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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 06/10] x86: Temporary disable SMAP to legally access user pages in kernel mode



> From: Wu, Feng
> Sent: Wednesday, May 07, 2014 4:20 PM
> 
> Use STAC/CLAC to temporarily disable SMAP to allow legal accesses to
> user pages in kernel mode
> 
> STAC/CLAC is not needed for compat_create_bounce_frame, since in this
> chunk of code, it only accesses the pv guest's kernel stack, which is
> in ring 1 for 32-bit pv guests.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>

> ---
>  xen/arch/x86/traps.c                | 12 ++++++++++++
>  xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c             |  6 ++++++
>  xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S         |  2 ++
>  xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h       |  8 ++++++--
>  xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/system.h |  4 +++-
>  5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> index 45070bb..19c96d5 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
> @@ -3811,6 +3811,18 @@ unsigned long do_get_debugreg(int reg)
> 
>  void asm_domain_crash_synchronous(unsigned long addr)
>  {
> +    /*
> +     * We need clear AC bit here because in entry.S AC is set
> +     * by ASM_STAC to temporarily allow accesses to user pages
> +     * which is prevented by SMAP by default.
> +     *
> +     * For some code paths, where this function is called, clac()
> +     * is not needed, but adding clac() here instead of each place
> +     * asm_domain_crash_synchronous() is called can reduce the code
> +     * redundancy, and it is harmless as well.
> +     */
> +    clac();
> +
>      if ( addr == 0 )
>          addr = this_cpu(last_extable_addr);
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c b/xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c
> index b79202b..4cc78f5 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/usercopy.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_to_user_ll(void __user *to, const
> void *from, unsigned n)
>  {
>      unsigned long __d0, __d1, __d2, __n = n;
> 
> +    stac();
>      asm volatile (
>          "    cmp  $"STR(2*BYTES_PER_LONG-1)",%0\n"
>          "    jbe  1f\n"
> @@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_to_user_ll(void __user *to, const
> void *from, unsigned n)
>          : "=&c" (__n), "=&D" (__d0), "=&S" (__d1), "=&r" (__d2)
>          : "0" (__n), "1" (to), "2" (from), "3" (__n)
>          : "memory" );
> +    clac();
> 
>      return __n;
>  }
> @@ -51,6 +53,7 @@ __copy_from_user_ll(void *to, const void __user *from,
> unsigned n)
>  {
>      unsigned long __d0, __d1, __d2, __n = n;
> 
> +    stac();
>      asm volatile (
>          "    cmp  $"STR(2*BYTES_PER_LONG-1)",%0\n"
>          "    jbe  1f\n"
> @@ -85,6 +88,7 @@ __copy_from_user_ll(void *to, const void __user *from,
> unsigned n)
>          : "=&c" (__n), "=&D" (__d0), "=&S" (__d1), "=&r" (__d2)
>          : "0" (__n), "1" (to), "2" (from), "3" (__n)
>          : "memory" );
> +    clac();
> 
>      return __n;
>  }
> @@ -113,6 +117,7 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from,
> unsigned n)
>  #define __do_clear_user(addr,size)                                   \
>  do {                                                                 \
>       long __d0;                                                      \
> +     stac();                                                         \
>       __asm__ __volatile__(                                           \
>               "0:     rep; stosl\n"                                   \
>               "       movl %2,%0\n"                                   \
> @@ -126,6 +131,7 @@ do {                                                      
>                 \
>               _ASM_EXTABLE(1b,2b)                                     \
>               : "=&c"(size), "=&D" (__d0)                             \
>               : "r"(size & 3), "0"(size / 4), "1"((long)addr), "a"(0));       
> \
> +     clac();                                                         \
>  } while (0)
> 
>  /**
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
> index 205251d..dce6eb5 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
> @@ -379,6 +379,7 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(create_bounce_frame_bad_sp)
>          movb  TRAPBOUNCE_flags(%rdx),%cl
>          subq  $40,%rsi
>          movq  UREGS_ss+8(%rsp),%rax
> +        ASM_STAC
>  .Lft2:  movq  %rax,32(%rsi)             # SS
>          movq  UREGS_rsp+8(%rsp),%rax
>  .Lft3:  movq  %rax,24(%rsi)             # RSP
> @@ -423,6 +424,7 @@ UNLIKELY_END(bounce_failsafe)
>  .Lft12: movq  %rax,8(%rsi)              # R11
>          movq  UREGS_rcx+8(%rsp),%rax
>  .Lft13: movq  %rax,(%rsi)               # RCX
> +        ASM_CLAC
>          /* Rewrite our stack frame and return to guest-OS mode. */
>          /* IA32 Ref. Vol. 3: TF, VM, RF and NT flags are cleared on trap. */
>          /* Also clear AC: alignment checks shouldn't trigger in kernel mode.
> */
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
> index 88b4ba2..92bc322 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/uaccess.h
> @@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
>   * aliasing issues.
>   */
>  #define __put_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret)    \
> +     stac();                                                         \
>       __asm__ __volatile__(                                           \
>               "1:     mov"itype" %"rtype"1,%2\n"                      \
>               "2:\n"                                                  \
> @@ -155,9 +156,11 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
>               ".previous\n"                                           \
>               _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b)                                    \
>               : "=r"(err)                                             \
> -             : ltype (x), "m"(__m(addr)), "i"(errret), "0"(err))
> +             : ltype (x), "m"(__m(addr)), "i"(errret), "0"(err));    \
> +     clac();
> 
>  #define __get_user_asm(x, addr, err, itype, rtype, ltype, errret)    \
> +     stac();                                                         \
>       __asm__ __volatile__(                                           \
>               "1:     mov"itype" %2,%"rtype"1\n"                      \
>               "2:\n"                                                  \
> @@ -168,7 +171,8 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
>               ".previous\n"                                           \
>               _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b)                                    \
>               : "=r"(err), ltype (x)                                  \
> -             : "m"(__m(addr)), "i"(errret), "0"(err))
> +             : "m"(__m(addr)), "i"(errret), "0"(err));               \
> +     clac();
> 
>  /**
>   * __copy_to_user: - Copy a block of data into user space, with less checking
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/system.h
> b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/system.h
> index 20f038b..b6341ad1 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/system.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/system.h
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>   * is the same as the initial value of _o then _n is written to location _p.
>   */
>  #define __cmpxchg_user(_p,_o,_n,_isuff,_oppre,_regtype)
> \
> +    stac();
> \
>      asm volatile
> (                                                      \
>          "1: lock; cmpxchg"_isuff" %"_oppre"2,%3\n"
> \
>          "2:\n"
> \
> @@ -22,7 +23,8 @@
>          _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b)
> \
>          : "=a" (_o), "=r" (_rc)
> \
>          : _regtype (_n), "m" (*__xg((volatile void *)_p)), "0" (_o), "1" (0) 
> \
> -        : "memory");
> +        : "memory");
> \
> +    clac();
> 
>  #define cmpxchg_user(_p,_o,_n)
> \
> 
> ({
>         \
> --
> 1.8.3.1


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