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Re: [BUG] Potential double-free in Xen dt-overlay attach/remove error path


  • To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 08:31:24 +0200
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  • Cc: Gyujeong Jin <wlsrbwjd7232@xxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 06:31:30 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 09.04.2026 23:28, Gyujeong Jin wrote:
> Hello Team, I was advised to report this issue in this way because
> dt-overlay is currently experimental and not security supported.
> 
> I would like to report a potential memory safety issue in Xen related to
> the Device Tree overlay handling logic.
> ------------------------------
> Problem Description
> 
> A double-free / use-after-free condition may occur in the dt-overlay
> handling path when an overlay attachment fails and the same overlay is
> later removed.
> 
> The issue arises because rangeset objects are freed on the failure path of
> handle_attach_overlay_nodes(), but the corresponding pointers are not
> cleared. Subsequently, handle_remove_overlay_nodes() may operate on these
> stale pointers, leading to a second free.
> Affected Component
> 
>    - Xen ARM
>    - Device Tree overlay subsystem
>    - File: xen/common/device-tree/dt-overlay.c
> 
> Relevant functions:
> 
>    - handle_attach_overlay_nodes()
>    - handle_remove_overlay_nodes()
> 
> Impact
> 
> This issue may lead to:
> 
>    - Double-free of rangeset structures
>    - Use-after-free when accessing stale pointers
>    - Potential hypervisor crash (DoS)
>    - Possible memory corruption depending on allocator behavior
> 
> Given that this occurs in the hypervisor context, the impact could extend
> beyond a simple crash under certain conditions.
> Root Cause
> 
> The issue originates from inconsistent memory management between the attach
> failure path and the remove path.
> 
> In handle_attach_overlay_nodes(), the failure path frees rangeset objects:
> 
> static long handle_attach_overlay_nodes(...)
> {
>     ...
> 
>     if ( entry )
>     {
>         rangeset_destroy(entry->irq_ranges);
>         rangeset_destroy(entry->iomem_ranges);
>     }
> 
>     return rc;
> }
> 
> However, the corresponding pointers (entry->irq_ranges and
> entry->iomem_ranges) are not set to NULL afterward, leaving dangling
> pointers in the entry structure.

Further to this, am I overlooking any check preventing an already created
pair of rangesets to be replaced by new ones, leaking the original pair?

And then there's a Misra issue as well: dt_overlay_domctl() has unreachable
code. Anything other than XEN_DOMCTL_DT_OVERLAY_ATTACH is excluded at the
top, so the "else" body near the bottom is unreachable. (This in turn makes
me wonder: How come there's no "detach"?) Yet then, that's probably pretty
meaningless, as there look to be other issues (Misra and general robustness
ones) as well.

Jan



 


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