[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH 0/4] XSM changes for split hardware / control domain
On 2025-06-11 09:28, Jan Beulich wrote: On 11.06.2025 00:57, Jason Andryuk wrote:Theses are the broad changes needed for a split hardware / control domain. An earlier posting gave device_model privileges to hardware domain. For this posting, it was split out into a new capability. This way the operator can choose where to run the device models without making the hardware domain have the permissions. The first patch add XSM_HW_PRIV for the hardware hypercalls. Unlike the first posting, the control domain can call these hypercalls even though it doesn't really make sense. The idea was to keep the control domain all powerful from an XSM perspective. SILO is changed to allow control, hardwware or xenstore to service domUs. Xenstore and hardware will use grants for PV interfaces. Control wouldn't typically provide PV interfaces to domUs, but it is given the permision to do so. Again, to keep control all powerful. xsm/dummy: Allow hwdom SYSCTL_readconsole/physinfo this is not strictly needed. xenconsoled could read Xen's dmesg. If it's in hwdom, then that permission would be required. SYSCTL_physinfo is mainly to silence xl messages, which are mostly cosmetic. Jason Andryuk (4): xen/xsm: Add XSM_HW_PRIV xsm/silo: Support hwdom/control domains xen: Add DOMAIN_CAPS_DEVICE_MODEL & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_device_model xsm/dummy: Allow hwdom SYSCTL_readconsole/physinfoOverall I can't help the impression that this level of disaggregation simply requires the use of Flask. I have thought about that. The problem with Flask is the complexity of the security server. We don't want to have to deal with all that code. A fixed policy is easier for our coverage testing. Exposing separate control, hardware and xenstore capabilities, it makes sense for the default policy to function with them. This would be a coarse level of functionality, and Flask would remain for fine-grain and MAC enforcement. Regards, Jason
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