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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: IOMMU faults after S3
On 02.04.2026 11:42, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 02, 2026 at 10:47:53AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 02.04.2026 10:39, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 02.04.2026 10:08, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>>>> The xl dmesg output (from MTL this time):
>>>>
>>>> (XEN) [ 123.477511] Entering ACPI S3 state.
>>>> (XEN) [18446743903.571842] _disable_pit_irq:2649: using_pit: 0,
>>>> cpu_has_apic: 1
>>>> (XEN) [18446743903.571856] _disable_pit_irq:2659:
>>>> cpuidle_using_deep_cstate: 1, boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_ARAT): 0
>>>
>>> XEN_ARAT being off is the one odd aspect here. That'll want tracking down
>>> separately. As per xen-cpuid output (below) ARAT is available.
>>
>> For this you may want to also add logging to intel_init_arat(): Since
>> opt_arat
>> can be false only due to command line option use, it can only be the function
>> not being called (which looks impossible on plain staging code), or
>> cpu_has_arat
>> being false despite the xen-cpuid output that you supplied earlier
>> (inexplicable
>> as well, at least for now).
>
> Hm, I got this:
>
> (XEN) [ 11.403340] intel_init_arat:674: opt_arat: 1, cpu_has_arat: 0
>
> so, cpu_has_arat=0 ...
> next lines are those, to hint when it happened in the boot process:
>
> (XEN) [ 11.409754] mwait-idle: MWAIT substates: 0x11112020
> (XEN) [ 11.416130] mwait-idle: v0.4.1 model 0xaa
> (XEN) [ 11.422396] mwait-idle: lapic_timer_reliable_states 0x2
>
> Looks like calculate_host_policy() runs much later...
Hmm, yes, and that's the problem. The reason I don't see this is that a newer
version of [1] has this
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
@@ -628,6 +628,8 @@ void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
/* Now the feature flags better reflect actual CPU features! */
+ if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
+ calculate_host_policy();
xstate_init(c);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ void calculate_raw_cpu_policy(void)
/* Was already added by probe_cpuid_faulting() */
}
-static void __init calculate_host_policy(void)
+void __init calculate_host_policy(void)
{
struct cpu_policy *p = &host_cpu_policy;
@@ -959,6 +959,7 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_pol
void __init init_guest_cpu_policies(void)
{
+ /* Do this a 2nd time to account for setup_{clear,force}_cpu_cap() uses. */
calculate_host_policy();
if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) )
and of course I'm doing my work (and my analysis) with that in place.
I may need to break this out and submit independently, but really the problem
here is that the containing series has been sitting largely unreviewed (and
hence not in a position to plausibly re-post) for almost 5 years. Andrew,
(maybe also Roger) - I'm open to suggestions how to proceed. When your xstate
cleanup patches were helped to go in ahead of mine, you promised to help mine
going in afterwards. Yet nothing has happened (and I'm tired of re-submitting
large pieces of work just for the sake of re-submitting, i.e. without having
has [sufficient] feedback on the earlier version).
Jan
[1] https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2021-04/msg01336.html
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