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Re: [PATCH v2 13/17] xen/riscv: Implement p2m_entry_from_mfn() and support PBMT configuration




On 7/16/25 6:18 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 16.07.2025 18:07, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
On 7/16/25 1:31 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 15.07.2025 16:47, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
On 7/1/25 5:08 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 10.06.2025 15:05, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
--- a/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c
@@ -345,6 +345,26 @@ static pte_t *p2m_get_root_pointer(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn)
       return __map_domain_page(p2m->root + root_table_indx);
   }
   
+static int p2m_type_radix_set(struct p2m_domain *p2m, pte_t pte, p2m_type_t t)
See comments on the earlier patch regarding naming.

+{
+    int rc;
+    gfn_t gfn = mfn_to_gfn(p2m->domain, mfn_from_pte(pte));
How does this work, when you record GFNs only for Xenheap pages?

I think I don't understand what is an issue. Could you please provide
some extra details?
Counter question: The mfn_to_gfn() you currently have is only a stub. It only
works for 1:1 mapped domains. Can you show me the eventual final implementation
of the function, making it possible to use it here?
At the moment, I planned to support only 1:1 mapped domains, so it is final
implementation.
Isn't that on overly severe limitation?
I wouldn't say that it's a severe limitation, as it's just a matter of how
mfn_to_gfn() is implemented. When non-1:1 mapped domains are supported,
mfn_to_gfn() can be implemented differently, while the code where it’s called
will likely remain unchanged.
What I meant in my reply is that, for the current state and current limitations,
this is the final implementation of mfn_to_gfn(). But that doesn't mean I don't
see the value in, or the need for, non-1:1 mapped domains—it's just that this
limitation simplifies development at the current stage of the RISC-V port.

In this context (not sure if I asked before): With this use of a radix tree,
how do you intend to bound the amount of memory that a domain can use, by
making Xen insert very many entries?
I didn’t think about that. I assumed it would be enough to set the amount of
memory a guest domain can use by specifying|xen,domain-p2m-mem-mb| in the DTS,
or using some predefined value if|xen,domain-p2m-mem-mb| isn’t explicitly set.
Which would require these allocations to come from that pool.
Yes, and it is true only for non-hardware domains with the current implementation.
???
I meant that pool is used now only for non-hardware domains at the moment.


Also, it seems this would just lead to the issue you mentioned earlier: when
the memory runs out,|domain_crash()| will be called or PTE will be zapped.
Or one domain exhausting memory would cause another domain to fail. A domain
impacting just itself may be tolerable. But a domain affecting other domains
isn't.
But it seems like this issue could happen in any implementation. It won't happen only
if we will have only pre-populated pool for any domain type (hardware, control, guest
domain) without ability to extend them or allocate extra pages from domheap in runtime.
Otherwise, if extra pages allocation is allowed then we can't really do something
with this issue.
But that's why I brought this up: You simply have to. Or, as indicated, the
moment you mark Xen security-supported on RISC-V, there will be an XSA needed.
Why it isn't XSA for other architectures? At least, Arm then should have such
XSA.
I don't understand why x86 won't have the same issue. Memory is the limited
and shared resource, so if one of the domain will use to much memory then it could
happen that other domains won't have enough memory for its purpose...

This is the kind of thing you need to consider up front. Or at least mark with
a prominent FIXME annotation. All of which would need resolving before even
considering to mark code as supported.
... At the moment, I’m trying to understand if this issue can be solved properly at
all when a domain is allowed to request or map extra memory for its own purposes.

The only solution I see is that each domain—regardless of its type—should have its
own pre-populated pools. This way, during construction, we’ll know whether the
domain can be created or if we’ve run out of memory, which would mean that no
more domains can be launched.
And if in runtime of a domain there is no free pages in a pre-populated pool then
just stop a domain (or return rc to a domain that there is no memory anymore and
let a domain to decide what it should do), otherwise if I will start to allocate
extra memory for domain which doesn't have free pages in a pool, it could lead
to the XSA issue you mentioned that one domain could exhaust memory so another
domain, at least, won't be able to allocate extra pages (in the case this another
domain also doesn't have free pages in a pool).

~ Oleksii


 


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