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Re: [PATCH v3 16/16] x86/hyperlaunch: add capabilities to boot domain


  • To: Alejandro Vallejo <agarciav@xxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 08:38:36 +0200
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Xenia Ragiadakou <xenia.ragiadakou@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 06:38:48 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 14.04.2025 21:31, Alejandro Vallejo wrote:
> On Thu Apr 10, 2025 at 1:18 PM BST, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 08.04.2025 18:07, Alejandro Vallejo wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain-builder/fdt.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain-builder/fdt.c
>>> @@ -257,6 +257,18 @@ static int __init process_domain_node(
>>>              bd->max_vcpus = val;
>>>              printk("  max vcpus: %d\n", bd->max_vcpus);
>>>          }
>>> +        else if ( strncmp(prop_name, "capabilities", name_len) == 0 )
>>> +        {
>>> +            if ( fdt_prop_as_u32(prop, &bd->capabilities) != 0 )
>>> +            {
>>> +                printk("  failed processing domain id for domain %s\n", 
>>> name);
>>> +                return -EINVAL;
>>> +            }
>>> +            printk("  caps: ");
>>> +            if ( bd->capabilities & BUILD_CAPS_CONTROL )
>>> +                printk("c");
>>> +            printk("\n");
>>> +        }
>>
>> Like for the other patch: What about other bits being set in the value read?
> 
> I take it that the non-worded suggestion is to have a mask of reserved
> bits for each case and check they are not set (giving a warning if they are)?

Whether a warning is sufficient I can't tell. I would have expected such to be
outright rejected.

>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
>>> @@ -1006,6 +1006,7 @@ static struct domain *__init create_dom0(struct 
>>> boot_info *bi)
>>>  {
>>>      char *cmdline = NULL;
>>>      size_t cmdline_size;
>>> +    unsigned int create_flags = 0;
>>>      struct xen_domctl_createdomain dom0_cfg = {
>>>          .flags = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TBOOT) ? XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_s3_integrity : 
>>> 0,
>>>          .max_evtchn_port = -1,
>>> @@ -1037,7 +1038,10 @@ static struct domain *__init create_dom0(struct 
>>> boot_info *bi)
>>>      if ( bd->domid == DOMID_INVALID )
>>>          /* Create initial domain.  Not d0 for pvshim. */
>>>          bd->domid = get_initial_domain_id();
>>> -    d = domain_create(bd->domid, &dom0_cfg, pv_shim ? 0 : CDF_privileged);
>>> +    if ( bd->capabilities & BUILD_CAPS_CONTROL )
>>> +        create_flags |= CDF_privileged;
>>
>> Seeing that builder_init() in the non-DT case sets the new bit 
>> unconditionally,
>> isn't the shim's only domain suddenly getting CDF_privileged set this way? 
>> Oh,
>> no, you then ...
>>
>>> +    d = domain_create(bd->domid, &dom0_cfg,
>>> +                      pv_shim ? 0 : create_flags);
>>
>> ... hide the flag here. Any reason to have the intermediate variable in the
>> first place
> 
> Well, the logic would end up fairly convoluted otherwise. As things
> stand this can be encoded in an if-else fashion with 2 calls, but
> there's 2 capability flags coming that need integrating together.
> 
> This is just avoiding further code motion down the line.

Is it?

-    d = domain_create(bd->domid, &dom0_cfg, pv_shim ? 0 : CDF_privileged);
+    d = domain_create(bd->domid, &dom0_cfg,
+                      ((bd->capabilities & BUILD_CAPS_CONTROL) && !pv_shim
+                       ? CDF_privileged : 0));

isn't really worse (imo), but is highlighting the problem more clearly: Why
would the shim have BUILD_CAPS_CONTROL set in the first place? Without that
the statement would remain pretty similar to what it was before.

Jan



 


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