[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [PATCH] x86/svm: require VMSAVEvirt for nested virt
- To: Stephen Cheng <stephen.cheng@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- From: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 13:48:30 +0200
- Authentication-results: eu.smtp.expurgate.cloud; dkim=pass header.s=selector1 header.d=vates.tech header.i="@vates.tech" header.h="From:Subject:Date:Message-ID:To:Cc:MIME-Version:Content-Type:In-Reply-To:References:Feedback-ID"
- Autocrypt: addr=teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDNBGn5sK8BDACuzSrrTjpVf4ay06OYB6yY0J1PqKffihoNMtrQRZjAHxoAPC7LTBVHV/XO Zw5HJc+9R71z1JV+iYg6z3jPziGKzX8Fj3ZXlzJPmpf1PuETH3KdbvtJT4ny+OGntnJntUoR KRPhTirr6yNeBk/637O3CQXjtqFUPZnko8OI/o1yawIBhJJAWicutjkkUgd28Bh6HV9EIumH tCBgn5/1A/fpm9624MMgYLsA8qjC4XsoovQvFCaO8HEhvfzrrTZHjn/nPeB9SigxIxXW8YaT VqMdqul07o72m3eA2mf+LMu9a04FX/d4wbxBLtELm+1jIrbtyaFZEMOLv/haSiS/Lj3btJH/ EoucejoZ5SH49ksmVAmKOLktOaTQ8b2gEvP7iaKiIiszCCtOSRohr+2GvDsDeLvVZnlR3I+S PhHar7TPKjFz0G3DPNolyjXywNqOAMpomSPi8lSwjAFsxOtQbcck/qRGRSNk4DAmH70pA+89 MXfQXZ3qt1Q01B1+sU0I8xsAEQEAAc0kVGVkZHkgQXN0aWUgPHRlZGR5LmFzdGllQHZhdGVz LnRlY2g+wsENBBMBCAA3FiEEGAIew9LzHY3pdrqtZg+p0QLLz9AFAmn5sK8FCQWjmoACGwME CwkIBwUVCAkKCwUWAgMBAAAKCRBmD6nRAsvP0ID6DACGOktArFbLKHNzuyOVCskwfUZPla6Z pd3GZ8r61SrAKePIr2BnpgPkd0hV3bSRkRLIrgjzR2NRCzfp0x0HfuhcYfAYPR46XHTvjaJE v99sT/vGUG1BZguYDOScSEpgSNaNlYum3RKZbMuROxdK8G+YHccJY8PvWSq2K2yiae2KGiAv 1yjnZxug9/PtDfX8vQFUSg2w1ukRDf50wvDohN1zUQfFtofOP2xCRsDZiHAlQ0pF+aUjXQhP eP3IdpfWc8cyRLXF06Rk46YMYCytweGtGdHcqAfrVthl84129ZPN422k/voW0sm14gjYlGcT UwgnYlFRk2FLq0QeKEDcS0aj3o3EVAQCrayoGzi1pnlIKE3PRGUcUzjGVvzQ/po24gOjwba9 Egr/Wmu3MQlx/7A8zT5QBzF/n+RYdLNQ0Eu6YnUwf0Z1uieqNaon+olyIRFiLb/hCZHO6ekN f5vrm2clHUbQAYaPQebknujoKBo6ZLHg0WM1gZS01Gz+aUpKsUfOwM0EafmwsAEMAKiQiZa3 yQMmc/h3sDbfVHPSiBA4IMI/NAB7IotzPHq1GzCpsoVILAhF/INbWjxJ3DbVf+en3/FvdVZg 2S38xtnth0njNdlVKpyxm054phKjbdoFDwaknWolS4hrddTmetSG5/52AjtmPFtlXAk0NmLv fJnW3seXVQbgM7sW/MNXPP5UKDpkGnLhnvej+GU0s3109sJeXT5ImVdphFs9cvyZyBT9t1Pb Rowv58EgV0zE4hbAeVkULAbxFV5b/ExTjjGVHoX7CVhWxvCiTqCUoXZRkUE9C3FnkzEFRkKb Yu6NCfiHfEyB3Xyg9hfdrRgjMRq907zCof+nDtWxGz1MSEuvTj1g9GZ049Bennqzjc/Q+0ov XoK4jm+Py0FiUGUaA6yhexficjH+kCR/xDbVnWrMhSLB4AuTBT9HjfZI6gk3uYLhoT8Pig4/ eVtR2Q1wZIJsFToR6ofGuyECwFcs+PUXN7fmGRSiPXgjAr/zIUBdW0VWCE3OGPNqtRk2E5s6 IQARAQABwsD8BBgBCAAmFiEEGAIew9LzHY3pdrqtZg+p0QLLz9AFAmn5sLAFCQWjmoACGwwA CgkQZg+p0QLLz9DncQwAg76IehTemLIfrB8T9WIBZrI4kUV7G7a4rjiVoUiHYN5QwhnbZnsa JDlt+Ezoqy/510eo2bCSzvW5xXYPgyjcuOPwgQo1Qp764QxyX6rld2f2RcWkDuBHun55ZWXj by8o21ginPRwruBVYY5rVf3DV1iBu4NurUeHtyFk/dS0XTOQi2wVUb17sW/+ybCEokdVacZG zOqP/OmwHrF8ylXlXnhQq6e3r+J+T8fuoGJelm/CJiMwyP6cEWE8sxVqX/iqwjwUYkuOCpE+ lOWSvdNHgoEkWR0RXBPQjnGmLKbfTl/QDXLk6NP2/r9uxm2HL6Ei3QJKSEdrp+XZaVnk/Off O485NOTKwGOxyWb006cTMh53xPkAJFQu4Tvdj+odsHz88jqw5wfPG0BYWx0I/FspYj7N9kZR 8ULR9nX0LvpzJ/kB4NgHIUt8YtIL6ZSfM2dbF7fKzvx1UqFfvozJZwFzfEieJLXa4nlGgR6D x9fhaZEsniw8/bYgC3igkk5YJiOa
- Cc: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@xxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 11:48:56 +0000
