[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v1 3/5] xen/arm: platforms: Add NXP S32CC platform code
Hi, On 13/09/2024 08:43, Julien Grall wrote: On 12/09/2024 23:44, Stefano Stabellini wrote:I am open to go this way. But I would like the commit message to contain some details on whether this will always work fine for dom0 (this would tell whether the feature can be supported or needs to be in experimental/tech preview).On Thu, 12 Sep 2024, Bertrand Marquis wrote:Hi Andrei,On 11 Sep 2024, at 23:05, Andrei Cherechesu <andrei.cherechesu@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:Hi Julien, Stefano, On 11/09/2024 08:19, Stefano Stabellini wrote:Yes, it is SCMI as defined by Arm. I agree it shouldn't be platform specific.On Tue, 10 Sep 2024, Julien Grall wrote:Hi, On 10/09/2024 15:34, Andrei Cherechesu (OSS) wrote:Is it SMCI as in the Arm spec? If so, this should not be platform specific.From: Andrei Cherechesu <andrei.cherechesu@xxxxxxx> Added support for NXP S32CC platforms (S32G2, S32G3, S32R45), which need SCMI over SMC calls forwarded to the firmware running at EL3 (TF-A). Linux relies on the SCMI Platform for system services such as clocking, reset, etc.In our case, only Dom0 has access to the SCMI mailbox. Hence, the other unprivileged domains are not aware of SCMI and do not make any SCMI requests to FW.Furthermore, I was under the impression that we can't blindly forwardeverything from a domain to the firmware. While it might be okayish for dom0, you also seem to give access to all the domains on the system is it intended?I also asked a few months ago on the ML in a virtio related thread if there are any updates regarding SCMI awareness for Xen and guests, then Stefano CCed Bertrand, but he did not comment [0].Anyway, there is a series on the ML to add a mediator for SCMI in Xen (see [1]). I think it would be preferable to focus on getting it merged as it wouldbenefit everyone and increase the security posture (we could restrict access).I'm curious why the SCMI mediator patch series did not progress.[0] https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/alpine.DEB.2.22.394.2401111627360.3675@ubuntu-linux-20-04-desktop/Sorry it seems i missed that one.There are several initiatives ongoing to investigate the global problem of clock handling and more specificallySCMI "sharing".The SCMI protocol contains some features to have virtual channels and the question is how to make a transport that is hypervisor agnostic to prevent to require the hypervisors to have to "decode" SCMI messages.Virtio-scmi is not really used for clock management per say at the moment and more specifically I do notthink it is a good solution to manage clocks of non virtio devices.In Soafee and in Linaro people are looking at using FF-A as a tansport for SCMI. The idea would be that the hypervisor is configuring the virtual SCMI channels using FF-A as a transport and then VMs are using FF-A to communicate with an SCMI server (probably sitting in secure world, atleast as a proxy). This is an investigation for now.Requiring Xen to act as a mediator is also a solution but might require a lot of platform specific codewhich i think we should prevent.For now having a solution in Xen where SCMI calls through SMC are only allowed by Dom0 is the onlyshort term solution I think.+1At least my main concern is anything to do with RAM. On Matrix, Bertrand suggested that none of the messages should contain addresses. What about the transport? Is it using buffer? If so, are they fixed?Brief looking at Linux, there are multiple DT compatible. IIUC, we would only support "arm,scmi-smc" with the implementation. If so, maybe we should check the DT. Some clarifications as I was asked on Matrix. The issue described in this patch is not specific to SCMI. So I think the SCMI trapping & forward should be part of common code. If it we are not sure whether it is safe, then it should be protected by CONFIG_EXPERT or CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED. I hope this clarifies what I would like. Not sure if the others agree though. Cheers, -- Julien Grall
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