[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 08/10] x86: Enable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) for Xen
> -----Original Message----- > From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] > Sent: Monday, May 05, 2014 7:20 PM > To: Wu, Feng > Cc: andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx; ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx; Dong, Eddie; > Nakajima, Jun; Tian, Kevin; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 08/10] x86: Enable Supervisor Mode Access Prevention > (SMAP) for Xen > > >>> On 05.05.14 at 10:23, <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > @@ -1394,6 +1401,13 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long > mbi_p) > > bootstrap_map, cmdline) != 0) > > panic("Could not set up DOM0 guest OS"); > > > > + /* > > + * Enable SMAP after constructing domain0, since there are lots of > accesses to > > + * user pages in construct_dom0(), which is safe at the current stage. > > + */ > > + if ( cpu_has_smap ) > > + set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMAP); > > + > > I should have noticed this on the previous round already - the way > it's being done right now will leave APs with SMAP disabled for an > indeterminate amount of time (until they first reload CR4 from > mmu_cr4_features). Yes, that's a question. In that case, we should move this part to the place where it was. So we should come back to the question about how to handle stac()/clac() in construct_dom0(), right? > > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c > > @@ -1182,11 +1182,12 @@ static int handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault( > > enum pf_type { > > real_fault, > > smep_fault, > > + smap_fault, > > spurious_fault > > }; > > > > static enum pf_type __page_fault_type( > > - unsigned long addr, unsigned int error_code) > > + unsigned long addr, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs) > > I see you followed the constification request here. > > > static enum pf_type spurious_page_fault( > > - unsigned long addr, unsigned int error_code) > > + unsigned long addr, struct cpu_user_regs *regs) > > But why not here? > > Jan Thanks, Feng _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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