- Feedback-id: default:8631fc262581453bbf619ec5b2062170:Sweego
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
Le 27/07/2026 à 09:20, Stephen Cheng a écrit :
Virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE lets an L1 guest execute VMLOAD and VMSAVE
without intercepts. Without it, Xen has to map the L1-provided VMCB
and re-execute each instruction in L0, complicating security-sensitive
state handling.
Make VMSAVEvirt a hard requirement for nested SVM. Advertise it to
L1, enable it when L1 enables SVM, and remove the nested VMLOAD/VMSAVE
emulation path. Any remaining intercept therefore comes from a guest
which has not enabled SVM and receives #UD.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Stephen Cheng <stephen.cheng@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md | 11 +++
xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c | 3 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/nestedsvm.c | 24 ++++--
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 100 +++---------------------
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.h | 2 -
5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md
b/docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md
index ce168e68e1..798480b259 100644
--- a/docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md
+++ b/docs/designs/nested-svm-cpu-features.md
@@ -109,3 +109,14 @@ leaf 8000000A:edx
Using it in L0 reduces the chance that we'll make some sort of error
in the decode path. And if hardware supports it, it's easy enough
to provide to the L1.
+
+- 15 `VLoadSave` *Virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE*: Require for L0, provide to L1
+
+ Without this feature Xen has to intercept the L1 hypervisor's VMLOAD
+ and VMSAVE instructions and emulate them by re-executing the real
+ instruction on a mapped copy of the L1-supplied VMCB. That path
+ handles a complex, security-sensitive subset of state (the hidden
+ segment descriptors for FS/GS/TR/LDTR plus the SYSCALL/SYSENTER
+ MSRs), so on faithfulness grounds we'd much rather let the hardware
+ do it. When present, the instructions execute natively in the guest
+ without a #VMEXIT, which is both simpler and faster.
I'm not convinced making "VMSAVEvirt" mandatory is a good idea, in
particular, there is a errata (1454 - Processor May Log Unexpected LS
MCE Error When Executing Virtualized VMLOAD or Virtualized VMSAVE) on
Family 19h regarding this feature.
Had you considered improving the current implementation of virtualized
VMLOAD/VMSAVE ? AIUI, the way Xen currently implements this instruction
(by mapping the L1 VMCB then calling vmload/vmsave on it) is more of a
implementation choice than a requirement.
A better (at least, likely safer) way to emulate such instructions (and
not relying on VMSAVEvirt) would be to copy parts of L1 VMCB from/to L0
VMCB and let Xen perform the appropriate vmload/vmsave on its own VMCBs
as usual.
Teddy
Attachment:
OpenPGP_0x660FA9D102CBCFD0.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key
Attachment:
OpenPGP_signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
|