[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v2] x86/hyperv: use dynamically allocated page for hypercalls
On Mon, Apr 28, 2025 at 12:50:55PM +0100, Alejandro Vallejo wrote: > On Mon Apr 28, 2025 at 12:07 PM BST, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > On 28/04/2025 11:55 am, Alejandro Vallejo wrote: > >> On Mon Apr 28, 2025 at 10:41 AM BST, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > >>> On Fri, Apr 25, 2025 at 04:43:31PM -0700, Ariadne Conill wrote: > >>>> Previously Xen placed the hypercall page at the highest possible MFN, > >>>> but this caused problems on systems where there is more than 36 bits > >>>> of physical address space. > >>>> > >>>> In general, it also seems unreliable to assume that the highest possible > >>>> MFN is not already reserved for some other purpose. > >>>> > >>>> Changes from v1: > >>>> - Continue to use fixmap infrastructure > >>>> - Use panic in Hyper-V setup() function instead of returning -ENOMEM > >>>> on hypercall page allocation failure > >>>> > >>>> Fixes: 620fc734f854 ("x86/hyperv: setup hypercall page") > >>>> Cc: Alejandro Vallejo <agarciav@xxxxxxx> > >>>> Cc: Alexander M. Merritt <alexander@xxxxxxxxx> > >>>> Signed-off-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@ariadne.space> > >>>> --- > >>>> xen/arch/x86/guest/hyperv/hyperv.c | 17 +++++++---------- > >>>> xen/arch/x86/include/asm/guest/hyperv.h | 3 --- > >>>> 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) > >>>> > >>>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/guest/hyperv/hyperv.c > >>>> b/xen/arch/x86/guest/hyperv/hyperv.c > >>>> index 6989af38f1..0305374a06 100644 > >>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/guest/hyperv/hyperv.c > >>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/guest/hyperv/hyperv.c > >>>> @@ -98,7 +98,13 @@ static void __init setup_hypercall_page(void) > >>>> rdmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL, hypercall_msr.as_uint64); > >>>> if ( !hypercall_msr.enable ) > >>>> { > >>>> - mfn = HV_HCALL_MFN; > >>>> + void *hcall_page = alloc_xenheap_page(); > >>>> + if ( !hcall_page ) > >>>> + panic("Hyper-V: Failed to allocate hypercall trampoline > >>>> page"); > >>>> + > >>>> + printk("Hyper-V: Allocated hypercall page @ %p.\n", hcall_page); > >>> This likely wants to be a dprintk, and possibly also print the > >>> physical address of the used page? And no period at the end of the > >>> sentence IMO. > >>> > >>> I think Xen might have used the last page in the physical address > >>> range to prevent HyperV from possibly shattering a superpage in the > >>> second stage translation page-tables if normal RAM was used? > >>> > >>> However I don't know whether HyperV will shatter super-pages if a > >>> sub-page of it is used to contain the hypercall page (I don't think it > >>> should?) > >> I think it's quite unlikely. > > > > It will shatter superpages. > > > > The overlay is not part of guest memory, and will hide whatever is > > behind it while it is mapped, which will force a 4k PTE in EPT/NPT. > > That's an implementation detail. They can very well copy the trampoline > to guest memory when there is such (and save the previous contents > elsewhere) and restore them when disabling the trampoline. It's a > trivial optimisation that would prevent shattering while being fully > compliant with the TLFS. It's an implementation detail relevant from a guest perspective, as it impacts guest performance. IOW: we care about the specific (current) implementation, as it's meaningful to how the guest-side should be implemented. > The actual physical location of the trampoline is fully undefined. It > is defined to be an overlay; but that's a specification, not an > implementation. > > > > > Thinking about it, a better position would be adjacent to the APIC MMIO > > window, so at 0xfee01000. The APIC MMIO window is forced to be a 4k > > mapping too, and the rest of the 2M window is normally empty. > > > > Sounds like an assumption waiting to be broken. Just like the last page > of guest-physical was. As a compromise - could we try to allocate from < 4GB first, and resort to high memory if that doesn't work? That would at least limit shattering (if done) to the low 4GB, which is quite likely fragmented already: hcall_page = alloc_xenheap_pages(0, MEMF_bits(32)); if ( !hcall_page ) hcall_page = alloc_xenheap_page(); if ( !hcall_page ) panic(...); That will need a comment to describe what's going on. Thanks, Roger.
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |