Re: [Xen-devel] [oss-security] Xen Security Advisory 57 - libxl allows guest write access to sensitive console related xenstore keys

[Kurt Seifried <kseifried@xxxxxxxxxx>]

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On 06/21/2013 04:07 AM, Xen.org security team wrote:
> Xen Security Advisory XSA-57 version 3
> 
> libxl allows guest write access to sensitive console related
> xenstore keys
> 
> UPDATES IN VERSION 3 ====================
> 
> Public release.
> 
> ISSUE DESCRIPTION =================
> 
> The libxenlight (libxl) toolstack library does not correctly set 
> permissions on xenstore keys relating to paravirtualised and
> emulated serial console devices. This could allow a malicious
> guest administrator to change values in xenstore which the host
> later relies on being implicitly trusted.
> 
> This vulnerability has not yet been assigned a CVE Candidate number
> by MITRE.  We will issue an updated version of XSA-57 when this is 
> available.

Please use CVE-2013-2211 for this issue.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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