[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Re: [PATCH] HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for
At 10:52 +0100 on 26 Jul (1280141550), Paolo Bonzini wrote: > On 05/25/2010 04:49 PM, Tim Deegan wrote: > > whatever they want, without any Xen hole. __addr_ok() is therefore > > always true for such guests. > > > > Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Sorry for picking up yet another old patch after two months. :) > > Do you have a testcase for this or the other patch in the thread? I'm afraid not - this was a very old patch that had been gathering dust at the bottom of the XenServer code base. Calling e.g. GNTTABOP_setup_table from inside a HVM guest with the frame_list argument somewhere in the Xen virtual address space should trigger it, though. Cheers, Tim. -- Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx> Principal Software Engineer, XenServer Engineering Citrix Systems UK Ltd. (Company #02937203, SL9 0BG) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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