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[Xen-devel] Isolated Device Domain and I/O Spaces in Xen 3


I've already sent this e-mail to xen-users@ but I haven't got any
answer.  So I dare to bug you here, hoping to have more luck.
I may end up in writing some documentation.  Is the wiki easily
accessible to lambda users, or should I contact a more priviledged folk?

I've read thoroughly the document entitled "Safe Hardware Access with
the Xen Virtual Machine Monitor" [1].

- Regarding IDD:
According to slide 49 in [2], Isolated Driver Domain (IDD) have only
been implemented experimentaly but is not used at all in the current
official releases of Xen 3.  Are there any plans about this?

- Regarding I/O Spaces:
Currently, Virtual Block Devices (VBD) and Virtual (Network) Interfaces
(VIF) are the most common way to provide storage and network devices
within Xen PV guests.  It is yet possible to assign exclusively a PCI
device to any one DomU, in which case the DomU's driver talks to the
hardware through the "Safe Hardware Interface" (see figure 1 in [1]),
enforced by I/O Spaces, as described in [1] section 4.  Am I right?

I have a few more questions coming up, if no one cares about me using
this list for such purpose.

Thank you.
Best regards,

[1] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/netos/papers/2004-oasis-ngio.pdf
[2] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/netos/papers/2005-xen-ols.ppt
Jeremie Le Hen
< jeremie at le-hen dot org >< ttz at chchile dot org >

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