[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 5/6] tools/libxl: Allow dom0 to be destroyed
On 03/05/2014 07:02 AM, Ian Jackson wrote: Daniel De Graaf writes ("[PATCH 5/6] tools/libxl: Allow dom0 to be destroyed"):When dom0 is not the hardware domain, it can be destroyed in the same way as any other service domain. Since the hypervisor already prevents a domain from destroying itself, this patch only changes behavior when used in a disaggregated environment.Thanks for this patch. You must be doing something very interesting to want this :-). I have a concern though: I wonder what the error behaviour is in the case where you try to destroy dom0 from itself. Does it get halfway through, breaking the system, and then fail ? Ian. It gets partway though, with the most important (bad) action being the removal of /local/domain/0 from xenstore succeeds. Testing on my development system to destroy a hardware domain (domid 3) from itself: # xl destroy 3 libxl: error: libxl.c:1411:libxl__destroy_domid: xc_domain_pause failed for 3 libxl: error: libxl_device.c:894:device_backend_callback: unable to remove device with path /local/domain/8/backend/vtpm/3/0 libxl: error: libxl.c:1451:devices_destroy_cb: libxl__devices_destroy failed for 3 libxl: error: libxl.c:1456:devices_destroy_cb: xs_rm failed for /vm/3: No such file or directory libxl: error: libxl.c:1471:devices_destroy_cb: xc_domain_destroy failed for 3 libxl: error: libxl.c:1342:domain_destroy_callback: unable to destroy guest with domid 3 libxl: error: libxl.c:1269:domain_destroy_cb: destruction of domain 3 failed destroy failed (rc=-3) # xl li Name ID Mem VCPUs State Time(s) xenstore 1 20 1 -b---- 2.9 vtpm-mgr 2 5 1 -b---- 3.2 (null) 3 489 1 r----- 9308.7 db-server 4 16 1 -b---- 1.7 vtpm-os 5 5 1 -b---- 2.4 ctl 6 4 1 -b---- 0.3 os-ctl 7 5000 1 -b---- 72923.1 vtpm-hw 8 5 1 -b---- 2.3 (The domain with ID 0 was already destroyed during bootup). The system still works after this, although I would expect possible issues to come up if I were to do if{up,down} on a guest or take other actions that cause Linux to read xenstore keys. If a domain were being started up during the destroy, it would become broken. In reply to both this and Jan's earlier email: So this gets deleted without replacement? How is the hardware domain being protected from (accidental or malicious) deletion then? Even if this is being dealt with in the hypervisor, I'd be afraid of the failure resulting in a cryptic error message instead of the very clear one above. The existing check seems to be a useful guard against accidentally breaking parts of a running system. Would requiring a -f flag on the destroy operation to work on domain 0 be preferable? -- Daniel De Graaf National Security Agency _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |