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Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] x86: prefer shadow stack for producing call traces


  • To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2026 10:42:30 +0200
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  • Cc: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 09 Apr 2026 08:42:39 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 08.04.2026 19:53, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 08/04/2026 1:23 pm, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Shadow stacks contain little more than return addresses, and they in
>> particular allow precise call traces also without FRAME_POINTER.
> 
> Do you have an example of what such a backtrace now looks like ?

I don't have one to hand, but I'll add an example for v3.

>> ---
>> While the 'E' for exception frames is probably okay, I'm not overly
>> happy with the 'C' (for CET). I would have preferred 'S' (for shadow),
>> but we use that character already.
>>
>> As an alternative to suppressing output for the top level exception
>> frame, adding the new code ahead of the 'R' output line (and then also
>> ahead of the stack top read) could be considered.
>>
>> Perhaps having a printk() for the PV entry case is meaningless, for
>> - no frame being pushed when entered from CPL=3 (64-bit PV),
>> - no entry possible from CPL<3 (32-bit PV disabled when CET is active)?
>> In which case the comment probably should just be "Bogus." and the code
>> merely be "break;".
> 
> Yes, PV32 doesn't exist when CET-SS is active, and PV64 doesn't push a
> frame.  regs->ssp will point to the supervisor token (IDT delivery) or
> on the boundary with the regular stack (FRED).

Okay, I'll change that then as indicated.

>> Quite likely a number of other uses of is_active_kernel_text() also want
>> amending with in_stub().
> 
> There are very few things which can exist on a shadow stack.
> 
> 1) Tokens (supervisor, restore or prev)
> 2) Return address
> 3) Old-SSP
> 4) Old-CS
> 
> Intel recommend not allowing code or stacks to be in the bottom 64k of
> the address space to prevent type confusion between Old-CS and the other
> values.  Xen matches this expectation, but it might be wise to check for
> it explicitly.

What exactly do you mean here? Neither is_active_kernel_text() nor
in_stub() nor the further "!((val ^ *ptr) >> (PAGE_SHIFT + STACK_ORDER))"
(which I only now notice can't be quite right, as val was read from *ptr;
I think (unsigned long)ptr is meant instead) would yield true there. If,
as per above, in the remaining else we'll have just "break", what would
such a separate check be good for?

Jan



 


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