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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 5/9] x86: Temporary disable SMAP to legally access user pages in kernel mode




> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Monday, May 05, 2014 2:57 PM
> To: Wu, Feng
> Cc: andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx; ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx; Dong, Eddie;
> Nakajima, Jun; Tian, Kevin; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: RE: [PATCH v3 5/9] x86: Temporary disable SMAP to legally access user
> pages in kernel mode
> 
> >>> On 05.05.14 at 07:12, <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx]
> >> >>> On 28.04.14 at 05:16, <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
> >> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
> >> > @@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ ENTRY(compat_int80_direct_trap)
> >> >  /* On return only %rbx and %rdx are guaranteed non-clobbered.
> >> */
> >> >  compat_create_bounce_frame:
> >> >          ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_ENABLED
> >> > +        ASM_STAC
> >> >          mov   %fs,%edi
> >> >          testb $2,UREGS_cs+8(%rsp)
> >> >          jz    1f
> >>
> >> I think this should be deferred as much as possible; I even think it is
> >> warranted to put this at two places here (in the two conditional
> >> execution branches) just to avoid doing this too early.
> >
> > I think about this again. Seems ASM_STAC/ASM_CLAC is not needed for
> > compat_create_bounce_frame, since in this chunk of code, it only accesses
> > the pv guest's kernel stack, which should be in ring 1 for 32-bit pv. Is my
> > understanding correct? Thanks a lot!
> 
> This is indeed correct, but at the same time means that we need to
> be aware that SMAP doesn't shield us at all from 32-bit PV guests, i.e.
> is only of limited use.

I am not quite understand about this, why eliminating ASM_STAC/ASM_CAL here
results in " SMAP doesn't shield us at all from 32-bit PV guests "? Thanks a 
lot!

> 
> Jan

Thanks,
Feng

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