
> - if ( !is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
> + if ( !is_vmx_vcpu(v) )
> {
> wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL,
> core2_vpmu_cxt->global_ovf_ctrl);
> core2_vpmu_cxt->global_ovf_ctrl = 0;
> wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, core2_vpmu_cxt->global_ctrl);
> }
> /* Restore MSR from context when used with a fork */
> - else if ( mem_sharing_is_fork(v->domain) )
> + else if ( is_vmx_vcpu(v) && mem_sharing_is_fork(v->domain) )
> vmx_write_guest_msr(v, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
> core2_vpmu_cxt->global_ctrl);
> }
Same here. With those dropped (I could do so while committing, as long as you
agree):
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Jan
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