|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v10 2/5] xen: change VIRQ_CONSOLE to VIRQ_DOMAIN to allow non-hwdom binding
On Tue, 10 Feb 2026, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 10.02.2026 00:23, Stefano Stabellini wrote: > > On Mon, 9 Feb 2026, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> On 05.02.2026 00:37, Stefano Stabellini wrote: > >>> Today only hwdom can bind VIRQ_CONSOLE. This patch changes the virq from > >>> global to VIRQ_DOMAIN to allow other domains to bind to it. > >>> > >>> Note that Linux silently falls back to polling when binding fails, which > >>> masks the issue. > >>> > >>> Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@xxxxxxx> > >>> Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxx> > >> > >> Technically this is an ABI change, and hence I'm uncertain it can go > >> without > >> that aspect being at least mentioned, perhaps even its implications > >> properly > >> discussed. > > > > I am not sure if it qualifies as an ABI change or not but I am happy to > > expand the commit message in any way you might suggest. > > > > The jist of it is already in the commit message, really the key element > > is that VIRQ_CONSOLE can be bound by multiple domains. > > > > Aside from spelling out "this is an ABI change" what do you have in > > mind? > > What I mean is discussion of the implications for domains using the vIRQ. > Previously most domains would have attempts to bind this vIRQ rejected. > Technically it is possible that kernels had code paths blindly doing the > binding, relying on it to work only when running as Dom0. And really, you > appear to break XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler when used with VIRQ_CONSOLE, > without which its binding wasn't possible at all before (except for the > hardware domain, which get_global_virq_handler() falls back to when no > other domain is set). Or am I mis-reading things, as I can't spot any use > of VIRQ_CONSOLE under tools/, whereas I would have expected provisions > for (host) console handling to be delegated to a separate control or > console domain? Of course other toolstacks (the XAPI-based one for > example) might actually have such provisions. > > And then there's the XSM question: XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler obviously > is subject to XSM checking. The same isn't true for VIRQ_DOMAIN-type > vIRQ-s. Yet this vIRQ isn't supposed to be universally available to > every DomU. Instead the ->console->input_allowed checking is kind of > substituting such a check, which iirc Daniel said (in more general > context) shouldn't ever be done. IOW in patch 5 you're actually effecting > policy, which should be XSM's job aiui. > > Bottom line: The patch may need to be more involved, but at the very > least the description would need updating to justify it being as simple > as it is right now. What do you think of this: --- xen/console: change VIRQ_CONSOLE from global to per-domain Previously VIRQ_CONSOLE was a global VIRQ (VIRQ_GLOBAL type), meaning only the hardware domain (or a domain explicitly set via XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler) could bind it. Any other domain attempting to bind would fail with -EBUSY because get_global_virq_handler() would return hwdom by default. This patch changes VIRQ_CONSOLE to VIRQ_DOMAIN type, allowing any domain to bind it independently, similar to VIRQ_ARGO. The console notification is now sent via send_guest_domain_virq() directly to the focus domain rather than through send_global_virq(). Implications: 1. Guest kernels that previously called bind on VIRQ_CONSOLE blindly will now succeed. Linux handles binding failure gracefully by falling back to polling, so this should not cause regressions. 2. XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler can no longer be used with VIRQ_CONSOLE. The domctl explicitly rejects non-VIRQ_GLOBAL types. This means toolstacks that relied on set_virq_handler to delegate console handling to a separate console domain will need to use a different mechanism. Note: No known in-tree toolstack uses set_virq_handler with VIRQ_CONSOLE. 3. VIRQ_DOMAIN bindings are not subject to XSM checks beyond the standard event channel allocation policy. Access control for console input is enforced via the per-domain console->input_allowed flag, which is set for: - The hardware domain (by default in domain_create()) - dom0less domains on ARM (in construct_domU()) - The PV shim domain on x86 (in pv_shim_setup_dom()) - Domains with vpl011 using the Xen backend (in domain_vpl011_init())
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |