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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 06/25] libelf-loader: introduce elf_load_image



>>> On 09.12.11 at 16:23, Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Fri, 2011-12-09 at 15:12 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> >>> On 09.12.11 at 14:40, Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > On Fri, 2011-12-09 at 13:33 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> >> >>> On 09.12.11 at 14:13, <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> >> > Implement a new function, called elf_load_image, to perform the actually
>> >> > copy of the elf image and clearing the padding.
>> >> > The function is implemented as memcpy and memset when the library is
>> >> > built as part of the tools, but it is implemented as copy_to_user and
>> >> > clear_user when built as part of Xen, so that it can be safely called
>> >> > with an HVM style dom0.
>> >> 
>> >> I meant to ask this on the first round already, but apparently forgot:
>> >> What is it that prevents memcpy()/memset() from being used for a
>> >> HVM style Dom0? {clear,copy_to}_user() still expect the guest memory
>> >> to be visible in the hypervisor's virtual address space - how could a
>> >> fault happen here? And if you have to take precautions for a fault,
>> >> shouldn't the calling code check the respective return values?
>> > 
>> > HVM guest memory is not (necessarily) mapped in the hypervisor page
>> > tables, it needs to be mapped on demand. Also the source/target (delete
>> > as appropriate) is a guest virtual address so even if the RAM happened
>> > to be mapped it would (likely) not be in the same place so at a minimum
>> > we need to translate things.
>> > 
>> > This is what copy_{to,from}_user does for an HVM guest even on X86,
>> > where copy_to_user becomes copy_to_user_hvm as appropriate. 
>> 
>> But that's not true - the distinction of hvm vs pv is at the
>> copy_to_guest() layer (raw_copy_to_guest() in the x86 case). So
>> maybe the patch meant to use those interfaces (and then we'd need
>> a clear_guest() too, which should also have been obvious by the fact
>> that the prior patch only introduced clear_user(), but no hvm variant
>> of it)?
> 
> This code is also compiled in userspace which doesn't have copy_to_user
> and in that case we need to use memcpy.

Oh, the need for a distinct case for the user space version of it I
understand (assuming memcpy()/memset() indeed can't be used in the
hypervisor). What I was trying to tell you is that the ..._user()
interfaces don't have the property you're apparently thinking they
have, but instead you'd have to use the ..._guest() ones (I didn't look
at the ARM bits, but if there things are done differently that's likely a
mistake).

Jan


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