[PATCH v4 02/14] docs/guest-guide: Describe the PV traps and entrypoints ABI

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

... seeing as I've had to thoroughly reverse engineer it for FRED and make
tweaks in places.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>

Obviously there's a lot more in need of doing, but this is at least a start.

v4:
 * New
---
 docs/glossary.rst                 |   3 +
 docs/guest-guide/x86/index.rst    |   1 +
 docs/guest-guide/x86/pv-traps.rst | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 127 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 docs/guest-guide/x86/pv-traps.rst

diff --git a/docs/glossary.rst b/docs/glossary.rst
index 6adeec77e14c..c8ab2386bc6e 100644
--- a/docs/glossary.rst
+++ b/docs/glossary.rst
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ Glossary
      Sapphire Rapids (Server, 2023) CPUs.  AMD support only CET-SS, starting
      with Zen3 (Both client and server, 2020) CPUs.
 
+   event channel
+     A paravirtual facility for guests to send and recieve interrupts.
+
    guest
      The term 'guest' has two different meanings, depending on context, and
      should not be confused with :term:`domain`.
diff --git a/docs/guest-guide/x86/index.rst b/docs/guest-guide/x86/index.rst
index 502968490d9d..5b38ae397a9f 100644
--- a/docs/guest-guide/x86/index.rst
+++ b/docs/guest-guide/x86/index.rst
@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ x86
    :maxdepth: 2
 
    hypercall-abi
+   pv-traps
diff --git a/docs/guest-guide/x86/pv-traps.rst 
b/docs/guest-guide/x86/pv-traps.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2ff18e2f9454
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/guest-guide/x86/pv-traps.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-4.0
+
+PV Traps and Entrypoints
+========================
+
+.. note::
+
+   The details here are specific to 64bit builds of Xen.  Details for 32bit
+   builds of Xen, are different and not discussed further.
+
+PV guests are subject to Xen's linkage setup for events (interrupts,
+exceptions and system calls).  x86's IDT architecture and limitations are the
+majority influence on the PV ABI.
+
+All external interrupts are routed to PV guests via the :term:`Event Channel`
+interface, and not discussed further here.
+
+What remain are exceptions, and the instructions which cause a control
+transfers.  In the x86 architecture, the instructions relevant for PV guests
+are:
+
+ * ``INT3``, which generates ``#BP``.
+
+ * ``INTO``, which generates ``#OF`` only if the overflow flag is set.  It is
+   only usable in compatibility mode, and will ``#UD`` in 64bit mode.
+
+ * ``CALL (far)`` referencing a gate in the GDT.
+
+ * ``INT $N``, which invokes an arbitrary IDT gate.  These four instructions
+   so far all check the gate DPL and will ``#GP`` otherwise.
+
+ * ``INT1``, also known as ``ICEBP``, which generates ``#DB``.  This
+   instruction does *not* check DPL, and can be used unconditionally by
+   userspace.
+
+ * ``SYSCALL``, which enters CPL0 as configured by the ``{C,L,}STAR`` MSRs.
+   It is usable if enabled by ``MSR_EFER.SCE``, and will ``#UD`` otherwise.
+   On Intel parts, ``SYSCALL`` is unusable outside of 64bit mode.
+
+ * ``SYSENTER``, which enters CPL0 as configured by the ``SEP`` MSRs.  It is
+   usable if enabled by ``MSR_SYSENTER_CS`` having a non-NUL selector, and
+   will ``#GP`` otherwise.  On AMD parts, ``SYSENTER`` is unusable in Long
+   mode.
+
+
+Xen's configuration
+-------------------
+
+Xen maintains a complete IDT, with most gates configured with DPL0.  This
+causes most ``INT $N`` instructions to ``#GP``.  This allows Xen to emulate
+the instruction, referring to the guest kernels vDPL choice.
+
+ * Vectors 3 ``#BP`` and 4 ``#OF`` are DPL3, in order to allow the ``INT3``
+   and ``INTO`` instructions to function in userspace.
+
+ * Vector 0x80 is DPL3 in order to implement the legacy system call fastpath
+   commonly found in UNIXes.
+
+ * Vector 0x82 is DPL1 when PV32 is enabled, allowing the guest kernel to make
+   hypercalls to Xen.  All other cases (PV32 guest userspace, and both PV64
+   modes) operate in CPL3 and this vector behaves like all others to ``INT
+   $N`` instructions.
+
+A range of the GDT is guest-owned, allowing for call gates.  During audit, Xen
+forces all call gates to DPL0, causing their use to ``#GP`` allowing for
+emulation.
+
+Xen enables ``SYSCALL`` in all cases as it is mandatory in 64bit mode, and
+enables ``SYSENTER`` when available in 64bit mode.
+
+When Xen is using FRED delivery the hardware configuration is substantially
+different, but the behaviour for guests remains as unchanged as possible.
+
+
+PV Guest's configuration
+------------------------
+
+The PV ABI contains the "trap table", modelled very closely on the IDT.  It is
+manipulated by ``HYPERCALL_set_trap_table``, has 256 entries, each containing
+a code segment selector, an address, and flags.  A guest is expected to
+configure handlers for all exceptions; failure to do so is terminal similar to
+a Triple Fault.
+
+Part of the GDT is guest owned with descriptors audited by Xen.  This range
+can be manipulated with ``HYPERVISOR_set_gdt`` and
+``HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor``.
+
+Other entrypoints are configured via ``HYPERVISOR_callback_op``.  Of note here
+are the callback types ``syscall``, ``syscall32`` (relevant for AMD parts) and
+``sysenter`` (relevant for Intel parts).
+
+.. warning::
+
+   Prior to Xen 4.15, there was no check that the ``syscall`` or ``syscall32``
+   callbacks had been registered before attempting to deliver via them.
+   Guests are strongly advised to ensure the entrypoints are registered before
+   running userspace.
+
+
+Notes
+-----
+
+``INT3`` vs ``INT $3`` and ``INTO`` vs ``INT $4`` are hard to distinguish
+architecturally as both forms have a DPL check and use the same IDT vectors.
+Because Xen configures both as DPL3, the ``INT $`` forms do not fault for
+emulation, and are treated as if they were exceptions.  This means the guest
+can't block these instruction by trying to configure them with vDPL0.
+
+The instructions which trap into Xen (``INT $0x80``, ``SYSCALL``,
+``SYSENTER``) but can be disabled by guest configuration need turning back
+into faults for the guest kernel to process.
+
+ * When using IDT delivery, instruction lengths are not provided by hardware
+   and Xen does not account for possible prefixes.  ``%rip`` only gets rewound
+   by the length of the unprefixed instruction.  This is observable, but not
+   expected to be an issue in practice.
+
+ * When Xen is using FRED delivery, the full instruction length is provided by
+   hardware, and ``%rip`` is rewound fully.
+
+While both PV32 and PV64 guests are permitted to write Call Gates into the
+GDT, emulation is only wired up for PV32.  At the time of writing, the x86
+maintainers feel no specific need to fix this omission.
-- 
2.39.5