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[Xen-devel] Re: [PATCH] HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for



At 10:52 +0100 on 26 Jul (1280141550), Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 05/25/2010 04:49 PM, Tim Deegan wrote:
> > whatever they want, without any Xen hole.  __addr_ok() is therefore
> > always true for such guests.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Sorry for picking up yet another old patch after two months. :)
> 
> Do you have a testcase for this or the other patch in the thread?

I'm afraid not - this was a very old patch that had been gathering dust
at the bottom of the XenServer code base.  Calling
e.g. GNTTABOP_setup_table from inside a HVM guest with the frame_list
argument somewhere in the Xen virtual address space should trigger it,
though.

Cheers,

Tim.

-- 
Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx>
Principal Software Engineer, XenServer Engineering
Citrix Systems UK Ltd.  (Company #02937203, SL9 0BG)

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