[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] VTD/Intremap: Disable Intremap on Chipset 5500/5520/X58 due to errata
On 17/01/13 08:49, Jan Beulich wrote: The patch is just achieving the same effect in Xen as the BIOS workaround recommended in the Intel errata document.On 16.01.13 at 22:09, Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:On 16/01/13 13:57, Jan Beulich wrote:On 16.01.13 at 00:27, Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:+/* 5500/5520/X58 Chipset Interrupt remapping errata, for stepping B-3. + * Fixed in stepping C-2. */ +void __init tylersburg_intremap_quirk(void) +{ + uint32_t bus, device; + uint8_t rev; + + for ( bus = 0; bus < 0x100; bus++ ) + { + /* Match on System Management Registers on Device 20 Function 0 */ + device = pci_conf_read32(0, bus, 20, 0, PCI_VENDOR_ID); + rev = pci_conf_read8(0, bus, 20, 0, PCI_REVISION_ID); + + if ( rev == 0x13 && device == 0x342e8086 ) + { + dprintk(XENLOG_INFO VTDPREFIX, + "Disabling Interrupt Remapping due to Intel 5500/5520/X58 Chipset errata #47, #53\n"); + iommu_intremap = 0;Unless it is guaranteed that no system with this chipset can have x2APIC, I don't think this is right. For one, this happens way too late (namely after x2apic_bsp_setup()). And second, if you move this earlier, such systems with x2APIC pre-enabled won't boot anymore.After some digging, I discovered that the errata affects chipsets (5520,5500,X58) which don't have IOMMU EIM( Extended Interrupt Mode) support. EIM is required to support x2APIC mode and so this means the chipset can't support x2APIC mode and so we should never see a system with x2APIC enabled.Malcolm, I still don't feel well with this making a small security hole bigger (the erratum to me mainly means that with lost interrupts we might observe systems hangs in the worst case, or maybe data corruption if recovery code in the OSes doesn't work well). Whereas with interrupt remapping disabled passthrough becomes inherently insecure (and the host vulnerable to guest attacks). So the question really is whether, rather than disabling interrupt remapping, disabling the IOMMU as a whole wouldn't be the better (read: more secure) workaround. I also don't like the making the security hole bigger but I think we are making an Xen IOMMU support policy change if we disable the IOMMU support when interrupt remapping is not supported. Additionally, I believe that if we make this policy change then we will disable Xen IOMMU support for the Intel 3100/3200 chipset series. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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