[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Security Implications of letting customers use theirown kernel
On Thu, Dec 16, 2010 at 3:51 AM, James Harper <james.harper@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> An area of potential concern is if someone were to build a kernel that >> enabled "No Execute" or "Disable Execution", could that compromise > other >> DomUs? Or would that just leave their DomU vulnerable to running >> malicious code? I assume you mean a kernel that *disabled* No-Execute? No -- Xen should isolate decisions of individual VMs from each other (if the NX bit can be disabled from a PV kernel at all -- I'm not sure about that). That said, developers certainly *aim* to make it the case that a DomU cannot crash or gain access to Xen or Dom0 (or affect other security measures, like NX, in any way). However, as far as I'm aware, there is no testing or auditing done to verify this. And as James H. said, buggy DomU drivers do occasionally crash dom0: and if untrusted code can accidentally crash privileged code, it's often the case that a well-crafted exploit can use the same bug to gain control of the privileged code. -George _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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