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Re: [XEN PATCH v2] x86: p2m-pod: address violation of MISRA C Rule 2.1


  • To: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2024 12:03:46 +0200
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx, michal.orzel@xxxxxxx, xenia.ragiadakou@xxxxxxx, ayan.kumar.halder@xxxxxxx, consulting@xxxxxxxxxxx, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 10 Sep 2024 10:03:51 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 10.09.2024 11:53, Nicola Vetrini wrote:
> On 2024-09-10 11:08, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 10.09.2024 10:56, Nicola Vetrini wrote:
>>> On 2024-07-01 10:36, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 28.06.2024 08:30, Nicola Vetrini wrote:
>>>> This being about unreachable code, why are the domain_crash() not the
>>>> crucial points of "unreachability"? And even if they weren't there, 
>>>> why
>>>> wouldn't it be the goto or ...
>>>>
>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
>>>>> @@ -1040,6 +1040,7 @@ out_unmap:
>>>>>       * Something went wrong, probably crashing the domain.  Unmap
>>>>>       * everything and return.
>>>>>       */
>>>>> +    /* SAF-8-safe Rule 2.1: defensive programming */
>>>>>      for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
>>>>>          if ( map[i] )
>>>>>              unmap_domain_page(map[i]);
>>>>
>>>> ... the label (just out of context) where the comment needs to go?
>>>
>>> Because of the way this rule's configuration work, deviations are 
>>> placed
>>> on the construct that ends up being the target of the unreachability,
>>
>> What's "target" here? What if this loop was removed from the function?
>> Then both the label and the domain_crash() invocations would still be
>> unreachable in debug builds. Are you telling me that this then wouldn't
>> be diagnosed by Eclair? Or that it would then consider the closing
>> figure brace of the function "the target of the unreachability"?
> 
> Exactly, the end brace is a target to which the "function end" construct 
> is associated.
> It would be kind of strange, though: why not just doing "domain_crash(); 
> return;" in that case?

Sure, the question was theoretical. Now if "return" was used directly
there, what would then be the "target"? IOW - the more abstract question
of my earlier reply still wasn't answered.

Jan



 


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