[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [PATCH for-4.22] XSM: guard .sysctl() and .readconsole() hooks
- To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 08:49:00 -0400
- Arc-authentication-results: i=1; mx.zohomail.com; dkim=pass header.i=apertussolutions.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; dmarc=pass header.from=<dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Arc-message-signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; t=1781786943; h=Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:Cc:Date:Date:From:From:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Message-ID:References:Subject:Subject:To:To:Message-Id:Reply-To; bh=pILEMyw5gCxqIrCUuBXTTwRSJypX7InxQ7qQLI/bSBI=; b=n7+iJvVogihZrYC0szI1+oSzoD4oFyZMo1576KsLilXxICRA0pLerG5vrnIlizXRVLce0pCFvT92NnOIcSxmXdyi6utANEHxjd8DK0CJZZCaOmaYlywJeoSn/lPr+7xHJWrWtvxdYvbq6MsKTONCIJXzB/FxzoUL7t3om0aDsug=
- Arc-seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1781786943; cv=none; d=zohomail.com; s=zohoarc; b=V35hGhBAXmI4Sb14UhtVaYgWPyiOlSLqndTPTAB069PMWkIJpKxS64hK03c5NwiHS49zgi/ru0QiRdpY65kMhN9b5wSAxoY8l8PY1AzX8PoKupSRBoUGy3wC0ZpXZ+y3Mi5UROKBFkldex+3lVrv0keZEHceji00v32PYlLrp8I=
- Authentication-results: eu.smtp.expurgate.cloud; dkim=pass header.s=zoho header.d=apertussolutions.com header.i="dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" header.h="Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:Cc:References:From:In-Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding"
- Cc: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 12:49:09 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 6/18/26 8:43 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 18.06.2026 14:40, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
On 6/18/26 8:23 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 18.06.2026 14:13, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 18/06/2026 12:32 pm, Jan Beulich wrote:
Leaving the hook pointers in struct xsm_ops when !SYSCTL would lead to
the BUG_ON() in xsm_fixup_ops() triggering for respectively configured
hypervisors.
While moving the #ifdef for the corresponding xsm_*() wrappers, also move
those for xsm_page_offline() (where the hook pointer field already is
suitably guarded).
Fixes: c9eabaa03a68 ("xen/xsm: wrap around xsm_sysctl with CONFIG_SYSCTL")
Fixes: bddd9af6049f ("xen/sysctl: wrap around XEN_SYSCTL_readconsole")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Ugly. We probably ought to see about booting the RANDCONFIG hypervisor
too, which should be able to spot things like this.
This is a regression vs 4.21, so does need including.
Aiui it's a regression vs 4.20, i.e. will want backporting to 4.21.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, although...
Thanks.
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ struct xsm_ops {
#endif
int (*set_target)(struct domain *d, struct domain *e);
int (*domctl)(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl *op);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
int (*sysctl)(int cmd);
int (*readconsole)(uint32_t clear);
+#endif
... this is now the 3rd CONFIG_SYSCTL in xsm_ops.
I know it will grow the diff, but can we see about collecting them into
a single region, and in dummy_ops too? It will shrink the overall
result, and the order of pointers in this ops structure is uninteresting.
I have a far more consolidating patch in the works, which is how I actually
noticed the issue. I'd prefer to keep things as simple as possible here.
Would also be good to clean up flask_ops similarly.
Hence the "far more consolidating" - that'll happen (implicitly) all in one
go.
Perfect. Just wanted to be sure it was on your radar.
v/r,
dps
|
