[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v5 5/7] xen/riscv: introduce and initialize SBI RFENCE extension
On 28.08.2024 15:11, oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx wrote: > On Tue, 2024-08-27 at 16:19 +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 21.08.2024 18:06, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>> @@ -38,7 +51,265 @@ struct sbiret sbi_ecall(unsigned long ext, >>> unsigned long fid, >>> return ret; >>> } >>> >>> +static int sbi_err_map_xen_errno(int err) >>> +{ >>> + switch ( err ) >>> + { >>> + case SBI_SUCCESS: >>> + return 0; >>> + case SBI_ERR_DENIED: >>> + return -EACCES; >>> + case SBI_ERR_INVALID_PARAM: >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + case SBI_ERR_INVALID_ADDRESS: >>> + return -EFAULT; >>> + case SBI_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED: >>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP; >>> + case SBI_ERR_FAILURE: >>> + fallthrough; >>> + default: >> >> What's the significance of the "fallthrough" here? > To indicate that the fallthrough from the case SBI_ERR_FAILURE and > default labels is intentional and should not be diagnosed by a compiler > that warns on fallthrough. Or it is needed only when fallthough happen > between switch's cases label ( not default label ) like in the > following code ( should it be fallthrough here? ): > case SBI_EXT_RFENCE_REMOTE_HFENCE_GVMA: > case SBI_EXT_RFENCE_REMOTE_HFENCE_VVMA: > case SBI_EXT_RFENCE_REMOTE_SFENCE_VMA: No, it's also not needed there. It's only needed when there are statements in between. > Additionally, I am considering whether the case SBI_ERR_FAILURE should > be removed or if we should find the appropriate Xen error code for this > case. I am uncertain which Xen error code from xen/errno.h would be > appropriate. There's nothing really suitable, I fear. >>> +static unsigned long sbi_major_version(void) >>> +{ >>> + return MASK_EXTR(sbi_spec_version, >>> SBI_SPEC_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK); >>> +} >>> + >>> +static unsigned long sbi_minor_version(void) >>> +{ >>> + return MASK_EXTR(sbi_spec_version, >>> SBI_SPEC_VERSION_MINOR_MASK); >>> +} >> >> Both functions return less than 32-bit wide values. Why unsigned long >> return types? > We had this discussion in the previous patch series. Please look here: > https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/253638c4-2256-4bdd-9f12-7f99e373355e@xxxxxxxx/ That was for the variables used here, not the functions. The functions clip the values in the variables enough to no longer warrant wider- than-int. >>> + if ( ret.error ) >>> + { >>> + result = sbi_err_map_xen_errno(ret.error); >>> + printk("%s: hbase=%lu hmask=%#lx failed (error %d)\n", >>> + __func__, hbase, hmask, result); >> >> Considering that sbi_err_map_xen_errno() may lose information, I'd >> recommend logging ret.error here. > By 'lose information' you mean case SBI_ERR_FAILURE? Or anything else hitting the default label there. >>> +static int cf_check sbi_rfence_v02(unsigned long fid, >>> + const cpumask_t *cpu_mask, >>> + unsigned long start, unsigned >>> long size, >>> + unsigned long arg4, unsigned >>> long arg5) >>> +{ >>> + unsigned long hartid, cpuid, hmask = 0, hbase = 0, htop = 0; >>> + int result; >>> + >>> + /* >>> + * hart_mask_base can be set to -1 to indicate that hart_mask >>> can be >>> + * ignored and all available harts must be considered. >>> + */ >>> + if ( !cpu_mask ) >>> + return sbi_rfence_v02_real(fid, 0UL, -1UL, start, size, >>> arg4); >>> + >>> + for_each_cpu ( cpuid, cpu_mask ) >>> + { >>> + /* >>> + * Hart IDs might not necessarily be numbered contiguously >>> in >>> + * a multiprocessor system, but at least one hart must have >>> a >>> + * hart ID of zero. >> >> Does this latter fact matter here in any way? > It doesn't, just copy from the RISC-V spec the full sentence. If it > would be better to drop the latter fact I will be happy to do that in > the next patch version. You may certainly leave extra information, but then you want to somehow express which part is relevant and which part is "extra". One way of achieving such would imo be to actually state that you're quoting from some spec. >>> + * This means that it is possible for the hart ID mapping >>> to look like: >>> + * 0, 1, 3, 65, 66, 69 >>> + * In such cases, more than one call to >>> sbi_rfence_v02_real() will be >>> + * needed, as a single hmask can only cover sizeof(unsigned >>> long) CPUs: >>> + * 1. sbi_rfence_v02_real(hmask=0b1011, hbase=0) >>> + * 2. sbi_rfence_v02_real(hmask=0b1011, hbase=65) >>> + * >>> + * The algorithm below tries to batch as many harts as >>> possible before >>> + * making an SBI call. However, batching may not always be >>> possible. >>> + * For example, consider the hart ID mapping: >>> + * 0, 64, 1, 65, 2, 66 >> >> Just to mention it: Batching is also possible here: First (0,1,2), >> then >> (64,65,66). It just requires a different approach. Whether switching >> is >> worthwhile depends on how numbering is done on real world systems. > For sure, it's possible to do that. I was just trying to describe the > currently implemented algorithm. If you think it's beneficial to add > that information to the comment, I can include it as well. What I'd like to ask for is that you make a difference between "cannot" and "we don't". Jan
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